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Abstract
The thesis examines the nature of the legal interests in emissions
allowances (emissions entitlements), the tradable instruments created
by the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The
potential categorisation of emissions entitlements as private property
impacts significantly on the environmental success of the EU ETS
and, more widely, on the conceptualisation and functionality of prop-
erty rights. The current silence of the EU ETS on the nature of the
entitlements has caused problems in the emissions market, as illus-
trated by a case study and an analysis of the commercial contracts
constituting this market. In turn, the public policy goals of the EU
ETS depend on the success of the private market. The thesis puts
forward an analytical framework designed to articulate a construction
of emissions entitlements that reconciles the multiple and potentially
conflicting goals of the regime. The framework consists of two parts.
The first part examines legal theories of property and establishes that
the elements required to constitute a property right are exclusion,
transfer and use. The second part examines three legislatively cre-
ated rights regimes, namely intellectual property rights, milk quotas
and spectrum rights, which are compared to emissions entitlements
from the viewpoint of the identified requisite elements1. This exer-
cise further reveals instructive insights into the evolutionary nature of
property rights in a regulatory environment. For private property to
act as an effective tool of regulation, it needs to be specifically concep-
tualised as instrumental property, a new category which is put forward
by the thesis. The notion of instrumental property is defined by the
public policy goals of the regulatory regime and also by the particu-
lar context in which the rights operate. Instrumental property must
necessarily be balanced against extraneous public or private interests
which the law regards as deserving of protection.
1See S. Manea. “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emis-
sions Trading System”. In: Transnational Environmental Law 1 (2012), pp. 303–323, part
5.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In an increasingly urgent environmental situation, the Emissions
Trading System is not delivering emissions cuts. Policymakers
can make fundamental changes to the way the EU ETS [European
Union Emissions Trading System] works: excluding offsetting,
stopping free permits to polluters, setting a much tighter cap,
and preventing the use of banked permits from earlier phases of
the scheme. But they must also consider a return to other impor-
tant policy mechanisms which are currently being overshadowed
by carbon trading, such as budgetary reform, tougher renewable
and energy saving targets, CO2 taxation, efficiency standards and
national legislation. Only by doing so can Europe bring down its
emissions in line with scientific evidence and historical responsi-
bility.
(Friends of the Earth Europe)1
This damning assessment labels the EU’s flagship emissions reducing pro-
gramme to fight climate change as “not fit for purpose”2. Friends of the
Earth are not alone in highlighting the failure of the EU ETS to deliver
1The EU Emissions Trading System: failing to deliver. Friends of the Earth Europe,
2010. url: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/0005/registered/98255533
93-31_friends_of_the_earth_europe_en.pdf, p. 9.
2Ibid., p. 9.
10
significant levels of emissions abatement that can make a real difference to
climate change policy. In a 2010 report, Sandbag ominously warned that,
in the absence of considerable improvements, the EU ETS risked “becoming
an emissions trap and an increasingly redundant tool in European climate
policy”3. Improvements could include legislative provisions “to correct caps
in light of exogenous emissions reductions such as those brought about by
the recession”4. An additional recommendation was that companies be incen-
tivised by way of tax advantages to cancel unused emissions allowances (also
called emissions permits), the tradable regulatory instruments created by the
EU ETS. The following statement, made in the context of cancellation, is
particularly interesting:
Once companies are given a legal property right to an emissions
permit the vast majority of permits in circulation can then only
be removed through voluntary cancellation5. [emphasis added]
This statement gives rise to important and (so far) unanswered questions.
Has EU environmental policy (perhaps inadvertently) created private prop-
erty rights in regulatory instruments? If so, what are the wider implications
of this legal status for the conceptualisation and functionality of property
rights?
These two lines of enquiry form the starting point of the thesis. Thus
far, neither issue has been satisfactorily addressed by either policymakers
or scholarship. These issues matter for two distinct reasons. Firstly, their
resolution can determine the success or demise of the EU ETS as a valuable
weapon in the regional and global fight against climate change and an impor-
tant helping hand for the Union in making the transition to a progressively
greener, less fossil fuel-dependent economy. The success (or failure) of the
EU ETS as a market-based instrument of environmental regulation will also
act as a benchmark for assessing the likelihood of success of rapidly prolif-
erating tradable permit regimes in other jurisdictions. Secondly, the lines
3Cap or trap? How the EU ETS risks locking-in carbon emissions. Sandbag, 2010. url:
http://www.sandbag.org.uk/site_media/pdfs/reports/caportrap.pdf, p. 11.
4Ibid., pp. 11, 48-49.
5Ibid., p. 51.
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of enquiry put forward by the thesis reveal important findings about the
evolutionary nature of property rights in a regulatory environment. Specif-
ically, the lines of enquiry unveil the complexity of crafting an analytical
construction of these rights that can achieve multiple and potentially con-
flicting public policy goals and adapt to contexts which may even require
taking into consideration interests other than such goals.
The EU ETS, principally through the EU ETS Directive6, has created
a market in emissions allowances and emissions-based financial instruments
which are freely tradable between a wide range of participants, both regu-
lated (for instance industrial installations) and non-regulated (such as banks,
hedge funds and other financial institutions, and even individuals)7. The EU
ETS aims to reduce CO2 emissions by 21% from 2005 levels by 2021, and is
divided in three Phases: Phase I (2005-2007), Phase II (2008-2012) and Phase
III (2013-2020). Each Phase sees the imposition of a gradually reducing total
cap on EU-wide emissions. Within the respective caps, emissions allowances
can be traded, so that regulated entities can achieve the mandated reductions
at the lowest possible cost, whether by investing in new technologies to abate
emissions, or purchasing more allowances in the market8. The EU ETS there-
fore combines a command and control mode of regulation (as embodied by
the cap) with a market-based mechanism of tradable instruments to achieve
the set levels of emissions reductions in the most cost-efficient manner.
As a system of regulation which employs tradable instruments to achieve
its public policy goals, emissions trading in general has emerged as a persua-
sive solution to the global problem of climate change. It has been persua-
sively argued that the flexibility of the trading element and its translatability
across different legal systems has equipped emissions trading with significant
advantages in the climate change sphere over available alternatives, such
as standards-based regulation or taxation mechanisms9. On the other hand,
6Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32.
7Ibid., arts. 12(1), 19(2).
8The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). European Commission Climate Action.
url: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm.
9J. Baert Wiener. “Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Con-
12
significant areas of contention exist in respect of the use of tradable permit
regimes to counteract air pollution. For instance, the objectives pursued by
this mechanism have been criticised, in that it only aims for a given emis-
sions target to be reached at the lowest possible cost, rather than to reduce
emissions per se10. Moreover, it has been remarked that the supposed in-
novatory effect of tradable permit regimes may not be what it seems, since
such regimes may in fact stifle innovation by effectively compelling firms to
keep reducing emissions at the facilities with the lowest abatement costs11.
The fairness of tradable permit regimes has also been questioned. They may
disadvantage developing countries by disincentivising them from improving
their industries, and instead encourage them to maintain more rudimentary,
low-emission industries and sell permits to developed countries, which in turn
can continue to pollute and increase their profits12.
The critiques outlined above highlight the existence of a very legitimate
and important debate about the desirability of tradable permit regimes from
an environmental and public policy perspective. The thesis certainly does
not aim to underplay the relevance of this debate, but it does start from the
premise that such a regime has been chosen as the regulatory path in the EU
(as well as in other jurisdictions which are soon to follow suit). The aim of
the thesis is to offer a means of improving the workability of the EU ETS as
it is currently conceptualised, namely as an economically efficient regulatory
regime of permits which can be freely traded by any market participants,
whether or not regulated by the EU ETS. The thesis follows the view that
trading beyond the purpose of compliance within the EU ETS is pivotal
to maintaining market viability and thereby achieving the set environmen-
text”. In: Yale Law Journal 108 (1999), pp. 677–800, carries out a comprehensive compara-
tive analysis; D. Dudek and J. Palmisano. “Emissions Trading: Why Is This Thoroughbred
Hobbled?” In: Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 13 (1988), pp. 217–256, at 219,
discusses the suitability of emissions trading to address major environmental problems
such as climate change.
10R. Baldwin. “Regulation Lite: The Rise of Emissions Trading”. In: Regulation and
Governance 2 (2008), pp. 193–215, at 197.
11D. Driesen. “Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program? Replacing the
Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy”. In: Washington and Lee Law
Review 55 (1998), pp. 289–350, at 332-336.
12Baldwin, “Regulation Lite: The Rise of Emissions Trading”, at 202-203.
13
tal goals. The thesis argues that the achievement of the environmental goals
pursued by a tradable permit regime such as the EU ETS depends on the con-
tinued viability of the market in emissions allowances. Such viability requires
liquidity in the market, which, to exist, in turn requires a sufficient number
of trading parties. “A functional market is first and foremost a liquid market,
with the following requirements: continuous sufficient supply and demand;
enough market parties; and minimal market restrictions...”13. In particular,
“[e]nsuring a deep market with multiple participants (in particular, beyond
those solely with compliance obligations) [enhances] the likelihood that the
price signal generated by trading is a reliable indicator for investment deci-
sions”14. Broad participation in the allowance market, meaning the inclusion
of participants trading for investment and speculatory purposes rather than
for compliance reasons, is said to assist with minimising the cost of complying
with the emissions cap by increasing liquidity and thereby lowering trading
costs for participants. “In a more liquid market, regulated firms that wanted
to buy or sell allowances, particularly in large numbers, could more quickly
identify another party with whom to trade without affecting the market price
of allowances”15. An experiment-based analysis has shown that non-regulated
entities (meaning entities not subject to environmental regulation such the
EU ETS) trading in the emissions market “directly enhance the liquidity of
the permit market, thereby favoring investments in low pollution-emitting
technologies”16.
13C. de Jong and K. Walet. “Compliance Strategies in the US Acid Rain Program”. In:
A Guide to Emissions Trading: Risk Management and Business Implications. Ed. by C.
de Jong and K. Walet. London: Risk Books, 2004, pp. 201–218, at 204.
14A. Hedges. “The Secondary Market for Emissions Trading: Balancing Market De-
sign and Market Based Transaction Norms”. In: Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto,
Copenhagen and Beyond. Ed. by D. Freestone and C. Streck. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009, pp. 310–334, at 311.
15T. Dinan and A. Stocking. “U.S. Cap-and-Trade Markets: Constraining Participants,
Transactions, and Prices”. In: Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 6 (2012),
pp. 169–189, at 172.
16L. Taschini M. Chesney and M. Wang. Regulated and Non-Regulated Companies, Tech-
nology Adoption in Experimental Markets for Emission Permits, and Options Contracts.
Centre for Climate Change Economics, Policy, Working Paper No. 51; Grantham Research
Institute on Climate Change, and the Environment, Working Paper No. 41, 2011. url:
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/37577/1/Regulated_and_non-regulated_companies%
2C _ technology _ adoption _ in _ experimental _ markets _ for _ emission _ permits %
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The value of the EU emissions market reached €106 billion in 2011, with
transaction volumes of 7.9 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent17. Despite this
level of growth, emissions prices have fallen dramatically, as evidenced by
the lowest point (below €6) in 201218. The fall in price has been caused by
a surplus of allowances in the market. The reasons for the surplus are an
over-allocation of emissions allowances to regulated installations in Phase I of
the EU ETS19 and the permitted carry-over of unused allowances from Phase
II to Phase III20, coupled with a general slowdown in production (and thus
a corresponding reduction in emissions) caused by the worldwide economic
crisis21. The price depression in the market seriously threatens the environ-
mental credentials of the EU ETS as an effective tool of climate change
policy in the EU’s drive towards a low-carbon economy, as the following part
demonstrates. In October 2012 the UK Energy Secretary called for the can-
cellation of over 1 billion allowances created under the EU ETS. The hope
was that such a move would boost the flagging emissions price and resurrect
the emissions market22.
But what of the “legal property right” in emissions allowances? If such a
right exists, can allowances simply be cancelled under the current legal frame-
work of the EU ETS? If the legal framework requires amendment before the
regulator can cancel valid allowances in the market, what boundaries (if in-
deed any) should be placed on this discretion? The UK’s position serves to
2C_and_options_contracts%28lsero%29.pdf, especially at p. 4 and pp. 13-16.
17State and Trends of the Carbon Market. World Bank, 2012. url: http://siter
esources.worldbank.org/INTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/State_and_Trends_201
2_Web_Optimized_19035_Cvr&Txt_LR.pdf, pp. 9-10.
18“UK proposes canceling EU CO2 allowances to raise carbon price”. In: Bloomberg
News. 8 October 2012.
19M. Pohlmann. “The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme”. In: Legal Aspects
of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and Beyond. Ed. by D. Freestone and C. Streck.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 336–349, at 353; D. Ellerman and B. Buchner.
“The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results”.
In: Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 1 (2007), pp. 66–87, at 69-70.
20Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and as-
sessing the risk of carbon leakage. COM(2010)265 final. European Commission Communi-
cation. 2010. url: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:
2010:0265:FIN:en:PDF, pp. 3-4.
21State and Trends of the Carbon Market, p. 9.
22“UK proposes canceling EU CO2 allowances to raise carbon price”.
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illustrate a key tension between certainty in the emissions market and flexi-
bility in regulation. Excessive regulatory intervention23 to reduce supply in a
private market can be both counterproductive and destabilising: compliance
with the EU ETS will become more expensive as emissions prices rise at a
time of economic difficulty, and increased market volatility decreases investor
confidence. On the other hand, a continued substandard emissions price dis-
courages investment in green technologies and significantly undermines the
EU’s low-carbon trajectory.
The thesis explores the role of property rights in managing the tension of
market certainty versus regulatory flexibility in the market-based system of
regulation that is the EU ETS. It is crucial to determine whether property
rights can successfully resolve this tension, and, if this is the case, exactly
what type of property right is required, and with what characteristics and
limitations. The thesis posits that two elements are required to strike the
correct balance between the two variables of market certainty and regulatory
flexibility, so that the EU ETS can achieve its environmental goals. The two
requisite elements are an analytical construction of the legal interests created
in emissions allowances (emissions entitlements), and an understanding of the
public policy goals that the EU ETS seeks to achieve. The two elements are
themselves interlinked: the success of the public policy goals is dependent
on the analytical construction of emissions entitlements24. Without such a
construction, it is contended that the EU ETS as an effective tool of environ-
mental policy will ultimately fail because it will not be able to accommodate
its various and potentially conflicting goals.
Providing a construction of emissions entitlements in order to enable the
23K. Gray. “Can Environmental Regulation Constitute a Taking of Property at Com-
mon Law?” In: Environmental and Planning Law Journal 24 (2007), pp. 161–181. url:
http://www.trin.cam.ac.uk/show.php?dowid=865, at 3, 7, highlights the two meanings
of regulatory intervention, namely the importance of the distinction between the possi-
bility that emissions allowances may be cancelled or otherwise expropriated, and mere
regulation of use. The thesis is specifically concerned with the former, not the latter. The
distinction is relevant, for instance, to the question as to whether or not compensation is
payable. Mere regulatory interference with use would generally not attract compensation,
but expropriation would.
24Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, especially at 323, part 2.
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achievement of environmental goals is important beyond the confines of the
case study provided by the EU ETS. Market-based regulation in the shape of
tradable permit regimes is growing in popularity, particularly in the context
of environmental and conservation policy. An Australian emissions trading
scheme is set to launch in 201525, preceded by a similar regulatory system in
the US state of California in 201326. New Zealand has been considering the
idea of a tradable deforestation permit regime to regulate land use27. Further
afield, suggestions have been made for the introduction of tradable whale
catch quotas to reduce the numbers killed28. The thesis therefore speaks,
firstly, to the environmental community, to regulators, economists, scien-
tists, lawyers and campaigners: to all those who are preoccupied with the
effectiveness of environmental policy.
Since the analytical construction of emissions entitlements affects the en-
vironmental success of the EU ETS, this construction necessarily involves
drawing a dividing line between regulatory flexibility (as to the scope of in-
tervention in the emissions market) and market certainty (in the shape of
the protection afforded to traders). The connection between the analytical
construction of entitlements and the success of regulatory systems of tradable
permits has wider implications which provide rich opportunities for future re-
search beyond the focus of the thesis. How do we craft new, effective tradable
permit regimes which can achieve ambitious public policy goals? Is it always
possible to define the resulting entitlements in such a way as to enable the
25Clean energy legislation. Australian Government Department of Climate Change and
Energy Efficiency. url: http://climatechange.gov.au/government/clean-energy-fu
ture/legislation.aspx.
26Cap-and-Trade Program. California Environmental Protection Agency Air Resources
Board. url: http://arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm.
27Design Options for A Tradeable Deforestation Permit Regime: A supplementary
discussion document for the Sustainable Land Management and Climate Change Con-
sultation. New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 2006. url: http :
//www.mpi.govt.nz/news-resources/publications.aspx?title=Design%20Options%
20for%20a%20Tradeable%20Deforestation%20Permit%20Regime, p. 6, “Under a trade-
able permit regime any party that deforested an area of land would be required to relin-
quish a suitable number of permits. . . , or make a cash payment to cover the cost of the
carbon released”.
28C. Costello, S. Gaines, and L. Gerber. “Conservation Science: A Market Approach to
Saving the Whales”. In: Nature 481 (2012), pp. 139–140.
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achievement of these goals? Or are there circumstances where other types
of regulation are to be preferred? Should we follow the advice to consider
returning to “other important policy mechanisms” which have been sidelined
by the recent fashion for tradability – such as taxation or standards-based
regulation29 ? And, if alternative modes of regulation may be more appropri-
ate, is there any possibility of combining them with tradable permit regimes
in order to harness as many advantages as possible to achieve the public
policy goal? These questions offer a few examples of available avenues which
merit further investigation.
Secondly, the thesis speaks to property lawyers and theorists. The ex-
ercise of crafting an analytical construction of emissions entitlements in a
way that can effectively achieve public policy goals reveals new, highly in-
structive insights into the complexity and fragmentation of property rights.
The entitlements created by market-based regulatory systems of tradable
instruments test the boundaries of property in ways that have not been com-
prehensively and comparatively analysed to date. The thesis gathers together
and compares selected regimes that exemplify an instructive variety of prop-
erty rights, and can offer useful parallels with emissions entitlements. In the
first instance, this exercise helps to articulate a construction of emissions
entitlements. It also more generally demonstrates the fluidity of the legal
interests created by regulatory regimes to achieve public policy goals. A
generic definition of these kinds of legal interests as private property rights
does not accurately portray their precise scope and contents. Consequently,
in the UK for example, the judgment in Armstrong v. Winnington30, which
holds that emissions entitlements represent private property, is not the end
of the matter, and serves to highlight the continued importance of determin-
ing specifically what sort of property these entitlements represent, and with
what contents31. Legal interests created for regulatory purposes emerge as
a special category of private property, whose characteristics are shaped by
the regulatory goal which they have been created to pursue. Instead, the
29The EU Emissions Trading System: failing to deliver , p. 9.
30Armstrong DLW GmbH v. Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC (Ch) 10, discussed
in more detail in chapter 3.5.
31See further chapter 4.1.
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kind of analysis that is better suited to defining such legal interests neces-
sarily involves a type-by-type examination of the different contexts where
the interests are of relevance. How are the interests to be treated in insol-
vency? Can they form the subject of a trust? Can security rights be created
therein, and can such rights be adequately enforced and protected? These
are examples of questions which are particularly relevant in the context of
commercially valuable tradable instruments created for a regulatory purpose.
This incremental approach serves to comprehensively elicit the characteris-
tics of the entitlements in situations where a generic private property rights
categorisation, without further elaboration, would be overly simplistic.
This kind of pragmatic approach also illustrates the changing nature of
property in the regulatory state, where its subordination to the achievement
of public policy goals has the potential to disrupt the traditional concep-
tualisation and functionality of property rights. The rights-based analysis
of entitlements created by tradable permit regimes put forward by the the-
sis illustrates the dramatic transformation of property beyond the limited
conceptualisation customarily employed by lawyers to date. Property in law
generally means private property32. In addition, some commentators speak of
the new category of “regulatory property”33, also called “hybrid property”34
32Unless it is expressly stated that we are referring to, for instance, state property,
or public property which is accessible to all. For the purposes of the thesis, property
is taken to mean private property, unless specified otherwise. This is because emissions
entitlements cannot be regarded as either state or public property, due to their being held
and traded in a private market.
33K. Anttonen, M. Mehling, and K. Upston-Hooper. “Breathing Life into the Carbon
Market: Legal Frameworks of Emissions Trading in Europe”. In: European Environmental
Law Review 16 (2007), pp. 96–113, at 97; B. Yandle and A. Morriss. “The Technologies
of Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons”.
In: Ecology Law Quarterly 28 (2002), pp. 123–168, at 129; B. Yandle. “Grasping for the
Heavens: 3-D Property Rights and the Global Commons”. In: Duke Environmental Law
and Policy Forum 10 (1999), pp. 13–44; Wiener, “Global Environmental Regulation:
Instrument Choice in Legal Context”, at 800.
34C. Rose. “Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled
Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property Regimes”. In: Duke
Environmental Law and Policy Forum 10 (1999), pp. 45–72, especially at 51-52; C. Rose.
“The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and
Ecosystems”. In: Minnesota Law Review 83 (1998), pp. 129–182, especially at 164-166; R.
Stewart. “Privprop, Regprop, and Beyond”. In: Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy
13 (1990), pp. 91–96, especially at 93-94.
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or “statutory property”35, whose primary function is not the protection of
right holders (which traditional private property does), but rather, in effect,
the protection of the object of property itself. Emissions entitlements are
ultimately intended to protect a certain composition of the atmosphere. The
entitlements are not in the atmosphere itself, but are rights to pollute, whose
aim is to safeguard the atmosphere36.
It is submitted that the notion of regulatory property merely scratches
the surface of analysing the nature and operation of entitlements created for
public policy purposes. The goals of the EU ETS are to achieve cost-effective
emissions reductions to levels scientifically required to tackle climate change
and to support the Union-wide transition to a low-carbon economy. At the
same time, the EU ETS needs to maintain the viability of the private emis-
sions market, which is both a self-standing goal and the means of achieving
the aforementioned public policy objectives37. The analytical construction
of emissions entitlements that can best achieve these goals requires more
than a purely generic conceptualisation of property. Instead, it requires an
analysis of the nature of property according to the various contexts in which
it appears. The thesis therefore introduces the new notion of instrumen-
tal property, which has been created to reconcile and achieve multiple and
potentially conflicting regulatory goals, and whose characteristics shift ac-
cording to the different contexts in which it operates. In a wider sense, the
thesis opens possibilities for future exploration of other types of instrumen-
tal property. The implications of the proposed analytical exercise could well
stretch the boundaries of property even further than emissions entitlements
have done already.
The thesis thus weaves together the two themes: the need to craft an
analytical construction of legal interests which can achieve the public policy
goals of a regulatory regime, and the evolutionary nature of property rights
35K. Gray. “Regulatory Property and the Jurisprudence of Quasi-Public Trust”. In:
Sydney Law Review 32 (2010), pp. 221–241.
36M. Wemaere, C. Streck, and T. Chagas. “Legal Ownership and Nature of Kyoto Units
and EU Allowances”. In: Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and Beyond.
Ed. by D. Freestone and C. Streck. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 35–58, at
39.
37The goals of the EU ETS are discussed in further detail in this chapter and the next.
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in a regulatory environment which has been unveiled by this exercise. The
analytical framework devised by the thesis for emissions entitlements is in-
tended to serve as a blueprint for deciding how to treat things of value for
which we do not yet have a legal construction, where those things of value
have been created for a regulatory purpose. The laissez-faire approach taken
by emissions trading, whereby the EU ETS has created allowances and left
them to be defined and valued by the private market, extends to an absence
of a central construction of emissions entitlements38. This gap is problematic,
since the environmental success of the EU ETS is premised on the success
of the emissions market, which in turn depends on the analytical construc-
tion of emissions entitlements, for reasons which are discussed in more depth
below.
1.1 Emissions trading in neoclassical economic
theory and beyond
To conceptualise and legitimate tradable permit regimes, commentators typ-
ically rely on economic theory. Environmental economics has provided the
dominant model for crafting regulatory approaches to environmental pro-
tection since the 1960s39. This branch of economics has its foundations in
the “standard paradigm of neoclassical economics”40, as it applies the “stan-
dard economic tool kit” to environmental problems41. The notion of tradable
permits as instruments of regulation was notably articulated by Coase in
1960. He posited that the effects of economic actors on one another were
38Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, at 303-304, 306, part 3.
39R. Hahn. “The Impact of Economics on Environmental Policy”. In: Journal of En-
vironmental Economics and Management 39 (2000), pp. 375–399, at 375-376, notes the
influence of environmental economics in the sphere of environmental regulation.
40T. Tietenberg and L. Lewis. Environmental and Natural Resource Economics. Boston:
Pearson/Addison Wesley, 2009, p. 7.
41K. Turner, C. Perrings, and C. Folke. “Ecological Economics: Paradigm or Perspec-
tive”. In: The Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment (1996).
url: http://www.cserge.ac.uk/sites/default/files/gec_1995_17.pdf, p. 1.
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reciprocal42, and consequently argued that interparty bargaining in a market
context (as opposed to centralised regulation) could achieve the most efficient
outcome in addressing unwanted effects such as environmental degradation43.
Coase’s approach was subsequently employed by commentators such as
Crocker44, Dales45, Montgomery46, and Baumol and Oates47 to apply the
notion of tradable permits to environmental regulation. Regulated entities
trade such permits as they see most economically viable, so that their produc-
tion costs are kept as low as possible while the overall goals (such as emissions
targets) set by public authorities are complied with. This system creates an
incentive to trade the permits until the marginal costs of abatement are equal
to the market price of the permits. If costs exceed price, more permits are
bought. If costs are lower than price, the allowances can be sold and the
proceeds can be used for abatement48. On the basis of the Coasean model,
efficiency in the allocation and use of resources is the primary goal of tradable
permit regimes. In neoclassical economic theory, the success of such mecha-
nisms in achieving the regulatory goal is measured according to the extent to
which they lower the costs of achieving this goal. Emissions trading reduces
the costs of reducing emissions by allowing polluters to choose between the
cheaper of two possible avenues of action49. The choice is between abating
42R. Coase. “The Problem of Social Cost”. In: Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960),
pp. 1–44, at 1-2, 28-42.
43Ibid., at 2-8.
44T. Crocker. “The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems”. In: The
Economics of Air Pollution. Ed. by H. Wolozin. New York: W. W. Norton, 1966, pp. 61–
86.
45J. Dales. Pollution, Property and Prices. Toronto: University Press, 1968.
46W. Montgomery. “Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs”. In:
Journal of Economic Theory 5 (1972), pp. 395–418.
47W. Baumol and W. Oates. “The Use of Standards and Prices for Protection of the
Environment”. In: Swedish Journal of Economics 73 (1971), pp. 42–54, propose the use of
a pollution tax, but this instrument would be crafted so as to induce polluters to reduce
emissions to a certain, pre-set level.
48R. Turner, D. Pearce, and I. Bateman. Environmental Economics: An Elementary
Introduction. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1994, pp. 278-279.
49T. Tietenberg. Emissions Trading: Principles and Practice. Washington, DC: Re-
sources for the Future, 2006, especially chapter 2; R. Stavins. “What Can We Learn from
the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading”. In: The Journal of
Economic Perspectives 12 (1998), pp. 69–88, at 78-79, 84-85; R. Stewart. “United States
Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm”. In: Journal of Law and Commerce 15
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emissions by, for instance, developing greener technologies, and buying ad-
ditional emissions allowances in the market if productivity needs require the
maintenance or increase of emissions levels.
Despite the dominance of the neoclassical economic model in the sphere of
environmental protection regulation, this model exhibits two significant types
of problem: it does not provide a comprehensive analytical construction of
emissions entitlements, and it does not take into account certain social and
ethical aspects which are crucial to how the public policy goals of regulatory
systems are crafted.
1.1.1 The nature of emissions entitlements in the neo-
classical economic model
Firstly, the neoclassical economic model cannot assist with articulating an an-
alytical construction of the entitlements created by tradable permit regimes.
This is principally due to certain assumptions regarding the nature of rights
in valuable resources that the model relies on. A tradable permit has been
referred to general terms as “a transferable right to a common pool resource”,
or, in narrower terms, as “a transferable right to emit a substance that can
create pollution”50. Environmental economists generally view this entitle-
ment as a property right51. In economic theory, certainty in the understand-
ing of entitlements is a recognised prerequisite for a viable market, and well-
delineated property rights are considered fundamental to market exchange52.
(1996), pp. 585–596; R. Stewart. “Models for Environmental Regulation: Central Plan-
ning Versus Market-Based Approaches”. In: Boston College Environmental Affairs Review
19 (1992), pp. 547–562, especially at 552-555, 558-559; C. Sunstein. “Administrative Sub-
stance”. In: Duke Law Journal 1991 (1991), pp. 607–646, at 634-637; R. Hahn and G. Hes-
ter. “Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice”. In: Ecology Law Quarterly
16 (1989), pp. 361–406, at 363; B. Ackerman and R. Stewart. “Reforming Environmen-
tal Law”. In: Stanford Law Review 37 (1985), pp. 1333–1365, especially at 1341-1351; R.
Hahn and R. Noll. “Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air Pollution Permits: Problems
of Regulatory Interactions”. In: Yale Journal on Regulation 1 (1983), pp. 63–91, at 65-66.
50D. Ellerman. “A Note on Tradeable Permits”. In: Environmental and Resource Eco-
nomics 31 (2005), pp. 123–131, at 124.
51Ibid., at 126, 130.
52B. Field and M. Field. Environmental Economics: An Introduction. Boston: McGraw-
Hill Irwin, 2009, p. 203; D. Cole and P. Grossman. “The Meaning of Property Rights: Law
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However, when economists speak of property rights, they do not always mean
the same as what is recognised as property in law53. For instance, a key strand
of legal theory asserts that property rights exhibit certain requisite charac-
teristics which place them in this particular legal category, such as the right
to exclude others and the right to use the resource in question54. Economists
do recognise some of the attributes which are required in law to make partic-
ular entitlements property rights: for example, De Alessi views the rights to
transfer and use as part of private property55, while Demsetz56 and Alchian57
recognise the importance of the right of exclusion (or non-interference).
Other economists, however, adopt conceptualisations which have moved
substantially further from legal notions of property. Coase views property
rights as entitlements against other parties. In the absence of transaction
costs, it does not matter which of the parties holds the right58. Where trans-
action costs do exist, it is generally regarded as more efficient if the legal
framework decides on the allocation of property rights59. In its widest form,
the economic understanding of property rights can encompass “virtually ev-
ery device – public or private, common law or regulatory, contractual or
governmental, formal or informal – by which divergences between private
and social costs or benefits are reduced”60. Barzel, for example, has been
criticised for “throw[ing] around the word “right” casually and without clear
versus Economics?” In: Land Economics 78 (2002), pp. 317–330, at 317; T. Tietenberg.
“Ethical Influences on the Evolution of the US Tradable Permit Approach to Air Pollution
Control”. In: Ecological Economics 24 (1998), pp. 241–257, at 253.
53Cole and Grossman, “The Meaning of Property Rights: Law versus Economics?”, at
317.
54J. Penner. The Idea of Property in Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, espe-
cially at pp. 68-69, 71, 74-75, 152; T. Merrill. “Property and the Right to Exclude”. In:
Nebraska Law Review 77 (1998), pp. 730–755, at 731, 740-752, 754.
55L. De Alessi. “Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in
Economic Theory”. In: American Economic Review 73 (1983), pp. 64–81, at 67.
56H. Demsetz. “Toward a Theory of Property Rights”. In: American Economic Review
47 (1967), pp. 347–358.
57A. Alchian. “Some Economics of Property Rights”. In: Il Politico 30 (1965), pp. 816–
829.
58Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost”, at 2-8.
59Ibid., at 15-19.
60T. Merrill and H. Smith. “What Happened to Property in Law and Economics”. In:
Yale Law Journal 111 (2001), pp. 357–398, at 358, quoting R. Posner.
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definition”61. He distinguishes between “economic rights” and “legal rights”
to property: a thief, for instance, can have the former, but not the latter62.
However, unless validated in law, a mere ability to make use of a particular
resource is not a property right as such63. Barzel also regards contract as the
principal means and first point of call for the allocation of property rights,
with government (legal) protection being available as a default mechanism
where voluntary, private contracting would not be able to adequately allo-
cate the rights. For Barzel, contractual rules have primacy and are of the
utmost importance, and legal property rights are subordinate to them and
only apply where contract has failed: “[a]t the heart of the study of property
lies the study of contracts”64. The perception of property rights in economics
therefore lacks consistency: “[e]conomists have not been able to agree among
themselves, let alone with legal scholars, on a common, consistent definition
of property rights”65.
Even those economics scholars who recognise some of the key characteris-
tics of property required in law do not explore in depth why these character-
istics are so crucial to the constitution of property rights, and in particular
what kind of limitations on these characteristics can tip an interest from
the property category to a different (and potentially weaker) type of right.
These two avenues of investigation are, by contrast, of significant interest to
lawyers. A high level of precision in the construction of property is necessary
in order to be able to proceed to analysing new types of entitlements (such
as those in EU emissions allowances).
61Cole and Grossman, “The Meaning of Property Rights: Law versus Economics?”, at
324-325.
62Y. Barzel. Economic Analysis of Property Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997, p. 110.
63Cole and Grossman, “The Meaning of Property Rights: Law versus Economics?”, at
324-325; M. Heller. “The Boundaries of Private Property”. In: Yale Law Journal 108
(1999), pp. 1163–1223, at 1192-1193.
64Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights, at 3-4, 7-9, 11-13, 33, 39-40, 141.
65Cole and Grossman, “The Meaning of Property Rights: Law versus Economics?”, at
328.
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1.1.2 The objectives of tradable permit regimes: cost-
efficiency and beyond
Secondly, the neoclassical economic model has been criticised for missing
certain social and ethical perspectives which are crucial to the conceptuali-
sation of regulatory systems. The absence of these wider perspectives throws
an obstacle in the path of comprehensively articulating the public policy
goals that such systems seek to achieve. Understanding the goals of tradable
permit regimes beyond the cost-benefit analysis prescribed by the neoclassi-
cal economic model is an exercise that has been carried out using a number
of approaches. The ones that have been selected for discussion here are of
most relevance of the concerns of the thesis, in the sense that they illustrate
the need to view emissions trading in the wider context of EU environmental
policy and also from a social perspective, namely that of traders participating
in the emissions market.
Ecological economics provides a notable critique of the efficiency-focused
approach of environmental economics. It borrows the principal tenets of the
traditional neoclassical economic model and infuses them with ideas from
the natural sciences, notably ecology66. Ecological economics focuses on the
physical viability of ecosystems and the consequent need to protect them
against unbridled economic growth. The aim of environmental regulation
thus becomes more than the cost-effective allocation of resources, and in-
cludes placing physical limits on economic development in order to protect
endangered resources67. The views of ecological thinkers range from seeking
to devise a way of harmonising economic growth with environmental protec-
tion68, to favouring the resolution of environmental problems through an in-
creased closeness to nature and the fostering of an ethical relationship based
66R. Costanza et al. An Introduction to Ecological Economics. Boca Raton, Florida: St
Lucie Press, 1997, for an authoritative account of ecological economics.
67S. Baumgärtner et al. “Relative and Absolute Scarcity of Nature: Assessing the Roles
of Economics and Ecology for Biodiversity Conservation”. In: Ecological Economics 59
(2006), pp. 487–498, at 490-492.
68M. Sagoff. “Ethics, Ecology, and the Environment: Integrating Science and Law”. In:
Tennessee Law Review 56 (1989), pp. 77–229, at 110.
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on respect for the environment (the so-called “deep ecology” approach)69.
With emissions trading, policymakers have sought to address the issue of
the maximum permissible levels of atmospheric pollution by means of the
aggregate cap on emissions levels. However, it cannot realistically be envis-
aged that there will ever be a total prohibition on emissions even if it were
unsustainable to continue to emit. This would most likely not be socially
acceptable, as human life would not be able to continue without economic
growth.
Linked to the view of physical resources as finite is the idea that emissions
trading may not be able to continue indefinitely. Neoclassical economics, with
its neutral approach to scarcity, assumes that a price can be put on climate
stability and that this good can subsequently be traded in a market (which
is what emissions trading does by pricing the entitlement to emit greenhouse
gas pollution). The next assumption is that, even if the climate degrades at
a given time, it can always be priced and traded again later. The normative
issue of the inherent undesirability of climate change which is presupposed
by the environmental policy behind emissions trading is absent from the
neoclassical economic model, according to which the climate can continue
to be traded ad infinitum, irrespective of its ever decreasing quality. This
absence causes potential conflict in the context of emissions trading, namely
between maintaining a viable emissions market and achieving the requisite
levels of emissions reductions.
Aside from ecological economics, other strands of critique have persua-
sively argued that an area of public concern such as environmental protection
necessitates the taking into account of social and normative factors, which
may not be quantifiable within a standard exercise of cost-benefit analysis.
For instance, the notion of distributional fairness requires that tradable per-
mit regimes take into consideration the need to achieve environmental justice,
particularly for less privileged, low-income communities70. In a wider sense,
69E. Louka. International Environmental Law: Fairness, Effectiveness, and World Order.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 16-17.
70D. Kysar. “Law, Environment and Vision”. In: Northwestern University Law Review
97 (2003), pp. 675–729, at 685; R. Toshiyuki Drury et al. “Pollution Trading and En-
vironmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy”. In: Duke
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the idea of distributional fairness also highlights the importance of the social
and participatory nature of tradable permit systems of environmental reg-
ulation. The interests to be accounted for and reconciled with one another
necessarily include those of market participants (whether polluters which
are regulated by the said system, or entities trading purely for investment
purposes), public authorities and society at large. Furthermore, Heinzerling
and Ackerman propose a revised type of cost-benefit analysis, which is more
holistic and takes into account elements which are crucial to areas of public
interest such as environmental protection, for example scientific information,
the nature of the risks involved and the importance of providing for future
generations71. Their approach links in with the need to take into account
the wider picture of EU environmental policy when crafting an analytical
construction of emissions entitlements.
Moreover, the emissions market differs from markets in other types of
instrument from the point of view of regulatory involvement. The degree
of such involvement, due to the primarily environmental goals of emissions
trading, is substantially greater than in other markets. In other words, al-
though it has been persuasively argued that all markets are shaped by the
characteristics of the social and institutional environment which they inhabit,
the influence of these characteristics is of particular importance in the case
of the emissions market.
The conventional neoclassical economic account of how markets function
generally is based on the forces of supply and demand, which are consti-
tuted by the rational, self-interested behaviour of market participants. The
constitution and operation of markets are therefore little affected by social
relationships: parties have access to perfect information, and the function-
Environmental Law and Policy Forum 9 (1999), pp. 231–289, at 271-273; L. Chinn. “Can
the Market Be Fair and Efficient? An Environmental Justice Critique of Emissions Trad-
ing”. In: Ecology Law Quarterly 26 (1999), pp. 80–125; R. Lazarus. “Fairness in Environ-
mental Law”. In: Environmental Law 27 (1997), pp. 705–739, especially at 712-714, 725;
H. Gorovitz Robertson. “If Your Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can You: Environmental
"Grandfather Clauses" and Their Role in Environmental Inequity”. In: Catholic University
Law Review 45 (1995), pp. 131–179, at 139.
71B. Ackerman and L. Heinzerling. Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and
the Value of Nothing. New York: The New Press, 2004, chapter 9.
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ality of markets does not require prolonged human or social contact72. This
view has been challenged by insights from sociology. Specifically, writers such
as Fligstein and Granovetter have argued that the role of social and political
interactions in shaping markets is much more significant than the minimal
impact assumed by the neoclassical economic account.
The idea that “market structures include a wide variety of elaborated so-
cial structures”73 is discussed by Fligstein, who argues that the constitution
of markets is not determined universally, but instead depends on the nature
of the relationships and interactions between participants in a given social
set-up74. He devises a so-called political-cultural approach, which states that
social action takes place in fields (also known as organised social spaces) that
are governed by formal and informal rules of participation and functionality.
Markets are thus a type of field, and reflect the social understandings and
rules existent in a particular culture: they are “social constructions that re-
flect the unique political-cultural construction of their firms and nations”75.
Moreover, “governments as a set of fields interact with markets as a set of
fields”76, and devise rules intended to promote the stability of markets, such
as competition regulation77. States thus “intervene, regulate and mediate”78,
and range from interventionist regimes making direct substantive decisions
for markets, to regulatory regimes that enforce market rules through inter-
72A. Alchian and H. Demsetz. “The Property Rights Paradigm”. In: Journal of Economic
History 33 (1973), pp. 16–27; M. Granovetter. “Economic Action and Social Structure:
The Problem of Embeddedness”. In: American Journal of Sociology 91 (1985), pp. 481–
510, at 481, 484.
73N. Fligstein. The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-
Century Capitalist Societies. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001, p.
7.
74Ibid., p. 7.
75Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-
Century Capitalist Societies, pp. 15-17, 97; N. Fligstein. “Markets as Politics: A Political-
Cultural Approach to Market Institutions”. In: American Sociological Review 61 (1996),
pp. 656–673, at 670-671.
76Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-
Century Capitalist Societies, p. 19.
77Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-
Century Capitalist Societies, p. 19, also pp. 42, 73; Fligstein, “Markets as Politics: A
Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions”, at 657, 660-661.
78Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-
Century Capitalist Societies, p. 42.
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mediary agencies79.
Granovetter presents another type of sociological argument and suggests
that markets exist within the context of social relations: this is the so-called
embeddedness of markets in social networks80. Actors’ actions are said to be
“embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations”81. This social
structure thus affects economic outcomes as it affects the flow and quality
of information, it is a source of reward and punishment and provides the
environment for the emergence of trust between market participants82. The
social structure is constituted to a significant extent of non-economic activ-
ity (such as culture, politics and religion), which therefore affects economic
activity83. Granovetter gives the example of trust and malfeasance: believing
that others will behave morally and honestly, as well as behaving dishonestly
and deceitfully are not likely to happen due to a generalised view of morality.
Rather, they depend on the particular make-up of every set of social rela-
tions between economic actors (and arguably more so than on the internal
organisational forms of those actors)84.
It seems logical to suppose that all markets are to some extent social and
political creations, and not driven exclusively by the rational behaviour of
market participants, which can be universalised irrespective of the particular
social and institutional set-up. It is argued, however, that this social and
political make-up lies on a spectrum: the social and political aspects of some
markets are more pronounced than those of other markets. In particular,
public authorities and the influence of public policy play a role in markets to
differing degrees85. The regulatory function of an emissions market (such as
79Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-
Century Capitalist Societies, p. 42; Fligstein, “Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural
Approach to Market Institutions”, at 661.
80Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness”,
at 481-482.
81Ibid., at 487.
82M. Granovetter. “The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes”. In: Journal
of Economic Perspectives 19 (2005), pp. 33–50, at 33.
83Ibid., at 35.
84Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness”,
at 487-493, 502-503.
85Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-
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that created by the EU ETS) is its primary feature. The existential purpose
of such a market is to achieve certain public goals (notably to reduce emis-
sions to scientifically acceptable levels and support a low-carbon economy).
Such public objectives are not present in other markets, for instance those in
traditional commodities such as oil or gas. The emissions market has been
created entirely artificially, at regulatory level. The regulatory framework
allows the market to function by creating its instruments and permitting
tradability.
Specifically, the EU ETS contains detailed provisions on the mechanisms
envisaged to achieve emissions reductions and support a low-carbon econ-
omy, for instance on the contents of the emissions permit to be held by a
regulated entity86, and on the working details of monitoring and surrender-
ing emissions allowances87. This focus reflects the primary purpose of the EU
ETS, namely the reduction of emissions in accordance with a pre-determined,
decreasing cap88. By contrast, the EU ETS does not prescribe any particu-
lar rules on the trading of allowances, which is open to both regulated and
non-regulated entities89. There is consequently a gap between regulating the
reduction of emissions (the ultimate purpose of the EU ETS) and regulating
emissions trading (the means employed by the EU ETS to achieve the de-
sired levels of emissions reductions, and effectively an intermediate purpose
of the regulatory regime). While the behaviour of installations in terms of
how they may carry out their emitting, EU ETS covered activities is reg-
ulated in detail, participants in the emissions market (which include those
regulated installations) are left to develop their own framework of rules as
Century Capitalist Societies, pp. 11-13.
86Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , arts. 4-7.
87Ibid., arts. 12, 14.
88Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , art. 1; Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution
of the EU Emissions Trading System”, at 303-304.
89Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , arts. 12(1), 19(2).
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regards the trading of allowances. The emissions market thus has a par-
ticular social and collective nature. It is constituted by the interactions of
different actors and organisations. It is originally a regulatory construct, and
its public policy aspect remains its primary and defining characteristic, but
its continued functionality is dependent on participants’ involvement in the
trading process90.
A prime example of where the cost-effectiveness goal does not paint the
full picture of what tradable permit regimes aim to achieve is the issue of
low emissions prices in the EU market. “Low or highly volatile prices have
the potential to reduce incentives for investment in low-carbon technologies”,
which the EU ETS has undertaken to support as part of a general, Union-
wide move towards a low-carbon economy91. At the same time, on the basis
of the neoclassical economic model, low prices simply indicate that the EU
ETS is functioning as it should: purchasing allowances in the market is
cheaper than abatement. However, the model does not take into account
the reality that EU ETS does not exist in a “regulatory void”, where cost-
efficiency in emissions reductions is all that matters. The EU ETS is part
of a greater regulatory scheme, the EU Climate and Energy Package, whose
aims are to reduce emissions and increase the use of renewable energy, so
that Europe can transform itself into “a highly energy-efficient, low-carbon
economy”92. Furthermore, the EU ETS can play an important role in an
international move towards a low-carbon society, which forms part of tackling
complex environmental issues at the global level, for instance the effects of
climate change on global health93. The wider issue of low-carbon development
90J. Knox-Hayes. “The Architecture of Carbon Markets: Institutional Analysis of the
Organizations and Relationships that Build the Market”. In: (2009). url: http://paper
s.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1395312, especially p. 18.
91Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, at 304, 314.
92The EU Climate and Energy Package. European Commission Climate Action. url:
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm; Manea, “Defining
Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions Trading System”, pp. 313-
314.
93A. Costello et al. “Managing the Health Effects of Climate Change”. In: Lancet
373(9676) (2009), pp. 1693–1733, especially at 1695-1696, 1719, 1723, 1729, highlights
the importance of combined social and institutional commitment to moving towards a
low-carbon economy.
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mandates that additional goals must be ascribed to the EU ETS, such as
promoting greener technologies, which can be done by way of an adequate
emissions price level.
The common denominator of these social and ethical concerns is the sub-
mission that there is a fundamental and underappreciated difference between
the creation of a market as a means to achieve most effectively certain pub-
licly defined regulatory objectives (namely reducing emissions and decarbon-
isation) on the one hand, and the more conventional situation in which a
market is created solely to provide an ostensibly neutral space where in-
dividuals can pursue their respective interests and where collective social
preferences are thereby revealed rather than centrally defined. Whilst neo-
classical economic theory is well equipped to conceptualise the latter type
of market, it is less capable of providing an accurate narrative of the former
type. This is because the application of the neoclassical economic model
to social and regulatory phenomena necessarily involves normative choices
which cannot be ignored; it can never be a neutral, technical or mechani-
cal exercise. The absence of space for normative choices in the neoclassical
economic model and its insistence on efficiency94 as the yardstick for measur-
ing the environmental performance of emissions trading may therefore render
this mechanism less effective as a regulatory tool of environmental protection
than hitherto assumed. An example where economic incentives cannot, on
their own, address the environmental impact of pollution is offered by the
suggestion that a synergy could be achieved in the EU ETS between eco-
nomic efficiency and tortious liability, so as to address the physical as well
as the economic consequences of emissions95.
At the same time, the importance of the neoclassical economic model
in environmental policy and, more specifically, EU climate change policy
must not be underestimated. The neoclassical economic model remains the
94Dudek and Palmisano, “Emissions Trading: Why Is This Thoroughbred Hobbled?”,
at 218-219; Hahn and Hester, “Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice”, at
361-362; Stavins, “What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from
SO2 Allowance Trading”, at 70-72; Hahn, “The Impact of Economics on Environmental
Policy”, at 378.
95M. Lee. “Safety, Regulation and Tort: Fault in Context”. In: Modern Law Review 74
(2011), pp. 555–580, at 576.
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dominant account of how regimes of environmental protection are crafted.
Articulating the goals of the EU ETS does necessitate employing this model,
since under a tradable permit regime, by definition, regulated entities re-
duce their emissions by assessing the cost-efficiency of purchasing allowances
versus abatement.
Critics of the dominant model therefore need to engage with the tradable
permit regimes that this model has legitimised. Such critics can deploy their
lines of questioning of the dominant model to assist in articulating clear and
comprehensive goals that regimes such as the EU ETS should be striving to
achieve. These goals are likely to go beyond the cost-effectiveness element
prescribed by the neoclassical economic model, so as to take into account the
wider social and institutional context in which the EU ETS exists, in partic-
ular the wider goals of EU environmental policy. That cost-benefit analysis
is fundamentally capable of engaging with wider social and ethical consid-
erations (provided that the challenges of quantifying these considerations in
the economic model can be overcome) has been recognised by commentators
such as Lee96. The goals can include reducing emissions to lower levels than
a cost-effectiveness assessment would recommend, and supporting the EU’s
centralised move towards a low-carbon economy. The principal role that can
most usefully be played by the social and ethical perspectives which are miss-
ing from the dominant model is to enrich the vision of the regulatory goals
of the EU ETS beyond pure economic efficiency. Emissions trading should
entail an effective strategy which correlates with and supports the rest of EU
environmental policy, while adequately protecting market participants so as
to enable the trading element to support the regulatory goals.
In consequence, a comprehensive legal analytical construction of emissions
entitlements must necessarily be crafted in a way which accommodates the
multiple and potentially conflicting objectives revealed by the neoclassical
economic model and its critiques. In effect, this legal construction is tasked
with the implementation of a (modified) economic model. The exercise of
crafting such a construction illustrates the instrumentalisation of law: in
particular, property law is employed in a regulatory context in order to pursue
96Lee, “Safety, Regulation and Tort: Fault in Context”, at 577.
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public policy goals which are dictated by an economic model. As noted earlier
in the chapter, this instrumentalisation indicates that the nature of property
is much more adaptable to various contexts than traditionally portrayed.
It remains to be seen what the consequences of this adaptability are for
the conceptualisation and functionality of property law, an issue which is
addressed in particular in the final chapter.
1.2 An analytical construction of the legal
entitlements created by emissions trad-
ing
Crafting an analytical construction of the legal interests created by tradable
permit regimes, particularly emissions trading systems, is an issue of consid-
erable practical importance. Trading regimes are proliferating in air pollution
regulation across the world, with significant differences in the understand-
ing of emissions entitlements. The United States (US) Acid Rain Program,
which served as a source of inspiration for the EU ETS97 and involves the
trading of sulphur dioxide (SO2) allowances, views these instruments as lim-
ited authorisations to emit SO2, and therefore not property rights. Moreover,
the government has the authority to terminate or limit such authorisations98.
At the same time, US case law has established that the allowances exhibit
many characteristics of property rights as between private parties, though not
against the government. By contrast, Australia’s emissions trading scheme
has specifically designated emissions entitlements as property99.
It is consequently imperative to provide an authoritative legal analysis
“that can assist in determining why such different classificatory outcomes
have been reached, and why these differences matter” for the success of envi-
97F. Convery. “Origins and Development of the EU ETS”. In: Environmental and Re-
source Economics 43 (2009), pp. 391–412, at 397, 407.
981990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 United States Code, §7651b(f).
99Clean Energy Act 2011 (Commonwealth), s. 103; Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitle-
ments in the Constitution of the EU Emissions Trading System”, at 307-308, 315.
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ronmental regulation100. The analytical approach followed in the thesis (and
elaborated below) provides a rigorous evidentiary path which serves to ensure
the legal coherence and persuasiveness of the construction of EU emissions
entitlements. The approach is more systematic, comprehensive and unitary
than the strands of discussion that have concerned themselves with the na-
ture of emissions entitlements thus far. The approach is intended to serve as
a working blueprint that enables the construction of any type of new legal
interest created by a regulatory regime of trading, whether in air pollution
regulation, other areas of environmental regulation, or beyond. For instance,
biodiversity offsetting is being pioneered as a new market-based mechanism of
environmental protection, and works by requiring developers to offset activ-
ities that damage conservation habitats by delivering equivalent biodiversity
units in other locations101.
The scholarship discussing the nature of emissions entitlements has to
date focused on three interconnected, overlapping areas of concern. The
first is the legal categorisation of the entitlements as property, which has
been put forward by some commentators. The second explores views that
question this categorisation and point to certain characteristics of emissions
entitlements which do not fit with notions of property. The third illustrates
the challenge as well as the urgency of crafting an analytical construction
of emissions entitlements that can accommodate multiple and potentially
conflicting regulatory goals.
1.2.1 The legal categorisation of emissions entitlements
as property
For some commentators, the draw of the property categorisation of emissions
entitlements remains strong, even beyond the realm of neoclassical economic
100Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, at 307.
101Technical Report for European Commission DG Environment, The Use of Market-
based Instruments for Biodiversity Protection – The Case of Habitat Banking. Economics
for the Environment Consultancy and Institute for European Environmental Policy et al.
2010. url: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/pdf/eftec_habitat_technic
al_report.pdf, especially pp. 3-4.
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theory. Welch writes that tradable permit entitlements belong to the cate-
gory of property rights, which encompasses common property (which “can
be used by anyone”), usufruct (a non-transferable right to exclude) and full
ownership (which means both the right to exclude and the right to trans-
fer)102.
Cole similarly considers SO2 entitlements in the US Acid Rain Program
to be property. The SO2 entitlements are “akin to a usufruct, a leasehold
or a defeasible fee to the environmental goods. These are certainly valu-
able property rights, though they amount to something less than fee-simple
ownership”103. Cole’s explanation delves into the potential limitations on the
scope of emissions entitlements, but employs a single view of property (as
a “bundle of sticks”) and automatically concludes that the particular bun-
dle (meaning the characteristics) constituting the entitlements amounts to
property. This conclusion leaves open the possibility that any set of char-
acteristics of a legal interest could potentially render it categorisable as a
property right. The reality is that, in law, not all rights are property rights;
some are categorised as purely personal (for instance contractual) rights. A
more detailed and nuanced discussion of other views of property, beyond the
“bundle of sticks” analysis, is therefore needed before a firm pronouncement
on the categorisation of emissions entitlements can be made.
In the specific context of the EU ETS, Spash notes that:
[a]llocating permits is equivalent to attributing polluters a prop-
erty right. . . Once permits systems are established, and permits
have been allocated, a Government has created property rights
for pollution which the courts may well protect. Subsequent at-
tempts to reduce the number of permits (that is, tighten the cap)
could then require the Government to buy back permissions ini-
102W. Welch. “The Political Feasibility of Full Ownership Property Rights: The Cases of
Pollution and Fisheries”. In: Policy Sciences 16 (1983), pp. 165–180, at 166.
103D. Cole. “New Forms of Private Property: Property Rights in Environmental Goods”.
In: Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics. Ed. by B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest. Chel-
tenham: Edward Elgar, 2000, pp. 274–314, at 284; D. Cole. “Clearing the Air: Four Proposi-
tions about Property Rights and Environmental Protection”. In: Duke Environmental Law
and Policy Forum 10 (1999), pp. 103–130, at 113-114.
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tially given away for free. Countries subject to a carbon cap
and wishing to establish an ETS must therefore decide how to
distribute permits knowing the potential for a shift in property
rights104.
Other commentators view emissions entitlements as property whose pri-
mary purpose is that assigned to it by neoclassical economic theory, namely
attaining cost-effectiveness. Rolph explores the design characteristics of emis-
sions entitlements; they are said to be transferable, long-term, and allocated
based on historic use105. These entitlements are classified in the category
of programmes to control externalities, and their characteristics are conse-
quently explained based on this objective. Transferability, for instance, is
said to be granted in order to “accommodate new entry into the industry”,
as the regulator’s intention in placing limitations on the use of a resource is
to continue such limitations permanently106. The notion that the role of air
pollution regulation is to control externalities is derived from the neoclassical
economic model of environmental protection, and implies a view of environ-
mental problems (such as climate change) as resolvable through the efficient
allocation of resources.
Another efficiency-based assessment is offered by Pennings et al in re-
spect of emissions entitlements (which they call environmental rights) and
EU milk quotas (termed production rights). Specifically, they assess trans-
ferability and so-called “property characteristics” (referring to the possibility
of withdrawal of the right by public authorities). The benchmark used in
this assessment is referred to as a “full right”. This is deemed to be a hypo-
thetical right with “optimal characteristics in the sense of efficiency – that
is, implementing a policy that is efficient for the affected firms as well as for
society”107.
104C. Spash. “The Brave New World of Carbon Trading”. In: New Political Economy 15
(2010), pp. 169–195, at 180.
105E. Rolph. “Government Allocation of Property Rights: Who Gets What?” In: Journal
of Policy Analysis and Management 3 (1983), pp. 45–61, at 49.
106Rolph, “Government Allocation of Property Rights: Who Gets What?”, at 51-53,
especially at 53; Wiener, “Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal
Context”, at 677, also highlights transferability as a key characteristic.
107J. Pennings, W. Heijman, and W. Meulenberg. “The Dimensions of Rights: A Clas-
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The attributes of exclusion and transfer are also considered vital to the
constitution of property rights by Yandle. Quoting Anderson and Leal108,
Yandle speaks of so-called “3-D rights”, by which he means rights which
are definable, defendable (meaning that third parties can be excluded) and
divestible (or transferable)109. This stance has been labelled free market en-
vironmentalism110. Scholars such as Anderson, Leal, Yandle and Morriss are
preoccupied with the evolution of property rights: why such systems have
developed to protect certain resources, including the environment, and how
they compare with command and control systems of regulation111. The reduc-
tion of transaction costs is considered an important part of the explanation as
to the choice of a particular form of property-based regulatory solution over
another112. The element of use has been identified as an additional requisite
of tradable permit entitlements, alongside exclusion and transfer. Colby fur-
ther argues that tradable permit regimes should define the duration of the
entitlement and the scope of use, namely whether the entitlement is forfeited
for lack of use or bankable for future use113.
sification of Environmental Rights and Production Rights”. In: European Journal of Law
and Economics 4 (1997), pp. 55–71, at 64-65, 68.
108T. Anderson and D. Leal. Free Market Environmentalism. New York and Basingstoke:
Palgrave, 2001, p. 22.
109Yandle, “Grasping for the Heavens: 3-D Property Rights and the Global Commons”,
especially at 15, 19-21, 29-30; T. Anderson and J. Bishop Grewell. “Property Rights Solu-
tions for the Global Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down?” In: Duke Environmental Law
and Policy Forum 10 (1999), pp. 73–101, at 76, also espouse this view.
110S. Eagle. “The Common Law and the Environment”. In: Case Western Reserve Law
Review 58 (2008), pp. 583–620, at 609-610; Yandle and Morriss, “The Technologies of
Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons”, at
131-132; A. Thompson. “Free Market Environmentalism and the Common Law: Confusion,
Nostalgia, and Inconsistency”. In: Emory Law Journal 45 (1996), pp. 1329–1372, especially
at 1333-1339.
111Yandle, “Grasping for the Heavens: 3-D Property Rights and the Global Commons”,
at 30-36; Anderson and Leal, Free Market Environmentalism.
112Yandle and Morriss, “The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative
Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons”, at 139-141.
113B. Colby. “Cap-and-Trade Policy Challenges: A Tale of Three Markets”. In: Land
Economics 76 (2000), pp. 638–658, at 648-650.
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1.2.2 Questioning the property categorisation of emis-
sions entitlements
Some scholars do, however, qualify the categorisation of tradable permit en-
titlements as property. Young and McColl note that, for accuracy’s sake,
tradable permit systems should be described as “tradable permit, entitle-
ment or allocation systems and not. . . as tradable property right systems“,
as the notion of property has “different connotations in different audiences
and disciplines”114. That emissions entitlements are not necessarily property
rights is also recognised by Pennings et al, who use the example of the limita-
tions on the definition of allowances in the US Acid Rain Program115. Hahn
and Noll describe the nature of the entitlement created by tradable systems
of air pollution regulation as amounting to “an implicit property right in the
emissions permitted”116, though they also qualify this statement by noting
that it is “a limited property right”117.
Other commentators also note that emissions allowances exhibit the char-
acteristics of definability, enforceability and transferability, which are neces-
sary for market functionality. Instead of concluding that these characteristics
warrant the property categorisation, they refer to allowances as “regulatory
rights”, whose limits are created by the trading system: they are “somewhere
between an administrative grant and private property”118. Similarly, Antto-
nen et al identify the key characteristics of EU ETS allowances as transfer-
ability and economic value, two aspects which enable a market to function.
They also refer to allowances as “regulatory property”, which means that
some public authority is retained over the emissions market119.
114M. Young and J. McColl. “Defining Tradable Water Entitlements and Allocations: A
Robust System”. In: Canadian Water Resources Journal 30 (2005), pp. 65–72, at 66.
115Pennings, Heijman, and Meulenberg, “The Dimensions of Rights: A Classification of
Environmental Rights and Production Rights”, at 59-60.
116Hahn and Noll, “Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air Pollution Permits: Problems
of Regulatory Interactions”, at 67.
117Ibid., at 70.
118Wemaere, Streck, and Chagas, “Legal Ownership and Nature of Kyoto Units and EU
Allowances”, at 44.
119Anttonen, Mehling, and Upston-Hooper, “Breathing Life into the Carbon Market:
Legal Frameworks of Emissions Trading in Europe”, at 97-98.
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The Financial Markets Law Committee (FMLC) at the Bank of Eng-
land notes that allowances “have aspects of both administrative grants or
licences and of private property”, and that there is no EU-level categorisa-
tion of emissions entitlements: instead, it is left at the latitude of individual
Member States to choose whether they wish to define the legal nature of
these entitlements120. In the UK, for example, the FMLC opines that it is
likely that allowances will be considered property121. The FMLC views the
clarification of the nature of emissions entitlements as important to encour-
age the viability of the market, whose effectiveness can be impeded by lack
of certainty in the legal categorisation of the entitlements, contrary to the
purpose for which the EU ETS was established122.
That emissions entitlements contain both private property and regulatory
elements has also been expressed as follows:
[i]n sum, the EU Allowance does not fit easily in any legal system
of the EU Members. It can be deemed as a right ‘sui generis’ in
many jurisdictions, carrying the following features: (i) transfer-
able permit; (ii) an administrative public right; (iii) an intangible
good or a commodity; and (iv) a security or a financial instru-
ment. It will also depend on the legislative purpose for how the
property rights (and obligations) to the allowance will be de-
fined123.
Button further asserts that “a carbon unit is a sui generis right which. . .
exhibits characteristics of both a commodity and a currency”124. She notes
that trading systems such as the EU ETS generally define what the unit
enables holders to do, rather than provide a legal characterisation of the
120Emissions Allowances: Creating Legal Certainty. Financial Markets Law Committee.
2009. url: http://www.fmlc.org/Pages/papers.aspx, pp. 5, 7-8.
121Ibid., p. 11.
122Ibid., pp. 15-16.
123Wemaere, Streck, and Chagas, “Legal Ownership and Nature of Kyoto Units and
EU Allowances”, at 52; Pohlmann, “The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme”, at
350-351.
124J. Button. “Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon
Market Based on the Currency Model”. In: Harvard Environmental Law Review 32 (2008),
pp. 571–596, at 572-573.
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unit (for instance emit one tonne of CO2 equivalent)125. She also notes that a
previous draft of the EU ETS Directive had defined emissions allowances as
administrative authorisations, but was rejected by the European Commission
Legal Service as it conflicted with the subsidiarity principle, and instead the
adopted version avoided a legal characterisation of the unit126. Button warns
that the increase in investment-motivated trading in the emissions market
means that “the use of bureaucratic, legalistic language like “administrative
approvals” or “quasi-property rights” to refer to units of trade will not be
tolerated by the industry”. She points out that the proliferation of investment
trading poses new challenges in the shape of ensuring that emissions trading
can still achieve its environmental goal efficiently and cost-effectively127.
Another, more pragmatic approach suggests that emissions entitlements
may be best construed according to the particular context in which it be-
comes necessary to elucidate their legal nature. Reporting on the conclusions
of a workshop on the legal nature of emissions reductions organised by the
Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD)
and Baker & McKenzie in 2004, Mace concludes that a number of the char-
acteristics of allowances which are necessary for a viable emissions market
exist already, such as transferability and a system of registration. Moreover,
he notes that the nature of allowances depends on the context, for instance
where there is a situation of insolvency, and that, therefore, the key features
of allowances for the operability of the market are irrevocability and trans-
ferability, rather than express categorisation as a particular type of right128.
This view is supported by Anttonen et al, who observe that, for instance,
English law does not generically categorise emissions entitlements, but in-
stead leaves it to the courts to determine whether this type of instrument
125Button, “Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon
Market Based on the Currency Model”, at 574.
126Button, “Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon
Market Based on the Currency Model”, at 575; Wemaere, Streck, and Chagas, “Legal
Ownership and Nature of Kyoto Units and EU Allowances”, at 49.
127Button, “Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon
Market Based on the Currency Model”, at 583.
128M. Mace. “The Legal Nature of Emission Reductions and EU Allowances: Issues Ad-
dressed in an International Workshop”. In: Journal for European Environmental and Plan-
ning Law 2 (2005), pp. 123–134, at 125.
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can constitute “property” in specific scenarios, such as insolvency129.
1.2.3 The importance of crafting an analytical con-
struction of emissions entitlements for the at-
tainment of regulatory goals
The imperative need to craft an analytical construction of emissions enti-
tlements which enables the EU ETS to achieve its environmental goals is
recognised by Button:
it is important for governments to seek consensus as to the le-
gal characteristics of the basic unit of exchange in [the emissions]
market, and the related issue of which market model to adopt.
The model ultimately adopted should reflect the economic sub-
stance of international emissions trading, while not compromising
the environmental integrity of the system130.
The success of tradable permit regimes of regulation is closely linked to
articulating an analytical construction of emissions entitlements that goes be-
yond using economic efficiency as the sole or principal benchmark. Emissions
entitlements in the EU ETS may well require the presence of the elements of
exclusion, transfer and use in order to provide a cost-effective way of reducing
emissions. Viewing efficiency as paramount131, however, leaves open the im-
portant question of whether any limitations are needed on the scope of these
elements, if the EU ETS is to pursue additional, wider goals. In particular,
it has been asked how strong emissions entitlements are as against the regu-
lator, and whether allowances can be put to crucial commercial uses in the
129Anttonen, Mehling, and Upston-Hooper, “Breathing Life into the Carbon Market:
Legal Frameworks of Emissions Trading in Europe”, at 98-99; M. Wilder. “Nature of
an Allowance”. In: Climate Change: A Guide to Carbon Law and Practice. Ed. by P.
Watchman. London: Globe Business Publishing, 2008, pp. 93–109, at 101-102.
130Button, “Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon
Market Based on the Currency Model”, at 572.
131Cole, “New Forms of Private Property: Property Rights in Environmental Goods”,
at 275, 283-284; Cole, “Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and
Environmental Protection”, at 111.
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market (namely whether security interests over allowances can be protected
and enforced effectively)132.
Dennis points out that emissions trading regimes such as the US Acid
Rain Program may have (inadvertently) given rise to “two independent and
contradictory goals”: making the air cleaner versus creating a viable emis-
sions market133. The potential conflict between market certainty and regu-
latory flexibility elicits a key limitation on the scope of emissions entitle-
ments: that they may be susceptible to regulatory intervention, in particular
to cancellation or withdrawal from the market, should circumstances arise
where the urgency of achieving increased environmental protection (meaning
greater levels of emissions reductions than originally envisaged) so requires.
Cole remarks that:
“The less secure property rights are, the less likely potential buy-
ers will be to invest in them. . . there is every reason to suspect
that defeasible pollution rights would have lower market value
than absolute pollution rights. Of course, if the market value of
the rights falls too low, the market for them will simply disap-
pear”134.
Cole, however, argues that, in the US Acid Rain System, the absence of
security in the rights does not seem to have impeded trading, given that the
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will most likely treat allowances
as if they were property rights, save in exceptional circumstances135. Dennis,
on the other hand, recognises that the EPA needs to reserve some degree
132See chapter 4.3 for a discussion as to how the creation of security interests constitutes
a use of a resource.
133J. Dennis. “Smoke for Sale: Paradoxes and Problems of the Emissions Trading Program
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990”. In: UCLA Law Review 40 (1993), pp. 1101–
1144, at 1137-1138.
134Cole, “New Forms of Private Property: Property Rights in Environmental Goods”,
at 285; Wemaere, Streck, and Chagas, “Legal Ownership and Nature of Kyoto Units and
EU Allowances”, at 50; Cole, “Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights
and Environmental Protection”, at 114; Dennis, “Smoke for Sale: Paradoxes and Problems
of the Emissions Trading Program of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990”, at 1118,
1133, 1139-1140.
135Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, at 317; Cole, “New Forms of Private Property: Property Rights in En-
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of authority to intervene in the emissions market to reduce emissions if so
required, but if this authority is too extensive, regulated entities could de-
cide that the risk of allowance confiscation is too great to justify market
participation136.
Hahn and Hester are of the view that tradable permit systems would
benefit from increased economic efficiency and therefore cost savings if “un-
certainties over the definition of property rights” were addressed, as such
uncertainties lower the value of the allowances137. They do, however, also
recognise that full property rights (enforceable against the issuing authority)
would not be helpful in achieving environmental goals, as they would reduce
regulatory discretion to amend emissions reduction goals as necessary138.
The need for a trade-off between flexibility in regulation and certainty
in the market is also recognised by Rose: tradable permit systems need to
be sufficiently flexible to deal with “future ecological change”, and at the
same time sufficiently certain so as not to discourage investment139. Provid-
ing regulated entities with “increased flexibility” must necessarily be balanced
against “offering environmentalists continuing progress toward environmen-
tal quality goals”; this means that the entitlements granted in permits must
not be “too clear a property right”, so as to reconcile these conflicting inter-
ests140. It is worth noting that, in US law, the view that certain limitations
vironmental Goods”, at 292; Cole, “Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property
Rights and Environmental Protection”, at 114; Dennis, “Smoke for Sale: Paradoxes and
Problems of the Emissions Trading Program of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990”,
at 1137.
136Dennis, “Smoke for Sale: Paradoxes and Problems of the Emissions Trading Program
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990”, at 1124, 1137.
137R. Hahn and G. Hester. “Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA’s
Emissions Trading Program”. In: Yale Journal on Regulation 6 (1989), pp. 109–153, at
116-117, 149; Cole, “New Forms of Private Property: Property Rights in Environmental
Goods”, at 295; Cole, “Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and
Environmental Protection”, at 115.
138Hahn and Hester, “Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA’s Emissions
Trading Program”, at 150-151; Cole, “New Forms of Private Property: Property Rights in
Environmental Goods”, at 295-296; Hahn and Hester, “Marketable Permits: Lessons for
Theory and Practice”, at 378-379.
139Rose, “Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled Trad-
able Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property Regimes”, at 62.
140R. Hahn. “Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Fol-
lowed the Doctor’s Orders”. In: The Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (1989), pp. 95–
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on the entitlement are deemed necessary is significantly influenced by the
factor of compensation: if the entitlements were deemed property rights, the
government would have to compensate their holders for cancellation or expro-
priation141. The concern regarding compensation may not directly translate
(or at least not to the same significant extent) into the EU legal framework.
In the context of the EU ETS, Mace considers whether uncertainties in
the legal nature of emissions entitlements could negatively impact on the
functioning of a liquid market. He notes that, upon issue by the regula-
tor, allowances are effectively administrative grants, but they assume prop-
erty characteristics once they are held by market participants. There is
consequently a difference of opinion between market participants, who feel
that property rights are required to facilitate transferability and protect al-
lowances against state confiscation, and public representatives, who wish to
retain the flexibility to withdraw or cancel units as necessary for the purposes
of environmental policy142. In respect of the reservation of discretion on the
part of the regulator, Winter, for instance, calls for more ambitious emissions
reduction targets for the EU ETS (40-50% by 2020) to reflect ecological ne-
cessity, and opines that installations that hold excess, unused allowances
allocated for free should not be permitted to keep them143.
Furthermore, the uncertainty as to the legal nature of emissions entitle-
ments has given rise to practical questions relevant to the development of
the emissions market, notably whether security interests can subsist in al-
lowances. Anttonen et al opine that the creation of security over allowances
is possible in the UK, which allows the nomination of an “additional autho-
rised representative” in the allowances register144. The importance of estab-
lishing whether EU allowances can support the existence of security rights
114, at 101.
141M. Breger et al. “Providing Economic Incentives in Environmental Regulation”. In:
Yale Journal on Regulation 8 (1991), pp. 463–495, at 480.
142Mace, “The Legal Nature of Emission Reductions and EU Allowances: Issues Ad-
dressed in an International Workshop”, at 123-124.
143G. Winter. “The Climate Is No Commodity: Taking Stock of the Emissions Trading
System”. In: Journal of Environmental Law 22 (2009), pp. 1–25, at 22, 24.
144Anttonen, Mehling, and Upston-Hooper, “Breathing Life into the Carbon Market:
Legal Frameworks of Emissions Trading in Europe”, at 98-99.
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for the functionality of the emissions market has also been highlighted by the
FMLC145. In the UK, the judgment in Armstrong v. Winnington146 provides
authority that third party interests such as security interests can be created
over emissions allowances. However, significant uncertainties remain over
whether such security interests can be adequately protected and enforced, so
as to lend them genuine legal and commercial value147.
The areas of concern discussed above serve to emphasise the importance of
clarification on two fronts. Firstly, how susceptible are emissions allowances
to regulatory intervention? Secondly, can allowances be put to important
commercial uses which enhance the viability of the emissions market, notably
can security interests created over allowances for the benefit of third parties
be adequately protected and enforced? The answers to these two questions
are closely linked to the goals that the EU ETS has set out to pursue: the
scope of regulatory intervention and the range of uses to which allowances
can be put will necessarily be determined by the fact that the EU ETS
is primarily a tool of environmental regulation, designed to achieve certain
scientifically mandated levels of emissions reductions in order to effectively
address climate change and assist the EU in its move towards a low-carbon
economy. Answering the two questions will provide the answer as to how best
to resolve the tension between market certainty (which entails certainty as
to the strength of the entitlement as against the regulator and as to the uses
to which allowances can be put) and regulatory flexibility to intervene in the
market in order to ensure the success of EU climate change as well as wider
environmental policy. In turn, exploring (and resolving) this tension reveals
the two key findings of the thesis: an analytical construction of emissions
entitlements which can achieve the public policy goals of a regulatory regime
such as the EU ETS, and the evolutionary nature of property rights in a
regulatory environment.
145Emissions Allowances: Creating Legal Certainty, especially pp. 5, 8, 19.
146Armstrong DLW GmbH v. Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC (Ch) 10 , discussed
in more detail in chapter 3.5.
147Emissions Allowances: Creating Legal Certainty, especially pp. 5, 8, 19; see also chap-
ter 3.5 and 3.6.
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1.3 The contribution of the thesis: a new an-
alytical framework to craft a construction
of the legal interests created by tradable
permit regimes of regulation
The focus of the thesis on crafting a comprehensive analytical construction
of emissions entitlements in the EU ETS serves a dual purpose.
Firstly, the practical question of the nature of these entitlements needs
to be resolved as a matter of urgency, otherwise the emissions market is
at substantial risk of failing, which would be a considerable set-back for the
tradable permit regimes which are proliferating in other areas of environmen-
tal protection. It is of course recognised that tradable permit regimes have
met with considerable and legitimate criticism as regards their environmen-
tal effectiveness. However, it remains the reality that this regulatory path
has been chosen at the EU level, and has further inspired similar approaches
in other jurisdictions. Consequently, the thesis aims to assess and improve
the workability of the EU ETS as it is currently conceptualised. The thesis
analyses the EU ETS as a market-based regime of regulation which aims to
lower the costs of reducing emissions and facilitate a EU-wide transition to
a low-carbon economy. These environmental goals are pursued by means of
a market in emissions allowances, open to both regulated and non-regulated
entities so as to assist with achieving sufficient liquidity for this market to
remain viable148.
Secondly, the analysis of EU emissions entitlements provides a spring-
board for the conceptual exploration of the contemporary nature of property,
the traditional understanding of which needs to be revisited in order to en-
able such rights to meet the requirements of new, and specifically regulatory,
contexts. The analysis conducted by the thesis thus highlights the complexity
of regulatory innovation: the effects of tradable permit regimes reverberate
far beyond the public policy (and notably environmental) goals which they
148See the introduction to the thesis for a discussion of the need for broad participation
by both regulated and non-regulated entities in the emissions market.
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have been primarily designed to pursue. This type of entitlements-based ap-
proach to environmental regulation triggers a host of new questions which
are not traditionally associated with such regulation, in particular how the
legal nature of the entitlements impacts on the achievement of the regulatory
goals, and how the analysis of this legal nature affects the conceptualisation
of property in general.
The thesis puts forward an analysis which goes significantly further than
the dominant neoclassical economic model and its critiques in identifying
the goals of emissions trading, and uses the EU ETS as its case study. The
innovation of the proposed analysis lies in the direct link made between
the identification of the regulatory goals and the construction of the legal
interests created in the tradable permits under the EU ETS. The fact that,
in English law for instance, EU emissions entitlements have been categorised
as property is not the end of the matter: such categorisation does not provide
a full picture of the scope and contents of these entitlements that can best
achieve the environmental goals of the EU ETS149. The analysis provided
by the thesis also goes further than the neoclassical economic model and its
critiques in articulating a comprehensive understanding of property rights,
and consequently facilitates the construction of new types of legal interests
created for regulatory purposes, such as EU emissions entitlements.
The approach taken by the thesis encapsulates in a previously unexplored
manner the key feature of a tradable permit regime such as the EU ETS: that
it is a mode of regulation reliant on the success of a private market150. This
market, in turn, depends on a clear construction of the legal interests created
in the tradable instruments151. The neoclassical economic model and the
associated social and ethical critiques represent building blocks to elicit the
goals that the EU ETS is seeking to achieve as a tool of environmental policy,
goals which in turn can be used to articulate a construction of emissions
149See chapter 4.1.
150Sunstein, “Administrative Substance”, at 645, highlights that incentive-based regimes
harness the flexibility of private markets to pursue regulatory goals.
151Field and Field, Environmental Economics: An Introduction, p. 203; Cole and Gross-
man, “The Meaning of Property Rights: Law versus Economics?”, at 317; Tietenberg,
“Ethical Influences on the Evolution of the US Tradable Permit Approach to Air Pollu-
tion Control”, at 253.
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entitlements that can best pursue them. The thesis aims to enrich the current
economics-based analysis of emissions trading as well as its critiques, by way
of bridging the gap between these types of approaches and a legal analysis
of the entitlements in the tradable instruments.
By emphasising the interdependence between the goals of the EU ETS
and the nature of emissions entitlements, the thesis further proposes a novel
approach to articulating a construction of such entitlements. The exercise
consists of a two-part analytical framework, which is intended to serve as a
blueprint for crafting a construction of any new type of legal interest created
to fulfil a regulatory purpose in the context of tradable permit regimes. The
aim is ultimately to assist regulators faced with the prospect of creating
a new tradable permit regime in a particular area of regulation, whether
in climate change policy, other areas of environmental policy or beyond,
as well as scholars writing in these areas. The analytical framework put
forward here enables determining the legal nature of the entitlements to be
granted in the permits, in accordance with the public policy goals that the
relevant regulatory system aims to achieve. To this end, as noted earlier in the
chapter, the thesis introduces a new category of instrumental property, which
encompasses entitlements created to achieve regulatory goals. Moreover, the
construction of such entitlements varies with and adapts to the particular
contexts in which they operate. As the conclusion to the thesis argues,
instrumental property differs in certain significant respects both from the
generic property categorisation ascribed to emissions entitlements in English
law152, and from the notion of regulatory property previously advanced by
commentators.
The importance of devising a comprehensive analytical framework that
can help to elicit a persuasive and effective construction of emissions en-
titlements is demonstrated by the practical problems encountered in the
EU emissions market and engendered by the absence of such a construc-
tion. Questions as to the scope of regulatory intervention in the emissions
market and the range of uses of allowances have shown themselves to be of
paramount importance in the context of the commercial contracts which con-
152See also chapter 4.1.
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stitute this market. The two issues of regulatory intervention and potentially
reduced usability encapsulate risks for market participants that are peculiar
to emissions trading and that are due to the regulatory origins of emissions
allowances. Parties trading in the emissions market therefore need to be able
to adequately protect themselves against these risks if the market is to re-
main functional. Such protection needs to be crafted using a dual approach
of improved contractual drafting and regulatory clarification. By contrast
with markets in conventional instruments such as equities and commodities,
the emissions market has a public policy purpose which goes beyond econom-
ically benefiting its participants. Moreover, the environmental goals of the
EU ETS can only be achieved if there is continued broad participation in the
market in order to maintain its viability, where such participation is incen-
tivised by the possibility of adequately protecting the interests of participants
against the aforementioned risks.
Consequently, the thesis works to determine whether the characteristics
and limitations of emissions entitlements identified by the proposed legal
analysis of property can effectively reconcile market certainty and regulatory
flexibility in the contractual context. The categorisation of emissions enti-
tlements as instrumental property put forward by the thesis has important
consequences for commercial relationships in the emissions market, as the en-
suing scope of regulatory intervention and the potential use restrictions (in
particular, the absence of effective protection and enforceability of security
interests over emissions allowances) significantly curtail the ability of market
participants to treat allowances in the same way as conventional instruments
in the contractual context. In turn, the viability of the emissions market,
which is constituted of the contractual relationships between trading partic-
ipants, is directly linked to the success of the environmental goals of the EU
ETS, as discussed above.
The first part of the analytical framework draws on common law theories
of property to elicit a general understanding of property rights. The common
law model has been selected as the focus of discussion, since the contracts
which constitute the EU emissions market are preponderantly governed by
English law. Some strands of theory emphasise the relative nature of property
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rights, whereby they are seen as a nexus of relationships between individuals
and thus become conceptually difficult to distinguish from personal rights,
except that the former type of right is held against a larger and less definite
set of parties153. Other strands of legal theory, however, continue to emphasise
the “otherness” of property rights as the relationship between an owner and
the thing owned. These views posit that property rights are constituted of
certain essential elements which give them their property status, namely the
right to exclude others from accessing or enjoying the thing owned, and the
right to use the thing owned154. The thesis adopts the latter view of property
as constituted of a set of requisite elements, for the reason that this view
accurately reflects a distinction between property rights and personal rights
which remains very real in legal doctrine and practice. Moreover, the view
of property as constituted of certain requisite elements provides the kind of
analytical account that the thesis requires for crafting a construction of new
types of legal interests such as emissions entitlements. The thesis further
builds on the view of property as constituted of the minimum necessary
elements of exclusion and use by adding a third element: transfer. The right
to transfer the object of ownership is an additional crucial characteristic in
the context of commercially valuable legal interests: it must not be forgotten
that tradability is the very foundation of the EU ETS as a market-based
system of environmental protection.
The second part of the analytical framework put forward by the thesis
encapsulates a new vision of how legislatively created rights regimes compare
to one another and how the characteristics of the legal interests originating
153W. Hohfeld. “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”.
In: Yale Law Journal 23 (1913), pp. 16–59; W. Hohfeld. “Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”. In: Yale Law Journal 26 (1917), pp. 710–770, pioneered
the idea of property as a nexus of relationships between individuals. This view subsequently
came to be known as the “bundle of rights” theory of property: property rights are made
up of a variety of “sticks”, which represent the types of entitlements that owners have to
the thing owned. On the basis of this view, there is effectively no qualitative difference
between the traditionally separate legal categories of personal rights and property rights:
property rights simply mean a collection of personal rights. Consequently, there are no
requisite components which make up a property right; if one or more “sticks” are missing,
the right can still be a property right.
154Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, especially pp. 68-69, 71, 74-75, 152; Merrill,
“Property and the Right to Exclude”, at 731, 740-752, 754.
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thereunder are connected to the respective goals of the regimes. This part of
the analytical framework employs the requisite characteristics of exclusion,
transfer and use identified from legal theories of property to examine three
rights regimes which cover a broad spectrum of recognised legal interests.
These regimes are intellectual property rights (which are property), EU milk
quotas and spectrum rights (where the last two exhibit some, but not all
characteristics of property). The elements of exclusion, transfer and use pro-
vide the analytical thread which links the three regimes to one another and
also to the emissions trading regime created by the EU ETS, where emissions
entitlements have not yet been conclusively categorised in law. The second
part of the analytical framework explores the scope of exclusion, transfer and
use for each of the three regimes which have already been categorised in law,
how this scope is affected by the goals of each regime, and consequently how
the ultimate categorisation of the legal interests created by each regime has
been achieved. Comparing the scope of exclusion, transfer and use in the
three established regimes to the scope of these elements in the context of
emissions entitlements, in view of the goals of the EU ETS which the thesis
has identified, ultimately facilitates articulating an authoritative construc-
tion of such entitlements155. They constitute instrumental property, whose
characteristics are primarily shaped by the regulatory goals and modified
according to the particular context in which they operate.
This comparative approach to providing a construction of the legal inter-
ests created by regulatory regimes represents previously uncharted territory.
It fills a notable gap between the conceptualisation of rights in property the-
ory and their application in pre-established regimes which have been created
for the purpose of pursuing regulatory goals. The comparative approach
therefore adds substantial value to existing property rights scholarship, as
well as to analyses of legislatively created rights regimes with public policy
goals. The dual analytical approach entwining property theory and compara-
ble rights regimes put forward by the thesis emphasises the need to articulate
a construction of legal interests which can achieve the public policy goals of
155Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, part 5.
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a trading regime, and reveals new, significant findings regarding the evolu-
tionary nature of property rights in a regulatory environment. Entitlements
which have been legislatively created to achieve a specific regulatory goal,
a category to which intellectual property rights, milk quotas and spectrum
rights all belong, are composed of elements which are determined by the goal
which the particular regime pursues. At the same time, as evidenced by the
judicial treatment of milk quotas in the UK, this type of entitlement is not
amenable to being subsumed under a generic legal label of private property.
Rather, its characteristics vary according to the context where its analysis
becomes necessary (for instance, insolvency). Similarly, emissions entitle-
ments are likely to exhibit different sets of characteristics according to the
circumstances in which they operate.
This is the notion of instrumental property which the thesis puts forward.
This concept will be further elaborated and defended in the final chapter. In
particular, that chapter will defend this notion against the potential criticism
that the ensuing fluidity in regulatory purpose and context renders it difficult
(and perhaps even impossible) to determine the precise nature of an entitle-
ment which falls within the proposed new category. The final chapter will
also argue that instrumental property differs considerably from the generic
property categorisation of emissions entitlements in English law, as well as
from the idea of regulatory property. The notion of instrumental property
is therefore able to provide a nuanced and comprehensive picture of the na-
ture of entitlements created to achieve regulatory goals. It is argued that
such an account is currently missing both from the property categorisation
of emissions entitlements in English law and from the concept of regulatory
property.
1.4 Chapter roadmap
Chapter 2156 charts the origins of the EU ETS as a tool of climate change
regulation to reduce emissions in line with the international requirements of
156An earlier version of this chapter appeared as Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitle-
ments in the Constitution of the EU Emissions Trading System”.
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the Kyoto Protocol, and credits the US Acid Rain Program with providing
the inspiration for the EU trading regime. The chapter provides an account
of the EU ETS and its constitutive framework, which is intended to serve
as a useful reference point and glossary as the reader progresses through the
thesis. The chapter subsequently explains the importance of the emissions
market in achieving the environmental goals of the EU ETS and the con-
sequent need to articulate an analytical construction of the entitlements in
emissions allowances. To demonstrate the practical importance of such a
construction, the chapter discusses a case study where uncertainty as to the
nature of emissions entitlements has caused significant problems for market
participants, and can negatively affect the success of the EU ETS as a tool
of environmental policy.
Chapter 3 reinforces the urgency of the need for a comprehensive con-
struction of emissions entitlements by exploring an area where continuing
uncertainty regarding the scope of regulatory intervention and the uses of
emissions allowances (notably creating protectable and enforceable security
interests over them) negatively affects the emissions market, and can thereby
seriously impede the environmental success of the EU ETS. This area is rep-
resented by the commercial contracts which constitute the emissions market.
It is argued that market participants need to be sufficiently well equipped
(by way of carefully drafted contractual arrangements as well as regulatory
clarification) to address both types of risk. In particular, it is posited that
assistance should be provided to contracting parties in the shape of amend-
ments to the standard form agreements used in emissions trading, given that
the emissions market is more unpredictable than markets in ordinary trad-
able instruments, as it is susceptible to regulatory intervention. The chapter
also argues for EU-level clarification as to the protectability and enforceabil-
ity of security interests over emissions allowances. If the market is allowed to
develop without resolution of this uncertainty, and the default of a trading
entity occurs, this could lead to market destabilisation. Overall, if contracts
can effectively protect the economic interests of trading parties, these entities
will be incentivised to continue participating in the emissions market, which
will thus operate in fulfilment of the environmental goals of the EU ETS.
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Chapter 4 covers the first part of the analytical framework put forward
by the thesis, and focuses on common law property theory, given that the
standard form contracts which constitute the EU emissions market are pre-
dominantly subject to English law. In the case of emissions entitlements, it is
argued that their judicial categorisation as property in English law does not
provide a conclusive answer to the key question posed by the thesis, namely
how the scope and contents of these entitlements are shaped by the environ-
mental goals of the EU ETS and also by other interests deemed worthy of le-
gal protection. To address this question, the chapter compares and contrasts
two leading strands of common law property theory. The chapter assesses the
respective usefulness of the two strands in articulating a construction of new
types of legal interests created by regulatory regimes (specifically emissions
entitlements) which takes into account their public policy goals. The first
strand is the view of property as a bundle of sticks, as pioneered by Hohfeld.
The second strand is the view of property as a type of right with certain req-
uisite characteristics which grant it its property character. In the context of
commercially valuable property, these characteristics are identified as being
exclusion, transfer and use. The analysis selects the latter view of property as
formed of the three requisite elements as the more useful basis for examining
established rights regimes and comparing them with emissions entitlements
in the second part of the framework. The chapter further assesses the scope
and limitations of the three constitutive elements of exclusion, transfer and
use in respect of EU emissions entitlements. The limitations identified ques-
tion the accuracy of simply categorising emissions entitlements as private
property in a generic manner, given that their characteristics are determined
by the public policy goals pursued by the EU ETS. This dependency on the
regulatory regime raises the possibility, to be explored further in the second
part of the analytical framework, that, within the broad notion of private
property, emissions entitlements are better viewed as a special category with
a set of unique characteristics shaped by their regulatory origins.
Chapter 5 represents the second part of the analytical framework put
forward by the thesis. It discusses the three rights regimes which have been
identified as sufficiently comparable with emissions entitlements, namely in-
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tellectual property rights, spectrum rights (both of which are discussed in the
context of the UK legal system) and EU milk quotas. The chapter applies
the key elements of exclusion, transfer and use to analyse the contents of the
aforementioned regimes, and then compares this analysis with that of the
three elements as reflected in emissions entitlements. Out of the three rights
regimes examined, emissions entitlements are most similar to milk quotas,
albeit with some major exceptions. In the UK, courts have sought to clarify
the treatment of milk quotas on an area-by-area basis, for instance as regards
security interests or in cases of insolvency. The regulatory purpose of milk
quotas and the flexibility in their characteristics according to the context
in which they operate also translates to emissions entitlements. This find-
ing supports the characterisation of emissions entitlements as instrumental
property, the new concept put forward by the thesis.
Chapter 6 assesses the findings of the thesis: a comprehensive analytical
construction of emissions entitlements to ensure the continued viability of
the EU ETS as a tool of environmental policy, and the evolutionary nature
of property rights in a regulatory environment. The thesis puts forward
the new category of instrumental property, to which emissions entitlements
are said to belong. It is argued that instrumental property differs from
the generic property categorisation of emissions entitlements in English law
as well as from the concept of regulatory property. It is therefore posited
that the notion of instrumental property is better suited to accommodating
the evolutionary nature of entitlements created to pursue regulatory goals.
Specifically, the characteristics of instrumental property are determined by
the regulatory goals of the regime which has created the rights, as well as
by the particular contexts in which these rights operate. This flexibility
has the potential to undermine market certainty and thereby the success of
the environmental goals in the specific case of the EU ETS. The flexibility
also has wider reverberations for the functionality of property, which, in
a regulatory environment, becomes necessarily subordinated to extraneous
interests.
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Chapter 2
The Origins and Workings of
the EU ETS, and the
Importance of the Analytical
Construction of Emissions
Entitlements1
2.1 Introduction
At a regulatory level, the EU ETS framework, notably the EU ETS Direc-
tive2, has not specified the legal nature of the entitlements that subsist in
emissions allowances once they are held and traded in the private market.
This position stands in contrast with commodities such as oil or gas, to which
emissions allowances have been compared3, where the nature of the rights is
1An earlier version of this chapter appeared as Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitle-
ments in the Constitution of the EU Emissions Trading System”.
2Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 .
3E. Doyle, J. Hill, and I. Jack. Growth in Commodity Investment: Risks and Challenges
for Commodity Market Participants. Financial Services Authority Markets Infrastructure
Department. 2007. url: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/commodity_invest.pdf,
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uncontroversial, as traditional commodities can be owned as private prop-
erty. In English law, for instance, following the judgment in Armstrong v.
Winnington4, emissions entitlements have been designated as property rights.
However, the exact scope and contents of such entitlements as a form of prop-
erty remain unclear5. To demonstrate the practical importance of crafting
an analytical construction of emissions entitlements, the chapter discusses a
case study where the absence of such a construction has negatively impacted
on the functionality of the emissions market and its continued success as a
tool of environmental policy.
It should be recognised that the primary objective of the EU ETS is the
reduction of emissions over time in line with a decreasing cap6. The viability
of the emissions market and the maintenance of a price level sufficient to
incentivise participants to trade are the means to achieve this goal. Whether
emissions prices are low as a result of market oversupply or high because of
undersupply at any given time, it is the adequacy of the cap that remains
the main prerequisite for achieving the desired levels of emissions reductions
in the short term, during a particular trading period. Low or high emis-
sions prices indicate, respectively, that it is either cheaper or more expensive
to buy allowances than to invest in emissions abatement methods in order
to achieve the reductions stipulated in the cap, and thus demonstrate the
flexibility and economic efficiency of emissions trading. It is argued that, in
addition to a sufficiently stringent cap, achieving emissions reductions in the
long term requires an adequate emissions price level7. Low or highly volatile
prices have the potential to reduce incentives for investment in low-carbon
technologies (which the EU ETS has pledged to encourage as part of the
pp. 30-31.
4Armstrong DLW GmbH v. Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC (Ch) 10 , discussed
in more detail in chapter 3.5.
5See further chapter 4.1.
6Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , art. 1.
7C. Kettner et al. Price Volatility in Carbon Markets: Why It Matters and How It Can
Be Managed. Austrian Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 409/2011, 2011.
url: http://angela.koeppl.wifo.ac.at/fileadmin/files/price_volatility_0
1.pdf, pp. 6-7.
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EU’s move towards a low-carbon economy)8, as it would become more ex-
pensive or economically risky to invest in abating emissions than to purchase
allowances in the market9. Conversely (although this has not been a prob-
lem encountered in the EU ETS to date), excessively high emissions prices
can increase compliance costs and thus reduce support for the scheme from
regulated entities10. Continued support is important, given that the political
acceptability of the EU ETS is premised on its perceived advantages as a
flexible, lowest-cost means of reducing emissions which renders it preferable
to, notably, an emissions tax11.
A key issue raised by the case study is the strength of emissions entitle-
ments when invoked against public authorities. The EU ETS Directive is
silent on the permissible extent and consequences of interference by public
authorities with emissions entitlements during their period of validity. These
points are particularly relevant as the EU ETS moves towards its Phase III
(2013–20). Phase I (2005–07) was characterised by a substantial surplus of
allowances as a result of regulated installations having over-estimated their
free initial allocations. This over-estimation and consequent over-allocation
were caused by the unavailability of accurate historical emissions data for
regulated installations across the EU12. It is worth noting that Phase I was
viewed as a trial stage by the European Commission. This phase was es-
sentially intended to create an emissions market that would act as a path
towards attaining the reductions prescribed under the Kyoto Protocol13. The
8Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , recital 20.
9Kettner et al., Price Volatility in Carbon Markets: Why It Matters and How It Can
Be Managed, p. 7; M. Grubb and K. Neuhoff. “Allocation and Competitiveness in the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme: Policy Overview”. In: Climate Policy 6 (2006), pp. 7–30, at
13-14.
10Kettner et al., Price Volatility in Carbon Markets: Why It Matters and How It Can
Be Managed, p. 7.
11Convery, “Origins and Development of the EU ETS”, at 392-393.
12Ellerman and Buchner, “The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins,
Allocation, and Early Results”, at 69-70; Pohlmann, “The European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme”, at 353.
13Questions and Answers on the Revised EU Emissions Trading System. European Com-
mission Climate Action. url: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/faq_en.htm,
answers to questions 3 and 4; Kyoto Protocol, Kyoto (Japan), 11 December 1997, in force
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over-allocation had the dual effect of rendering the emissions market more
volatile and driving down the emissions price14. Phase II (2008–12) has also
been blighted by a surplus of emissions allowances in the market, this time
as a result of the economic downturn, which has slowed down industrial pro-
duction and thus inadvertently reduced the levels of emissions. The EU ETS
Directive allows for unused Phase II allowances to be carried over into Phase
III, which means that the surplus will potentially continue to affect the sta-
bility of the market as well as the emissions price15. One way to deal with
the problem of carry-over may be to revoke the unused allowances. However,
it is argued that the interdependency between the viability of the emissions
market and the success of the environmental goal of emissions trading ren-
ders it necessary to balance carefully the need for some degree of security of
emissions entitlements against the need for regulatory flexibility in adjusting
the emissions cap as required for the purposes of environmental policy.
A second key issue highlighted by the case study is the treatment of
emissions entitlements in private law. The Corus case raised the question of
whether emissions entitlements can form the subject of a trust in the same
way as conventional property rights. The range of uses to which emissions
entitlements can be put by their holders and the level of protection afforded
to these entitlements are of particular importance in the sphere of commercial
contracts, which transact emissions entitlements between parties and form
the basis of the emissions market.
The chapter begins by charting the development of the EU ETS from
international environmental law in the shape of the Kyoto Protocol. Next
follows an account of the key constitutive and operational elements of the EU
regime that are relevant for the purposes of the thesis (Part 2.2). Part 2.3
explains the importance of crafting an analytical construction of emissions
16 February 2005. url: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
14M. Cames, F. Matthes, and S. Healy. Functioning of the ETS and the Flexible Mecha-
nisms. European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department
A: Economic, Scientific Policy, Environment, Public Health, and Food Safety. 2011. url:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/envi/dv/201/201
104/20110419_envi_functioning_of_ets_en.pdf, pp. 8-9.
15Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and as-
sessing the risk of carbon leakage, pp. 3-4.
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entitlements in view of the goals of the EU ETS and the means chosen to
achieve them. The environmental goal and the market mechanism employed
to achieve it highlight the particular interdependency that arises between the
public and private law aspects of emissions trading. The EU ETS aims to
reduce emissions, a public policy goal the achievement of which is premised
on the success of the emissions market. Part 2.4 discusses a case study that
exemplifies observed gaps in the regulatory scheme that arise from the ab-
sence of a comprehensive construction of emissions entitlements. Part 2.5
examines the treatment of allowances in the US Acid Rain Program, which
bears a number of similarities with the EU ETS, and highlights informa-
tive parallels between the legal nature of emissions entitlements in the two
regimes. The chapter concludes by reiterating the importance of articulat-
ing a construction of emissions entitlements which can reconcile the multiple
and potentially conflicting goals of the EU ETS. The conclusion reinforces
the urgency of this exercise by reference to the level of protection that the
commercial contracts constituting the emissions market can offer to trading
entities, a topic which is explored in the following chapter.
2.2 The origins and workings of the EU ETS
2.2.1 The origins of the EU ETS in international en-
vironmental law
Market-based instruments of regulation work by imposing a price on the pol-
lution or other environmental stress caused by regulated entities. Since the
entity faces this cost for each unit of pollution, it is incentivised to contin-
ually reduce the levels of environmental stress. It can do so in a flexible
manner best suited to its individual circumstances, rather than in the cen-
trally prescribed manner, as is the case with command and control regulation.
Tradable permit regimes, a category to which the EU ETS belongs, create
entitlements to pollute at the regulatory level, which are subsequently left to
be valued and traded in the market, enabling the reduction in overall emis-
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sions at the lowest cost to regulated entities16. The motivation to achieve
emissions reductions at the lowest cost will, it is hoped, encourage firms to
explore innovative abatement technologies17. It has been noted that:
“[t]he most common form of emissions trading is the cap-and-
trade mechanism [for instance the EU ETS], whereby compe-
tent authorities set aggregate caps on emissions during a certain
period of time, allocate emissions allowances to the regulated,
emitting participants, whether by way of free initial allocation or
auction, and allow participants to produce emissions up to the
allowances that they have been allocated”18.
The development of environmental protection at the international level
highlights the growing importance of market-based instruments. The 1992
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) pro-
duced the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-
FCCC)19, whose stated purpose was the “stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”20.
The UNFCCC divides countries into three main groups with differenti-
ated responsibilities vis-à-vis greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Annex
I includes developed countries which were members of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992, as well as coun-
tries with economies in transition, being Russia, Eastern European countries
and the Baltic States. Annex II consists of the OECD members in Annex I,
16S. Sorrell and J. Skea. Pollution for Sale: Emissions Trading and Joint Implementa-
tion. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp. 1, 3.
17B. Ackerman and R. Stewart. “Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case
for Market Incentives”. In: Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 13 (1988), pp. 171–
199, at 179, 183.
18R. de Witt Wijnen. “Emissions Trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol”. In:
Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms: Making Kyoto Work. Ed.
by D. Freestone and C. Streck. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 403–415, at
405-406.
19United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York (US), 9 May
1992, in force 21 March 1994. url: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conve
ng.pdf.
20Ibid., art. 2.
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but not the countries with economies in transition. Annex II countries are
charged with providing financial resources to assist developing countries with
reducing emissions and adapting to climate change. They are also tasked with
taking all practicable steps to promote the development and transfer of en-
vironmentally friendly technologies to countries with economies in transition
and developing countries. Non-Annex I parties are principally developing
countries, whose social needs and concerns, such as investment, insurance
and technology transfer, are looked after by the UNFCCC21.
The UNFCCC came into force in March 1994. The principal concern of
the parties at that stage was the clarification of the vague emissions reduc-
tion commitments that had been laid down in the UNFCCC. To this end,
a series of Conferences of the Parties (COP) culminated with COP3 in Ky-
oto in 1997, where an instrument strengthening the UNFCCC commitments
was negotiated and agreed upon22. The Kyoto Protocol23 was subsequently
adopted the same year, and set binding targets for the Annex I countries
and the EU (as a signatory in its own right) for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions24.
The development of international environmental law since the UNCED
has been characterised by an increased tendency to provide input on actual
implementation, rather than restrict itself to prescribing normative standards
of behaviour. This shift of focus has resulted, inter alia, in a focus on new
regulatory techniques, most notably tradable permits, as evidenced in the
sphere of climate protection by the Kyoto Protocol.
The Protocol sets up three distinct mechanisms for emissions reductions,
namely Joint Implementation (JI)25, the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM)26 and Assigned Amount Trading (AAT)27. As part of JI, countries
21United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Parties and Observers.
url: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php.
22D. Freestone. “The International Climate Change Legal and Institutional Framework:
An Overview”. In: Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and Beyond. Ed.
by D. Freestone and C. Streck. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 3–32, at 10-11.
23Kyoto Protocol, Kyoto (Japan), 11 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005 .
24Ibid., annex B.
25Ibid., art. 6.
26Ibid., art. 12.
27Ibid., art. 17.
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listed in Annex B of the Protocol (being industrialised countries, such as EU
Member States) may transfer to or acquire from one another reductions of
emissions. These are called Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) and are gener-
ated by specific, verified project activities in other Annex B countries. Within
the CDM, on the other hand, Annex B countries can finance verified CDM
projects in developing countries and use the resulting Certified Emission Re-
ductions (CERs) to fulfil their own emissions reductions commitments. The
AAT constitutes what has become widely known as emissions trading, as
Annex B parties may trade Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) with one an-
other. One AAU corresponds to one metric tonne of CO2 emissions. The
number of AAUs available corresponds to the targets set by the Protocol for
the 2008-2012 commitment period28. Countries who require AAUs over and
above the allocated targets can buy more AAUs from countries who have
not made full use of their allocated AAUs; this is the system of international
emissions trading that the Protocol has set up.
In order to comply with the Kyoto Protocol targets, signatories may set
up national or regional emissions trading systems. The EU is a signatory to
the UNFCCC and the ensuing Kyoto Protocol as a party in its own right,
and has set up the EU ETS, which is the largest compulsory scheme of its
kind currently in existence. The EU’s emissions reduction target under the
Kyoto Protocol is also shared with Member States under the Burden Sharing
Agreement29.
2.2.2 The purpose and ambit of the EU ETS
The principal legislative source setting out the Union system of emissions
trading is the EU ETS Directive30. The EU ETS has been devised to function
28Kyoto Protocol, Kyoto (Japan), 11 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005 , art. 3.
29Council Decision 2002/358/EC of 25 April 2002 concerning the approval, on behalf
of the European Community, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the joint fulfilment of commitments thereunder [2002]
OJ L130/1.
30Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 .
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in three phases, each with differing rules regarding, principally, the calcula-
tion of the EU-wide upper limits on emissions (known as the cap) and the
allocation of emissions allowances. Phase I covered the period from 2005 to
2007, Phase II spans 2008 to 2012, and Phase III is intended to run from
2013 to 2020. Any type of entity (including private individuals) may hold and
trade in emissions allowances; participation is not restricted to installations
trading for reasons of compliance with the EU ETS31. The stated purpose of
the EU ETS Directive is “to promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions
in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner”32.
The effect of the EU ETS regime is that every regulated installation needs
to hold a permit issued by a competent authority in the relevant Member
State33 in order to be able to carry on its emitting activities. The permit at-
tests that the installation is capable of monitoring and reporting emissions34,
and entails an obligation to surrender emissions allowances equal to the total
emissions in each calendar year within four months following the end of that
year35. “Allowance” is defined as an allowance to emit one tonne of CO236.
The installation is obliged to monitor and report its emissions, and this re-
port is verified and accredited by the responsible Member State37. Failure
to surrender the requisite number of emissions each year attracts a penalty
of €100 for each tonne of CO2 emitted for which no allowances have been
surrendered, to increase according to the European consumer prices index
from 201338.
31Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , arts. 12(1), 19(2).
32Ibid., art. 1.
33Ibid., art. 4.
34Ibid., art. 6(1).
35Ibid., art. 6(2)(e).
36Ibid., art. 3(a).
37Ibid., arts. 14, 15, and annexes IV, V.
38Ibid., art. 16(3), (4).
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2.2.3 Allocation of emissions allowances
In Phases I and II of the EU ETS, the annual allocation of emissions al-
lowances to regulated installations was carried out by way of National Allo-
cation Plans (NAPs), which each Member State was responsible for compil-
ing. The NAPs drawn up by individual Member States made up the total,
EU-wide emissions cap. This was subject to the fact that, for Phase II, EU
ETS emissions were capped at around 6.5% below 2005 levels. The set limit
was intended to ensure that the EU as well as individual Member States
would fulfil their Kyoto commitments as regards emissions reductions, since
Phase II coincided with the first Kyoto commitment period39.
Each NAP set out the quantity of emissions which the Member State in
question calculated that all its EU ETS regulated installations would need
every year. As well as this national cap, the NAP also included a list of the
relevant installations in that Member State and the quantities of allowances
that would be allocated to each installation. NAPs had to be submitted
to and approved by the European Commission before any allocation of al-
lowances could be made to regulated installations40.
In Phase I, the majority of the allowances under the NAPs (95%) were
allocated free of charge, with the possibility that Member States could auc-
tion 5% of the total number of allowances to be allocated . However, the
intention is that in subsequent phases the amount of allowances auctioned
to regulated installations should increase. In Phase II (2008-2012), provision
was made for 10% of allowances to be capable of being auctioned41.
Phase III sees the cap set centrally at the EU level, and is designed to
decrease annually in a linear manner by 1.74% in relation to the Phase II
cap42. The level of emissions reductions aimed for is 21% in 2020 compared
39Questions and Answers on the Revised EU Emissions Trading System, answer to ques-
tion 3.
40National Allocation Plans. European Commission Climate Action. url: http://ec.
europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/nap/index_en.htm.
41EU ETS 2005-2012. European Commission Climate Action. url: http://ec.europ
a.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/index_en.htm.
42Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , art. 9.
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to 200543. Allocations of emissions allowances by Member States to the reg-
ulated installations in their territory are to be made in accordance with
harmonised rules, thus doing away with NAPs44. Auctioning is intended to
become the basic method of allocation in Phase III, as opposed to the pre-
dominantly free allocation of allowances in the previous two Phases45. Free
allocation is still possible, namely transitional free allocation for industrial
installations46. The process for free allocation is organised centrally, at the
EU level47. In some sectors, free allocations will be gradually phased out from
2013, with exceptions being available for installations at significant risk of
carbon leakage48.
All allowances which are not allocated freely are to be auctioned by each
Member State49. There are rules regarding how the European Commission
distributes the allowances to be auctioned to Member States, who are then
responsible for auctioning these allowances to regulated entities. 88% of the
allowances to be auctioned by each Member State are distributed on the basis
of the Member State’s share of historic EU ETS emissions, and 12% will be
distributed taking into consideration the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per
capita and the reductions achieved under the Kyoto Protocol50.
2.2.4 Links with the Kyoto Protocol
In order to avail itself of the different types of emissions reduction mech-
anisms permitted under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU, through its Linking
43Questions and Answers on the Revised EU Emissions Trading System, answer to ques-
tion 9.
44Ibid., answer to question 8.
45Auctioning. European Commission Climate Action. url: http://ec.europa.eu/cli
ma/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/index_en.htm.
46Questions and Answers on the Revised EU Emissions Trading System, answer to ques-
tion 13.
47Ibid., answer to question 14.
48Ibid., answer to question 15.
49Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , art. 10(1).
50Questions and Answers on the Revised EU Emissions Trading System, answer to ques-
tion 17.
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Directive51, has enabled EU ETS regulated installations to use a set propor-
tion of emissions reduction credits generated in developing countries under
certain types of project mandated by the Kyoto Protocol52.
EU ETS regulated installations can obtain emissions reduction credits
from JI projects, for instance building installations for the production of
electricity from wind power in Bulgaria53 or in other developed countries
which are listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol as subject to emissions
reduction commitments. Credits are also available from CDM projects, for
instance building installations for the production of electricity from wind
power in India54 or in other developing countries, in order to fulfil emissions-
surrendering obligations under the EU ETS. In exchange for one CER from
CDM projects or one ERU from JI projects held by a regulated installation,
the Member State is obliged to issue and surrender one emissions allowance,
and must also cancel the received CER or ERU55. Consequently, CERs and
ERUs cannot be traded as such within the EU ETS, by contrast with emis-
sions allowances.
The possibility of using CERs and ERUs as part of the EU ETS in this
manner, by swapping them for emissions allowances, is set to continue into
Phase III56. The EU ETS Directive sets limits on the levels of CERs and
ERUs that installations may use within the EU ETS57. In addition, from
51Directive 2004/101/EC of 27 October 2004 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 October 2004 amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, in respect of the Kyoto
Protocol project mechanisms [2004] OJ L338/18.
52Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , art. 11b.
53United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kaliakra Wind power
project. url: http://ji.unfccc.int/JIITLProject/DB/O3G4FV0BYW6RVN1OP8PESF
1BY7I8AX/details.
54United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Wind Power based elec-
tricity generation project in India by DLF Home Developers Limited. url: http :
//cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/BVQI1270985563.08/view.
55Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , art. 11(b)(3).
56Ibid., art. 11b.
57Ibid., art. 11a(8).
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Phase III the use of credits from certain project types has been restricted, as
permitted by the EU ETS Directive58. Utilising credits from certain types of
land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) projects, as well as from
projects at nuclear facilities in the EU ETS has not been permitted since
the incipience of the system in 200559. Similarly, credits originating from
industrial gas projects, namely those involving trifluoromethane (HFC-23)
and nitrous oxide (N2O) from adipic acid production cannot be used in the
EU ETS from 1 January 201360. This is because industrial gas projects raise
environmental concerns and do not contribute to reducing global emissions
in the most efficient manner61.
2.2.5 Registration and trading of emissions allowances
Under the EU ETS, all sales and purchases of emissions allowances are
recorded. In Phases I and II, transactions in emissions allowances were
recorded in national registries managed by nominated regulators, who dealt
exclusively with issuing, holding, transferring and cancelling such allowances62.
By contrast, from Phase III allowances are to be held in the central EU reg-
istry instead, namely the EU Transaction Log (EUTL)63.
58Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , art. 11a(9).
59Questions and answers on the use of international credits in the third trading phase
of the EU ETS. url: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/docs/q_a_
20111114_en.pdf, answer to question 8(b).
60Commission Regulation (EU) No 550/2011 of 7 June 2011 on determining, pursuant
to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, certain restric-
tions applicable to the use of international credits from projects involving industrial gases
[2011] OJ L149/1, art. 1.
61Ibid., preamble, paras. 8-9.
62Union Registry. European Commission Climate Action. url: http://ec.europa.eu/
clima/policies/ets/registry/index_en.htm.
63Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , art. 19(1); Union Registry.
70
2.2.6 Banking of emissions allowances
If, at the end of a Phase of the EU ETS, a regulated installation has unused
allowances left over which are not sold before the end of the Phase, these
allowances will not be lost, as the EU ETS permits for allowances to be
banked from one trading period to the next.
“Banking” in the context of the EU ETS effectively means that an in-
stallation can use the allowances it has left over: “every allowance not sur-
rendered or retired in the second trading period can be used [. . . ] in phase
3”64. The way that banking works in practice is through an exchange at the
end of one trading period. For example, allowances issued for use in Phase
I of the EU ETS are, technically speaking, only valid for compliance during
Phase I. However, if the relevant Member State allows it, at the end of Phase
I an installation with leftover, unused allowances will have them cancelled
by the relevant national regulator, and will receive in exchange an equivalent
number of allowances valid for use in Phase II.
The original EU ETS Directive held that the so-called banking of al-
lowances from Phase I to Phase II was permissible under the EU ETS, but
it was at the discretion of individual Member States to decide whether to al-
low this within their respective territories65. All Member States (for example
the UK66 and Germany67) except France and Poland68 elected not to allow
64Questions and Answers on the Commission’s proposal to revise the EU Emissions
Trading System. European Commission. 23 January 2008. url: http://europa.eu/rapi
d/press-release_MEMO-08-35_en.htm, question 25.
65Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , art. 13(2).
66An Operator’s Guide to the EU Emissions Trading System: The Steps to Compliance.
Department of Energy and Climate Change. 2008. url: http://www.decc.gov.uk/asse
ts/decc/what%20we%20do/global%20climate%20change%20and%20energy/tackling%2
0climate%20change/emissions%20trading/eu_ets/euets_phase_2/operators_guid
e/events-guide.pdf, p. 19.
67S. Borak et al. Convenience Yields for CO2 Emission Allowance Futures Contracts.
SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2006-076, Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin, 2006. url: http:
//environmentalfinance.groupsite.com/uploads/files/x/000/00a/711/Borak_
Haerdle_Rrueck_Weron_2006.pdf, p. 5.
68D. Ellerman and P. Joskow. The European Union’s Emissions Trading Sys-
tem in Perspective. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2008. url: http :
//www.c2es.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf, pp. 3, 49.
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banking between Phases I and II. The amended EU ETS Directive provides
that Member States are obliged to permit the banking of allowances from
Phase II to Phase III69.
2.2.7 The EU emissions market
The EU ETS does not restrict participation in emissions trading to regulated
entities which engage in emissions trading for the purpose of compliance70.
In practice, this has meant that another, rather differently motivated type
of trading has developed concurrently. Participants in the financial markets
have not missed the opportunity to become involved in the emissions market
by creating and trading in a variety of more or less complex financial instru-
ments based on underlying emissions allowances, purely for the purpose of
investment.
The European Commission has also taken it upon itself to monitor the EU
emissions market and report in this respect to the Parliament and Council
on an annual basis71. If, for more than six consecutive months, the allowance
price increases to more than three times the average price of allowances during
the two preceding years on the EU carbon market, and this is not caused by
changing market fundamentals, Member States may be permitted to bring
forward the auctioning of a part of the quantity to be auctioned, or to auction
up to 25% of the allowances in the new entrants’ reserve72.
As required by the EU ETS Directive73, the Commission has also pub-
lished a Communication on emissions market oversight. This document as-
sesses the current level of protection of the market from risks such as market
abuse and insider dealing, and puts forward proposals for improved protec-
tion74.
69Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , art. 13(2).
70Ibid., ats. 12(1), 19(2).
71Ibid., art. 10(5).
72Ibid., art. 29a(1), (2).
73Ibid., art. 12(1a).
74Towards an enhanced market oversight framework for the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme. COM(2010)796 final. European Commission Communication. 2010. url: http:
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2.3 The importance of crafting an analytical
construction of emissions entitlements: the
goals of the EU ETS
The EU ETS has been described by the European Commission as “the cor-
nerstone of the EU’s strategy for fighting climate change”75, and is the largest
compulsory trading regime of its kind in the world. It has set a precedent for
the way in which this kind of incentive-based regulation can work in practice,
and has highlighted both the pitfalls and the advantages of moving regulation
out of the hands of public authorities and into those of the market.
The EU ETS has inspired other emissions trading schemes, for example
in Australia (due to start in 2015)76 and in the US state of California (from
2013)77. As the EU ETS model offers instructive lessons in the sphere of
global climate change policy, the tensions in its construction that the chapter
identifies are highly relevant outside the confines of the EU. Achieving the
correct balance in the level of emissions entitlements protection against the
issuing authority and in the range of permissible uses of such entitlements
are universal concerns in this sense. They are likely to challenge regulators
in other jurisdictions that have newly adopted trading schemes or plan to do
so in the near future. While Australia has designated emissions entitlements
as property78, California has expressly legislated that they do not constitute
property rights79. It therefore becomes necessary to provide a legal analysis
that can assist in determining why such different outcomes have been reached,
and why these differences matter. Such an analysis must necessarily be
conducted with direct reference to the interplay between the public policy
//eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0796:FIN:EN:PDF,
the Commission has also published proposals on improving the regulation of emissions
trading from a market abuse and investment services perspective. These proposals are
outside the scope of the thesis.
75Questions and Answers on the Revised EU Emissions Trading System, answer to ques-
tion 1.
76Clean energy legislation.
77Cap-and-Trade Program.
78Clean Energy Act 2011 (Commonwealth), s. 103.
79California Code of Regulations, Title 17, §95820(c).
73
aims of, and private law entitlements created by, the EU ETS.
The primary goal of the EU ETS is to reduce emissions in line with
Kyoto Protocol commitments through an efficient emissions market, with
minimal diminution of economic development80. Moreover, it is intended that
emissions reductions will increase in the manner considered to be scientifically
necessary to avoid dangerous climate change81. In addition, the EU ETS
pledges to encourage investment in low-carbon technologies so as to achieve
long-term emissions reductions82. The trading aspect does not of itself bring
about emissions reductions. That is the job of the overall cap on emissions,
set in Phases I and II by way of NAPs for each Member State and, as of
2013, by the European Commission at a central level. The cap itself is a
classic command and control regulatory instrument. The role of the trading
aspect is to optimise the achievement of emissions reductions by allowing
them to be made where it is cheapest to do so, whether by actually reducing
emissions or by buying more allowances in the market83.
The EU ETS is a market mechanism that aims to create strong incentives
to reduce emissions by delegating the workings of the emissions market to its
participants. The logical consequence is that the market needs to function
effectively in order for the goal of reducing emissions to be attained. Even if
trading per se does not achieve emissions reductions, it does indirectly affect
the success of environmental regulation. This is because emissions trading
has emerged as a popular way to “sell” environmental protection to regulated
entities. It offers them flexibility in the manner of compliance, so that every
entity can reduce emissions in the most cost-effective way possible. This flexi-
bility can increase support for the pre-set cap and may increase the likelihood
of compliance with it, where the levels of reduction can be gradually lowered
over time to reduce the amount of environmentally harmful pollution84. The
80Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , recital 5.
81Ibid., art. 1.
82Ibid., recital 20.
83The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).
84N. Keohane. “Cap and Trade, Rehabilitated: Using Tradable Permits to Control U.S.
Greenhouse Gases”. In: Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 3 (2009), pp. 42–
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elements of emissions trading which make it popular with regulated entities
are precisely those elements that render it necessary to establish some degree
of certainty regarding the scope of (and, in particular, any limitations on)
the entitlements that can subsist in allowances. The EU ETS is neither a
mere regulatory tool, nor is it designed simply to support the workings of
command and control regulation in the way that the US trading regimes
of the 1970s and 1980s had been85. As with the US Acid Rain Program86,
under the EU ETS a market has developed where emissions allowances are
freely tradable between both regulated and non-regulated entities (such as
individuals or financial institutions)87.
A potential strong link exists between the scope of emissions entitlements
and the degree of environmental success that the EU ETS can expect to
achieve. Reducing emissions to the levels required to adequately tackle cli-
mate change by means of a decreasing cap arguably demands a significant
limitation on these entitlements. This limitation resides in the possibility of
regulatory intervention to adjust the amount of allowances in the market,
should the environmental goal of reducing emissions so dictate. On the other
hand, maintaining a viable emissions market becomes important in itself if
long-term reductions are to be achieved by way of low-carbon technologies88.
The outcomes of a viable emissions market and minimal impact on economic
development need certainty as to the scope of the entitlements89.
However, it should not be assumed that EU emissions entitlements are
equivalent to fully fledged private property rights. For instance, both the US
Acid Rain Program90 and the Californian emissions trading scheme91 have
62, at 45-46.
85T. Tietenberg. “The Evolution of Emissions Trading”. In: Better Living Through Eco-
nomics. Ed. by J. Siegfried. Boston: Harvard University Press, 2010, pp. 42–58, at 46-47.
86Ibid., at 47-48.
87Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , arts. 12(1), 19(2).
88Ibid., recital 20.
89Field and Field, Environmental Economics: An Introduction, p. 203, in microeconomic
theory, exclusivity, enforceability and transferability of rights are the key prerequisites for
a market to function effectively.
901990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 United States Code, §7651b(f).
91California Code of Regulations, Title 17 , §95820(c).
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expressly denied property status to their respective emissions entitlements.
This approach is intended to enable issuing authorities to cancel valid al-
lowances as they deem necessary to further environmental policies, without
incurring a corresponding obligation to compensate allowance holders as if
the authorities were expropriating property92. At the US federal level, the
EPA has recognised the risk to market viability posed by arbitrary market
intervention, and has stated that such intervention will occur only in excep-
tional circumstances, when made imperative by environmental policy93.
By contrast, the EU ETS Directive is silent on the possibility and extent
of regulatory intervention in the emissions market. The EPA’s example is in-
structive, and demonstrates a trade-off between the primary goal of emissions
reductions and the viability of the emissions market. It is argued that the EU
should clarify its position on this trade-off. In particular, supplementation
of the current EU ETS legislative framework would be welcomed. Market
certainty and thus, ultimately, the environmental goal of the EU ETS would
benefit from a defined scope of regulatory intervention and clear rules on
how such intervention should be carried out, so that the legitimate economic
interests of market participants are not unduly affected. This type of com-
promise scenario could assist in maintaining market confidence while, at the
same time, retaining a sufficient level of regulatory discretion over emissions
entitlements in order to pursue the emissions reductions objective.
Moreover, the nature and treatment of property are not centralised at the
EU level, but remain the responsibility of Member States. The categorisation
of emissions allowances, whether as property rights or as another type of
right, cannot therefore be easily harmonised across the EU. However, EU-
level clarification as to certain aspects of emissions entitlements would assist
92Cole, “Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and Environmental
Protection”, at 113; and see chapter 4.3 for a discussion of the relevance of interference by
public authorities to the existence of a property right.
93D. Cole. Pollution and Property: Comparing Ownership Institutions for Environmen-
tal Protection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 55; A. Rosenberg. “Emis-
sions Credit Futures Contracts on the Chicago Board of Trade: Regional and Rational
Challenges to the Right to Pollute”. In: Virginia Environmental Law Journal 13 (1994),
pp. 501–536, at 508; Dennis, “Smoke for Sale: Paradoxes and Problems of the Emissions
Trading Program of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990”, at 1137.
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Member States in deciding how to construct and treat such entitlements in
their domestic legal systems. This process appears to have already begun,
albeit in a localised fashion: the Commission Regulation establishing an EU
Registry from 201394 protects bona fide purchasers of emissions allowances by
enabling them to acquire full title in the allowance even in cases where there
is a dispute as to its ownership95. The interpretation of what constitutes
“good faith” is left to the Member States96. A similar approach could be
applied to clarify, for instance, the strength of emissions entitlements as
against the issuing authority, while leaving the level of protection afforded
to such entitlements to individual Member States.
If it can be agreed that the environmental success of the EU ETS depends
on adequately balancing its primary emissions reductions objective with the
legitimate economic interests of market participants, the logical next step
is to devise an analytical framework for determining the characteristics of
emissions entitlements of the type put forward in the introduction to the
thesis.
These characteristics should help to achieve the environmental goal of the
EU ETS while, at the same time, paying due consideration to the need to pre-
serve a sufficient degree of market viability. In terms of legal categorisation,
we must be prepared for the possibility that emissions entitlements may re-
quire further definition beyond the traditionally recognised conceptualisation
of property.
94Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1193/2011 of 18 November 2011 establishing a
Union Registry for the Trading Period Commencing on 1 January 2013, and Subsequent
Trading Periods, of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme pursuant to Directive
2003/87/EC and Decision 280/2004/EC and Amending Commission Regulations (EC)
No. 2216/2004 and (EU) No. 920/2010 [2011] OJ L315/1.
95Ibid., recital 12, art. 37(4).
96General Questions and Answers on Registries. European Commission Climate Action.
url: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/registry/faq_en.htm, answer to
question 6.
77
2.4 The importance of crafting an analytical
construction of emissions entitlements: some
practical lessons
This part highlights a number of limitations of the EU ETS that are cor-
related to the absence of a comprehensive construction of emissions enti-
tlements. The selected case study illustrates some potentially serious conse-
quences of the observed gaps in the EU ETS regulatory framework. The case
study thus demonstrates the need to articulate a clear construction of emis-
sions entitlements, which can best be done using an analytical framework in
the form put forward in the introduction to the thesis.
From February to August 2010, the media reported on the sale of a
Teesside steelmaking plant belonging to Corus, the European arm of Tata
Steel, to a Thai purchaser97. The plant had been mothballed by Corus prior
to the sale, but was still set to receive a substantial number of emissions
allowances under the EU ETS. Corus wanted to bank these allowances for
the following three years so that the purchaser could make use of them. It
was also queried whether Corus had to retain the allowances so that they
could form part of the sale, or whether it was entitled to sell them on the
open market prior to the sale98.
The questions that arise here are threefold and relate to (i) the structures
of ownership that can apply to emissions allowances; (ii) the situation where
an entity reduces or ceases its EU ETS regulated activities; and (iii) the
extent of discretion over the use of allowances that their owner can enjoy.
Firstly, if a seller such as Corus wishes to retain emissions allowances for
the purpose of passing them on to a purchaser of the EU ETS regulated
installation (as permitted by the EU ETS Directive)99 it is not clear what
97“Corus agrees to sell Teesside plant to SSI of Thailand”. In: The Guardian. 27 August
2010. url: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/aug/27/ssi-corus-teessid
e-sale.
98“Closed UK steel plant to get EU carbon permits: government”. In: Reuters.
13 December 2009. url: http : / / www . reuters . com / article / 2009 / 12 / 1
4/us-britain-steel-emissions-idUSTRE5BA2JJ20091214.
99Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
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ownership structure can be used to this effect. It was suggested that Corus
should place the allowances in trust for the prospective purchaser pending
completion of the sale, but this gives rise to the question of whether emissions
allowances can constitute the kind of property that may be the subject of
a valid trust, where direct legal ownership of the allowances may not be
appropriate for whatever reason100.
Secondly, the plant had been mothballed by Corus prior to the sale, which
meant that it effectively received an over-allocation of allowances that were
surplus to its actual production needs. However, the UK government held
that the plant could retain its allocation of emissions allowances for 2010,
as the allowances had already been issued and were thus said to be “the
property of Corus”101. For the duration of Phase II of the EU ETS (until
the end of 2012), future allocations would depend on the extent to which
any EU ETS regulated activities would continue at the plant, which had not
fully ceased to function102. For Phase III (from 2013), it has been expressly
stated by way of Directive that allocations would be reduced for partially
closed installations103. The European Commission has also issued a Decision
setting out the rules on capacity reductions and closures of installations104.
The Decision provides that, where an installation has a significant capacity
reduction, or where it ceases its operations either entirely or partially, the
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , art. 7.
100Armstrong DLW GmbH v. Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC (Ch) 10 , paras.
52-59, holds that in the UK an allowance is capable of forming the subject-matter of a
trust.
101Government Response to the North East Regional Committee’s Second Report of Ses-
sion 2009–10 into Teesside Cast Products. CM 7868. Department for Business, Innovation
and Skills. 2010. url: http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm78/786
8/7868.pdf, p. 7.
102Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , art. 7.
103Directive 2009/29/EC of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Im-
prove and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of the Com-
munity [2009] OJ L140/63, art. (8).
104Commission Decision 2011/278/EU of 27 April 2011 Determining Transitional
Union-Wide Rules for Harmonised Free Allocation of Emission Allowances pursuant to
Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC [2011] OJ L130/1.
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allowance allocation will be reduced accordingly105 or, in the case of total
cessation, will be withdrawn entirely106. It is worth noting that, in all three
scenarios, such adjustments to allocation levels will take place as of the year
following that during which the capacity reduction or cessation of operations
occurred107.
That a revision of the amount of allowances can be carried out for fu-
ture allocation periods is uncontroversial, but the question remains whether
a currently valid allocation can be reduced. Given the regulatory purpose
of the EU ETS, it is notable that the cancellation of emissions allowances
once issued was excluded as a possible solution to the discrepancy between
the number of allowances required to cover production and the number of
allowances actually held by the plant. The UK government’s reference to
the 2010 allowances as constituting the “property” of Corus is a debatable
choice of words. Since the EU ETS Directive neither allows nor prohibits the
cancellation of issued allowances, the fact that the UK government chose the
route of no cancellation may indicate an unwillingness to interfere with regu-
latory instruments which have effectively (and perhaps inadvertently) given
rise to private property rights in the hands of the holders. However, the issue
of whether Corus’ entitlements in the 2010 allowances amount to property
rights remains unclear since no legal analysis of the EU ETS framework was
carried out.
It appears, therefore, that the cancellation of valid allowances would po-
tentially require a review of the EU ETS legislative framework. Amending
the legislation to expressly provide for such cancellation is a possible solu-
tion to tackle the current surplus, which is negatively affecting the emissions
price. On the other hand, if such cancellation is carried out with little prior
notice, it could wreak havoc in the market. It would run counter to the idea
of certainty of rights, which is viewed by economists as necessary for the
105Commission Decision 2011/278/EU of 27 April 2011 Determining Transitional
Union-Wide Rules for Harmonised Free Allocation of Emission Allowances pursuant to
Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC [2011] OJ L130/1 , arts. 21, 23.
106Ibid., art. 22.
107Ibid., arts. 21(3), 22(3), 23(2)-(4).
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continuity of a viable emissions market108. While the primary goal of the EU
ETS remains emissions reductions, it has also become necessary to support
the viability of the emissions market as an effective means of achieving the
ultimate environmental objective. When considering the option of legislative
change, the Commission should consequently bear in mind that the environ-
mental success of the EU ETS has come to be measured by reference to the
functionality of the emissions market, as well as to the levels of emissions
reductions.
Thirdly, the question arose as to how Corus could use the allowances
appertaining to the plant. If Corus were entitled to all its allowances for
2010–12, despite the reduction in activity at the plant, it would be able to
sell in the market those which had been freed up as a result of the reduction
in activity (as opposed to making them part of the sale–purchase transaction
for the plant), and make a profit. This is not technically illegal, but the
issue arose whether doing so would comply with the environmental goals and
spirit of the EU ETS, as Corus would effectively be profiting from the over-
allocation of emissions allowances without having made any real effort to cut
emissions.
This highlights a potentially significant contrast between incidental emis-
sions reductions caused by, for instance, an economic crisis, and emissions
reductions achieved by developing greener technologies. Does it matter how
the reductions are attained, so long as they are attained? Arguably, in the
context of systematic, focused and long-term environmental policy, it does.
The very purpose of the EU ETS is to allow installations whose levels of
emissions fall below the corresponding number of allowances that have been
allocated to them to sell these allowances in the market. However, the EU
ETS envisages that this reduction in emissions levels will occur as installa-
tions develop greener, more innovative technologies of production that pave
the way towards low-carbon economies in the Member States109. The devel-
opment and eventual wide use of greener technology is thus presented as the
108Field and Field, Environmental Economics: An Introduction, p. 203.
109Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , recital 20.
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long-term goal of emissions trading, rather than simply trying to achieve re-
ductions wherever possible without a concerted strategy and in reliance upon
incidental decreases in industrial production. A report by the UK Committee
on Climate Change has highlighted the risk that reduced production caused
by the economic recession would lower the price of emissions allowances.
This may disincentivise self-scrutiny and investment in green technologies by
making it more attractive to continue to purchase allowances without any
effort to improve the environmental credentials of production110.
Investment in cleaner technologies and the consequent move to a low-
carbon economy have been identified as wider environmental policy goals by
the EU. The EU ETS forms part of a wider regulatory scheme, namely the EU
Climate and Energy Package, which has two aims, namely reducing emissions
and increasing the use of renewable energy. In the words of the European
Commission, the Package represents “an integrated approach to climate and
energy policy that aims to combat climate change and increase the EU’s en-
ergy security while strengthening its competitiveness”, so that Europe can
transform itself into “a highly energy-efficient, low carbon economy”111. The
EU ETS does not exist in a regulatory void where all that matters is achieving
cost-effective emissions reductions in line with a decreasing cap, irrespective
of whether the reductions are achieved by incidental falls in emissions or con-
certed efforts to move to a low-carbon economy. The European Commission
has remarked that the allowances surplus, inter alia, has already helped to
bring the 2020 emissions target within reach. Paradoxically, the ensuing low
emissions prices have compromised the low-carbon transformation intended
by the Package, which “was expected to be a key driver for [greenhouse gas]
emission reductions triggering innovation, and growth and job creation in the
low carbon technology industries”112. It has been noted that climate policy
needs to complement and support energy policy, and an inadequate emis-
110Meeting Carbon Budgets: The Need for a Step Change. Parliament Committee on
Climate Change. 2009. url: http://downloads.theccc.org.uk/docs/21667%20CCC%2
0Executive%20Summary%20AW%20v4.pdf, p. 17.
111The EU Climate and Energy Package.
112Analysis of Options Beyond 20% GHG Emission Reductions: Member State Results.
SWD(2012)5 final. European Commission Staff Working Paper. 2012. url: http://ec.e
uropa.eu/clima/policies/package/docs/swd_2012_5_en.pdf, pp. 5-6.
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sions price signal can lead to conflict between the two. So far, the short-term
volatility of the emissions price and the lack of a long-term price signal have
limited investment in low-carbon solutions. The EU ETS can assist energy
policy by encouraging low-carbon investment by way of a long-term price
signal113.
In addition, one of the amendments114 to the EU ETS Directive states
that:
more predictability should be ensured and the scope of the [emis-
sions trading] system should be extended by including new sectors
and gases with a view to both reinforcing a carbon price signal
necessary to trigger the necessary investments and by offering
new abatement opportunities, which will lead to lower overall
abatement costs and the increased efficiency of the system115.
In wider terms, the European Commission’s Roadmap for moving to a
low-carbon economy116 also requires a stable price signal that can act as a
powerful driver for technological innovation:
The EU ETS will be critical in driving a wide range of low carbon
technologies into the market, so that the power sector itself can
adapt its investment and operational strategies to changing en-
ergy prices and technology. For the ETS to play this role on the
identified pathway to 2050, both a sufficient carbon price signal
and long-term predictability are necessary117.
113B. Leguet, N. Fujiwara, and A. Georgiev. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme as a
Driver for Future Carbon Markets. Centre for European Policy Studies, 2012. url: http:
//www.ceps.eu/book/eu-emissions-trading-scheme-driver-future-carbon-marke
ts, pp. viii-ix, 27-8.
114Directive 2009/29/EC of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Im-
prove and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of the Com-
munity [2009] OJ L140/63 , art. 1(8).
115Ibid., recital 8.
116A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050. COM(2011)112
final. European Commission Communication. 2011. url: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0112:FIN:EN:PDF.
117Ibid., pp. 6-7.
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This preoccupation with moving to a low-carbon economy is logical: de-
veloping cleaner technologies is the long-term way of achieving emissions
reductions. Emissions reductions will not continue indefinitely on an inci-
dental basis, based on a decrease in production. Once any factors leading to
incidental reductions (for example, the economic crisis) are no longer present,
low-carbon technologies will need to be in place so as to continue to achieve
the requisite reductions while at the same time permitting economic growth.
2.5 Articulating an analytical construction of
emissions entitlements: lessons from the
US Acid Rain Program
The US Acid Rain Program has served as a source of inspiration for the EU
ETS118. The US trading regime was created by Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments119 with the purpose of reducing SO2 emissions responsible
for acid rain by 10 million tonnes below 1980 levels. The regime was divided
into two phases. In Phase I (from 1995), emissions allowances were allocated
to the 110 most polluting plants in 21 states, representing approximately
half of their historic emissions. In Phase II (from 2000), emissions from all
but the smallest polluters would be further reduced in line with centrally set
caps120. The model employed is cap-and-trade, with allowances (each equiv-
alent to one tonne of SO2)121 being freely tradable122. It has generally been
considered a success, as it has achieved emissions reductions at significantly
lower costs123.
118Convery, “Origins and Development of the EU ETS”, at 397, 407.
1191990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 United States Code, §7651.
120SO2 Reductions and Allowance Trading under the Acid Rain Program. US Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Clean Air Markets. url: http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/
progsregs/arp/s02.html.
1211990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 United States Code, §7651a(3).
122Ibid., §7651b(b).
123L. Chestnut and D. Mills. “A Fresh Look at the Benefits and Costs of the US Acid Rain
Program”. In: Journal of Environmental Management 77 (2005), pp. 252–266, at 253-255;
G. Chan et al. The SO2 Allowance Trading System and the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990: Reflections on Twenty Years of Policy Innovation. Harvard Kennedy School,
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Unlike the EU ETS Directive, the Clean Air Act offers a legal definition
of emissions allowances: they are limited authorisations to emit SO2, and do
not constitute property rights. Moreover, the government has the author-
ity to terminate or limit such authorisations124. One of the possible reasons
for these provisions may be to address the concerns of environmentalists that
granting property rights to pollute would be morally dubious125. A more prac-
tical purpose of the provisions is to reserve sufficient regulatory discretion to
interfere with emissions allowances as is necessary to pursue environmental
policy, while at the same time protecting the US government from the possi-
bility of compensation claims from entities whose allowances are cancelled or
confiscated126. If the allowances were considered to be property rights, regula-
tory interference once they had been allocated may be capable of amounting
to a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution and be sus-
ceptible to a claim for fair value compensation127. Regulators thus wished
to retain discretion over when to intervene in the trading system, either to
increase or decrease the number of allowances in circulation, free from the
liability associated with expropriating property rights.
Despite the apparently strict categorisation of emissions allowances as
limited authorisations to pollute, and specifically not property rights, US
case law has recognised a number of characteristics of allowances that are
very similar to property. According to the legislative framework itself, they
are freely tradable128. In Ormet Primary Aluminium Corp. v. Ohio Power
Co.129, which involved the assertion of a proprietary interest in certain al-
lowances, the court reiterated that such instruments were not property rights,
RPP-2012-01, 2012. url: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m- rcbg/rpp/Working%2
0papers/RPP_2012_01.pdf.
1241990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 United States Code, §7651b(f).
125M. Gehring and C. Streck. “Emissions Trading: Lessons from SOx and NOx Emissions
Allowance and Credit Systems, Legal Nature, Title, Transfer, and Taxation of Emission
Allowances and Credits”. In: Environmental Law Reporter 35 (2005), pp. 10219–10235, at
10221-10222.
126Cole, “Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and Environmental
Protection”, at 113.
127US Constitution, amend. V; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US 393 (1922),
this can include regulatory takings.
1281990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 United States Code, §7651b(b).
129Ormet Primary Aluminium Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F. 3d 799 (4th Cir. 1996).
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but had been intended only to be tradable like any other commodity. How-
ever, the court also added that, in creating a system of tradable allowances,
Congress intended that disputes between allowance holders be resolved in
the same manner as other private commercial disputes, namely in federal
courts as opposed to being resolved through the involvement of the EPA130.
This view suggests that disputes over allowances, while not disputes over
property rights, are effectively private disputes over ownership. This is be-
cause the Clean Air Act Amendments state that no acid rain permit will be
issued unless the applicant files a certificate confirming that allowances will
be deemed to be held or distributed “in proportion to each holder’s legal,
equitable, leasehold, or contractual reservation or entitlement”131. The Act
therefore provides for divided ownership of emissions allowances in a similar
way to that which may exist for property132. In Clean Air Markets Group v.
Pataki133, it was further held that state law-triggered diminution in value of
these allowances constituted injury that was in fact sufficient to demonstrate
standing134.
It would therefore seem that, although SO2 emissions allowances are not
property rights as against the government, they exhibit many characteris-
tics of property rights as between trading parties. An entity can hold and
transfer allowances as well as use them to emit corresponding amounts of
SO2135, and it can exclude others (though not the government) from interfer-
ing with these entitlements136. This scenario has been referred to as creating
de facto property rights between private parties137. It has also been viewed
130Ormet Primary Aluminium Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F. 3d 799 (4th Cir. 1996).
1311990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 United States Code, §7651g(i)(1).
132Gehring and Streck, “Emissions Trading: Lessons from SOx and NOx Emissions Al-
lowance and Credit Systems, Legal Nature, Title, Transfer, and Taxation of Emission
Allowances and Credits”, at 10222.
133Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147 (NDNY 2002).
134Ibid.
1351990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 United States Code, §7651b(b).
136Cole, Pollution and Property: Comparing Ownership Institutions for Environmental
Protection, pp. 53-54; Cole, “Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights
and Environmental Protection”, at 113-114.
137Gehring and Streck, “Emissions Trading: Lessons from SOx and NOx Emissions Al-
lowance and Credit Systems, Legal Nature, Title, Transfer, and Taxation of Emission
Allowances and Credits”, at 10224.
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as premised on the confusion between property rights in something and the
thing itself: the thing (the allowance) is not property, but property rights
can exist in it nonetheless138. It appears that the risk of regulatory interfer-
ence has not negatively affected the SO2 emissions market. This is largely
attributed to the EPA’s expressed intention to treat allowances as if they
were property rights, save in exceptional circumstances, which means that
the risk of expropriation is, in practice, remote139.
By analogy with the US scenario, EU allowances could be seen as de facto
property rights, or at least as exhibiting certain traits of property rights.
They can be held and traded. They can also form the subject of contracts
between private parties, are enforceable as between them and can form the
subject of litigation on, for instance, contractual grounds140. Their enforce-
ability against the regulator is less clear than it is in the case of US allowances;
the EU ETS Directive does not expressly state whether valid and allocated
allowances may be terminated or limited. It appears that, in the EU, inter-
ference can occur in respect of future trading periods (for example, to reduce
the allowances for installations where activity has decreased or ceased)141
but not in respect of already allocated allowances, which have been viewed
as effectively giving rise to property rights142. This position differs from that
138Cole, Pollution and Property: Comparing Ownership Institutions for Environmental
Protection, pp. 53-54; Cole, “Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights
and Environmental Protection”, at 113-114.
139Cole, Pollution and Property: Comparing Ownership Institutions for Environmental
Protection, p. 55; Rosenberg, “Emissions Credit Futures Contracts on the Chicago Board
of Trade: Regional and Rational Challenges to the Right to Pollute”, at 508; Dennis,
“Smoke for Sale: Paradoxes and Problems of the Emissions Trading Program of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990”, at 1137.
140INEOS Manufacturing Scotland Ltd v. Grangemouth CHP Ltd and Another [2011]
EWHC 163, concerned a dispute based on a commercial contract for allowances.
141Directive 2009/29/EC of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to
Improve and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of the
Community [2009] OJ L140/63 , art. 1(8); Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 es-
tablishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Com-
munity and Amending Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32 , art. 7; Commission De-
cision 2011/278/EU of 27 April 2011 Determining Transitional Union-Wide Rules for
Harmonised Free Allocation of Emission Allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive
2003/87/EC [2011] OJ L130/1 , arts. 21-23.
142Government Response to the North East Regional Committee’s Second Report of Ses-
sion 2009–10 into Teesside Cast Products, p. 7.
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taken by the EPA, which has pledged not to interfere with allowances save
in exceptional cases. The EU approach may still leave open the possibility
that regulatory interference can theoretically occur with allowances that have
already been allocated.
It is also not clear whether the concern with compensation, which figures
so strongly in the US model, directly translates to the EU and its Member
States. In German constitutional law, for instance, there is a distinction
between expropriations of property (which always attract compensation)143
and rules determining the content and limits of ownership (which do not
automatically give rise to a right to compensation)144. While under US law,
interference with allowances (if considered property) would amount to a reg-
ulatory taking and thus give rise to compensation145, it may be that, were
interference with EU allowances to be tested in Germany, it could be con-
strued as falling within the less interventionist category, namely, determining
the nature of the entitlements in emissions allowances. The concern regarding
compensation had considerable influence on the denial of property status to
US allowances. Regulatory interference with EU allowances, however, would
not necessarily rely on this ground146.
2.6 Conclusion
The dual public-private nature of the EU ETS has created a new interdepen-
dency between the regulatory purpose of emissions trading and its private
law expression in the shape of the emissions market. The reliance of EU
143Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (German Federal Basic
Law/Constitution), art. 14(3); U. Deutsch. “Expropriation Without Compensation
– the European Court of Human Rights Sanctions German Legislation Expropriating the
Heirs of “New Farmers””. In: German Law Journal 6 (2005), pp. 1367–1380, at 1370-1371.
144Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (German Federal Basic
Law/Constitution), art. 14(1); Deutsch, “Expropriation Without Compensation –
the European Court of Human Rights Sanctions German Legislation Expropriating the
Heirs of “New Farmers””, at 1370-1371.
145US Constitution, amend. V; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US 393 (1922),
this can include regulatory takings.
146See chapter 4.3 for a discussion of the relevance of interference by public authorities
to the existence of a property right.
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climate change policy on the success of a private law mechanism offers a
series of novel challenges, a key one of which is the pressing need to craft a
comprehensive analytical construction of emissions entitlements.
The chapter has justified the importance of crafting such a construction
by identifying the multiple and often conflicting public policy goals of the
EU ETS, and revealing a significant link between these goals and the char-
acteristics of the entitlements that can be granted to market participants.
The practical examples of loopholes and tensions experienced in the regu-
latory framework have occurred as a result of, or have been aggravated by,
the absence of a clear construction of emissions entitlements. The practi-
cal failings of the EU ETS demonstrate a considerable need to articulate an
analytical framework to assist in identifying the characteristics of emissions
entitlements and, subsequently, crafting a set of characteristics which best
fits with the goals of emissions trading and the market-based means chosen to
pursue them. The chapter has argued that, in deducing this set of contents,
there is much to learn by reference to a similar regulatory trading regime,
the US Acid Rain Program. Furthermore, a comprehensive understanding
of the nature of emissions entitlements can best be articulated using a sys-
tematic analytical framework of the kind put forward in the introduction to
the thesis, which consists of the dual exercise of examining legal theories of
property and rights regimes which are comparable with emissions trading.
The consequences of articulating a construction of emissions entitlements
have potential ramifications in a wide range of areas. A non-exhaustive list
includes the tax and accounting treatment of emissions allowances147, crim-
inal law (for instance, theft of emissions allowances)148, the treatment of
emissions allowances in insolvency149, commercial contracts150, environmen-
147A. Cook. “Accounting for Emissions: From Costless Activity to Market Operations”.
In: Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and Beyond. Ed. by D. Freestone
and C. Streck. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 59–76; Mace, “The Legal
Nature of Emission Reductions and EU Allowances: Issues Addressed in an International
Workshop”, at 129-134.
148Emissions Allowances: Creating Legal Certainty, pp. 5, 8.
149Ibid., pp. 5-8.
150Mace, “The Legal Nature of Emission Reductions and EU Allowances: Issues Ad-
dressed in an International Workshop”, at 124-125; S. Drummond. “Trading Instruments
and Risk Management”. In: A Guide to Emissions Trading: Risk Management and Busi-
89
tal regulation151, financial markets regulation152, competition law (especially
the issue of state aid in the context of free allocation of emissions allowances
within the EU ETS)153, and international trade agreements (for instance,
whether they cover emissions trading)154.
One particular area stands out as a crucially important avenue for fur-
ther investigation, in view of the fact that emissions trading has created a
new private market in valuable instruments: the commercial contracts which
transact emissions allowances. The treatment of emissions allowances in
contracts raises important questions as regards the nature of the entitlement
being transferred, for instance how safe it is against public intervention and
what commercial uses can be made of allowances. The following chapter
therefore explores the impact of the dual public-private nature of the EU
ETS on the ways in which market participants can protect their economic
interests against the risks inherent in emissions trading. Coupled with the
problems elicited by the Corus case, the practical issues of contractual pro-
tection serve to reinforce the urgency of providing a comprehensive analytical
construction of emissions entitlements.
ness Implications. Ed. by C. de Jong and K. Walet. London: Risk Books, 2004, pp. 157–
177.
151Cole, “Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and Environmental
Protection”, at 113.
152Mace, “The Legal Nature of Emission Reductions and EU Allowances: Issues Ad-
dressed in an International Workshop”, at 126-127.
153Ibid., at 127-128.
154L. Rubini and I. Jegou. “Who’ll Stop the Rain? Allocating Emissions Allowances for
Free: Environmental Policy, Economics, and WTO Subsidy Law”. In: Transnational Envi-
ronmental Law 1 (2012), pp. 325–354; C. Voigt. “WTO Law and International Emissions
Trading: Is There Potential for Conflict?” In: Carbon and Climate Law Review 2 (2008),
pp. 54–66; Mace, “The Legal Nature of Emission Reductions and EU Allowances: Issues
Addressed in an International Workshop”, at 128-129.
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Chapter 3
Commercial Contracts in the
EU Emissions Market:
Addressing Risks and
Achieving Environmental Goals
3.1 Introduction
The chapter focuses on the role of contracts in the EU emissions market.
Specifically, it is argued that the role of contracts in constituting a market
with public policy objectives makes it necessary to assess whether the draft-
ing of such documentation is fit for purpose. In other words, it is necessary
to determine whether the drafting as it currently stands provides adequate
protection for market participants against the particular risks presented by
emissions trading. These are the risk of regulatory intervention and the risk
of use limitations: the two issues require clarification by way of an analytical
construction of emissions entitlements which can accommodate both regula-
tory flexibility and market certainty. If contracts can effectively protect the
economic interests of trading parties, they will be incentivised to continue
participating in the emissions market, which will thus operate in fulfilment
of the environmental goals of the EU ETS.
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Part 3.2 highlights the need to address unresolved legal problems in seem-
ingly functional markets, and draws a parallel between the emissions market
and financial collateral. Part 3.3 explores the workings of the EU emissions
market and the role of contracts in addressing the risks peculiar to emis-
sions trading. The risk of regulatory intervention to reduce supply in the
emissions market is discussed in Part 3.4. Part 3.5 covers the risk of limi-
tations on the uses to which emissions allowances can be put, notably the
existing uncertainty over the effectiveness of the mechanism for protecting
and enforcing security interests over allowances. Parts 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate
perceived shortcomings in contractual drafting as regards addressing these
two risks, and suggest possible avenues for improvement in order to better
address the identified risks, both at the regulatory and the private levels.
The chapter concludes by reinforcing the need to provide greater regulatory
clarification and improve contractual drafting in order to address these sig-
nificant risks, so as to enable the EU ETS to achieve its environmental goals.
The concluding part also indicates that the categorisation of emissions enti-
tlements as instrumental property put forward by the thesis has important
consequences for commercial relationships and therefore for the continued
viability of the emissions market. This issue is addressed in greater detail in
the final chapter.
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3.2 Unresolved legal problems in seemingly
functional markets and the constitutive
role of contracts in markets with public
policy objectives
Despite being blighted by low prices in recent times1, the emissions market
created by the EU ETS has continued to flourish. In 2011, EU allowance
trading volumes reached 7.9 billion tonnes of CO2 (a 16% increase from 2010),
and the market was worth €106 billion (an 11% increase from 2010)2. From
an economic perspective, the low emissions price indicates that the market
is working as it should. The emissions price is low because the market is
oversupplied3. Moreover, the buoyancy of trading does not appear to have
been affected by perceived shortcomings in the drafting of the contracts which
constitute the emissions market.
However, precedent indicates that even seemingly functional markets can
go wrong, in the sense of creating unwanted and potentially negative results
for their participants. A parallel can usefully be drawn with the legal sen-
sitivities of financial collateral, notably the issues of book debts and charge
backs in English law4. The outcomes of the case law on book debts and charge
backs and their effects on the drafting of security documentation illustrate
the risks of unresolved legal issues, even in markets which have been oper-
ating smoothly thus far. Once these issues reach the litigation stage, the
1State and Trends of the Carbon Market, pp. 17-18; “EU Emission Allowances - Spot”.
In: European Energy Exchange. url: http://www.eex.com/en/Market%20Data/Trad
ing%20Data/Emission%20Rights/EU%20Emission%20Allowances%20%7C%20Spot;
“European Carbon Futures Chart - Derivatives”. In: European Energy Exchange. url:
http://www.eex.com/en/Market%20Data/Trading%20Data/Emission%20Rights/Euro
pean%20Carbon%20Futures%20%7C%20Derivatives/European%20Carbon%20Futures%2
0Chart%20%7C%20Derivatives/futures-chart/FEUA/2012.12/2012-08-13.
2State and Trends of the Carbon Market, pp. 9-10.
3Briefing on the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme. International Emissions Trading
Association, 2012. url: www.ieta.org/assets/EUWG/ieta_briefing_euets1004201
2.pdf, pp. 1-2.
4J. Benjamin. Financial Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, chapter 20, dis-
cusses these issues authoritatively.
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result may not reflect the economic interests of the parties, and may require
significant changes to established commercial practices.
Book debts are debts which arise in the course of a business, and which
are generally entered in the books related to that business, for instance sums
due for the supply of goods or services5. Book debts pose a recharacterisation
problem: where fixed charges are taken over them, the charges may be rechar-
acterisable as floating if the chargor retains the ability to deal with the book
debts. Over time, banks developed the drafting of security documentation
to prevent such recharacterisation (since a fixed charge would have priority
over a floating charge in insolvency). Such drafting would typically include,
for example, the possibility for the chargor to draw on an account (generally
maintained with the charge) where the proceeds of book debts were credited.
This was logical from a commercial perspective, since companies would often
need to fund running expenses by using the proceeds of their book debts6.
This kind of drafting was present in the case of In re Spectrum7. The House
of Lords held that, if the chargor may draw on the account containing the
proceeds of book debts without prior consent of the chargee, the charge was
a floating one. This was because a floating charge allowed a chargor to re-
move assets from it: using the proceeds of book debts necessarily involved
removing the asset from the charge in order to sell it and thus realise it8. The
judgment thus rejected what had become commercially established drafting
of security documentation.
Charge backs are security arrangements over positive cash balances in
bank accounts. This type of arrangement is fairly common as a way of en-
abling banks to secure the provision of credit to borrowers9. However, in Re
Charge Card10, the court held that the very notion of a charge back was
conceptually impossible, as a bank could not take security over its own lia-
5Benjamin, Financial Law, p. 382.
6Ibid., pp. 464-465.
7In re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] 2 AC 680 ; Benjamin, Financial Law,
p. 467.
8In re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] 2 AC 680 , at 703-704, 721-723; Ben-
jamin, Financial Law, pp. 467-468.
9Benjamin, Financial Law, p. 470.
10Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1987] 1 Ch 50 ; Benjamin, Financial Law, p. 470.
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bility11. Although this judgment was later rejected by the House of Lords in
Re BCCI (No 8)12, banks’ commercial practices had already changed signifi-
cantly following Re Charge Card. The drafting of the security documentation
would typically contain so-called “triple cocktail” language (namely charge
backs, rights of set off and flawed asset arrangements). The alternative bases
could serve as protection in case any of them were to be held unenforceable
by the courts13.
The examples provided by In re Spectrum, Re Charge Card and Re BCCI
(No 8) go to illustrate a key point regarding legal categorisation in law versus
legal categorisation by the parties to a transaction, which is particularly
apposite in the context of emissions entitlements. If these entitlements can be
viewed as property rights in law, they can support the existence of third party
interests, for instance equitable interests and security interests (where the
possibility of creating such interests is an important feature of commercially
valuable instruments). The significance of the line of cases discussed above is
that parties to a transaction involving a particular type of entitlement cannot
make that entitlement a property right in law simply by labelling it as such
in a contractual arrangement. The examples therefore show the limits of
freedom of contract, which here conflicts with the view of the English courts
that property rights are finite and clearly defined in law (for instance, the
notions of fixed and floating charges have set definitions). This illustrates a
tension between property law and freedom of contract, where, according to
the line of cases discussed above, the former usually wins.
In wider terms, the role of contracts in a market can also be assessed from
a regulatory perspective. Collins views contracts as a form of self-regulation,
as commercial parties are free to decide the terms of the relationships with
one another. The role of contract law is to regulate the contents of these rela-
tionships (in other words, to oversee parties’ self-regulation)14. Traditionally,
therefore, contract law has focused on the protection of the interests of parties
11Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1987] 1 Ch 50 ; Benjamin, Financial Law, p. 470.
12Re BCCI (No 8) [1998] AC 214 ; Benjamin, Financial Law, p. 470.
13Benjamin, Financial Law, p. 470.
14H. Collins. Regulating Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 56-57,
67-68.
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as against one another. However, contract law has found itself increasingly
aligned with public law regulation15. Consequently, in the present case of
emissions trading, contract law has the ability to broaden its concerns and
take into account environmental objectives set by the regulatory system, so
that these objectives can be achieved while at the same time preserving the
primary purpose of contract law, which is to regulate relationships between
parties.
The intersection between commercial interests and social obligations is
also discussed, rather differently, by Gray, who views the notion of the quasi-
public trust as a means of reining in the potentially predatory behaviour of
powerful private enterprises16. Commercial privilege therefore brings with it
a high level of social obligation, especially when “certain kinds of undertaking
are so heavily coloured by a general or public interest that they require gov-
ernance by special rules [endorsed] by a higher order of social and commercial
obligation”17. In this respect, Gray gives the example of the historic doctrine
of the “common callings”, which subjected commercial actors such as carriers
and innkeepers to a range of duties in respect of the private property that
they held, whose purpose was to provide a public service18. Viewed on this
basis, the contracts that constitute the emissions market should be consider-
ably subordinated to the environmental goals of the EU ETS. This position
goes further than that described by Collins, namely that such contracts are
able to take into account environmental objectives, whilst preserving their
primary commercial purpose.
In the present scenario, the emissions market is part of a larger structure
whose primary goals are to reduce CO2 emissions to scientifically acceptable
levels in order to address the problem of climate change and assist the EU in
its move towards a low-carbon economy. Emissions trading contracts there-
fore have the potential to act as a regulatory tool: they help to constitute a
market with specific environmental objectives. Articulating and prioritising
the public policy goals gives a clear purpose to the contracts that constitute
15Collins, Regulating Contracts, pp. 79-82.
16Gray, “Regulatory Property and the Jurisprudence of Quasi-Public Trust”, at 239.
17Ibid., at 227.
18Ibid., at 228.
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the emissions market which goes beyond the purely commercial. The viabil-
ity of the emissions market depends on the quality of contractual drafting and
its ability to achieve the requisite economic benefits in order to incentivise
parties to continue trading. The self-regulation by way of drafting for which
parties are responsible thus supplies a valuable ingredient in the construc-
tion and operation of a successful emissions market. Moreover, addressing
the latent problems in the current contractual drafting can help to prevent
undesirable results which may not reflect the economic interests of market
participants should these contracts become the subject of litigation, as seen
in the case of book debts and charge backs.
Unresolved legal problems in seemingly functional markets and the con-
stitutive role of contracts in markets with public policy objectives point to a
need to revisit contractual drafting and assess whether it is fit for purpose.
In other words, it must be assessed whether the drafting adequately protects
parties against the key risks peculiar to emissions trading. One such risk is
that of regulatory intervention to reduce supply in the emissions market. An-
other is the risk of limitations on the uses to which emissions allowances can
be put, notably the existing uncertainty as to whether security interests over
allowances can benefit from satisfactory protection and enforceability. Ad-
dressing these risks in contracts is arguably crucial for the continued viability
of the emissions market and thus for the achievement of the environmental
goals of the EU ETS.
3.3 The emissions market and the role of con-
tracts
3.3.1 A brief outline of the emissions market
The EU emissions market is split into two components. The primary mar-
ket involves the initial allocation of emissions allowances to regulated in-
stallations, whether freely or by way of auctioning, by Member States (and
centrally by the European Commission in Phase III). The secondary mar-
97
ket (which is the focus of the chapter) consists of trading in the allocations
between market participants. The openness of participation in emissions
trading permitted by the EU ETS Directive19 means that both regulated in-
stallations (compliance traders) and investment traders such as banks, hedge
funds and other financial institutions actively participate in the market20.
Regulated installations trade principally for reasons of compliance with the
EU ETS. Access to the market helps them ensure that they hold sufficient
emissions allowances on the date on which they are obliged to surrender
allowances to match their emissions under the Directive. By contrast, non-
regulated entities involved in the EU ETS market trade voluntarily rather
than compulsorily, mainly for the purpose of investment21. In effect, invest-
ment traders treat this market in the same way as markets in other types of
tradable instruments such as equities or commodities.
Trading of EU allowances in the secondary market encompasses over the
counter (OTC) trades and exchange trades22. The OTC market is constituted
of transactions entered into directly between parties (whether bilaterally or
using a broker), as opposed to the parties utilising an electronic trading
platform (an exchange) to trade in allowances (the exchange market). The
current volume split between the different types of trade in the EU ETS is
60/40 (exchange trades/OTC trades)23. The main exchanges where EU al-
lowances are traded include IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) Futures Europe,
Bluenext, the European Energy Exchange (EEX), Nord Pool and the Green
Exchange. Of these exchanges, ICE Futures Europe has the largest market
19Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , arts. 12(1), 19(2).
20J. Hill, T. Jennings, and E. Vanezi. The Emissions Trading Market: Risks and
Challenges. Financial Services Authority Commodities Group. 2008. url: http :
//www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/emissions_trading.pdf, p. 14.
21Ibid., p. 14.
22How to assess your green fraud risks. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011. url: http :
//www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/greenfraud.pdf, p. 7.
23The business of climate change, Beyond implementation: Helping you navigate how to
optimise your strategy under the Carbon Pricing Mechanism. Ernst & Young, 2012. url:
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/The_Business_of_Carbon_Change_
November/$FILE/The_Business_of_Carbon_Change.pdf, p. 10.
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share, of over 90%24.
The secondary market further consists of two main types of instrument:
emissions allowances per se, and derivative instruments based on underlying
emissions allowances (emissions derivatives). The buying and selling of emis-
sions allowances themselves is termed spot trading, meaning that the trans-
action effectively occurs “on the spot”. Payment of the agreed price entails
immediate (or almost immediate) delivery of the corresponding allowances,
which is carried out by way of transferring the record of the allowances in
the registry where they are held.
With trading in emissions derivatives, payment of the purchase price and
performance of the corresponding obligation are further apart in time. At
the time of contracting, the parties agree that a set price will be paid for the
allowances, where the purchase occurs at a predetermined later date. A key
rationale for this staggered type of arrangement is that it allows the parties
to lock in a certain price, thus addressing the risk of fluctuations over time.
Examples of emissions derivatives include futures and forwards. A futures
transaction is defined as “[a] standardised, exchange-traded transaction to
buy or sell allowances. . . at a designated future point in time at a price
agreed upon today by the buyer and seller”25. A forward transaction is “[a]
transaction between two parties to exchange a fixed volume of allowances
against fixed payment at a future date. It is a direct, ’over-the-counter’
(OTC) trade between two counterparties conducted bilaterally or through
a broker”26. When trading in emissions derivatives, parties have a choice as
to how the transaction is to be performed. Actual emissions allowances can
be delivered; this is termed physical delivery27. This type of performance is
24The Emissions Market. IntercontinentalExchange Futures Europe, 2012. url: https:
//www.theice.com/publicdocs/futures/ICE_ECX_presentation.pdf, p. 12.
25Technical Aspects of EU Emission Allowances Auctions: Consultation Paper. Euro-
pean Commission. 2009. url: http : / / ec . europa . eu / clima / consultations / 000
2/cons_paper_en.pdf, p. 99.
26Ibid., p. 98.
27Physical settlement in this context has a slightly different meaning than in the context
of conventional tangible commodities such as oil or gas. An emissions allowance has no
physical presence per se. Physical settlement means that the record of the emissions
allowance is transferred from the registry where the allowance is held, as opposed to cash
settlement, whereby the amount of profit or loss made on the transaction is paid by one
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useful for compliance traders, who need the underlying allowances to fulfil
their EU ETS obligations. Alternatively, the transaction can be cash settled.
This means that the parties settle by respectively paying or receiving the
loss or gain relating to the transaction. This loss or gain is the fluctuation
in price between the date of entering into the arrangement and the date
of performance of the transaction. This method is particularly useful for
investment traders, who may not be as interested in receiving the actual
underlying allowances as compliance traders.
3.3.2 Contractual relationships as a mechanism to fa-
cilitate achieving the goals of emissions trading
The framework of rules that market participants have developed in relation
to emissions trading has taken the form of contractual relationships to buy
and sell allowances, much in the same way that contracts are used to buy
and sell conventional commodities in other markets28. The difference is that
the contractual relationships in the emissions market do not simply serve to
protect the economic interests of parties. They also play a significant role in
the climate change regulation regime which is the EU ETS, as they facilitate
the buying and selling of allowances in a market which has been created by
regulation.
Of course, contracts on their own do not and cannot guarantee environ-
mental goals. It is ultimately the responsibility of the regulator to ensure
that the framework that governs this market is adequately calibrated in order
to achieve the environmental goal of emissions reductions29. This means that
the cap on emissions needs to be set at the level and rate of decrease required
to achieve the requisite reductions to address climate change. Contracts do,
however, come into play at the trading stage. They help to maximise the
party to the other.
28E. Peden. “Contractual Perspective of Climate Change Issues”. In: Research Paper
No. 10/125, Sydney Law School (2010). url: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c
fm?abstract_id=1706488, p. 1.
29Ibid., p. 1.
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functionality of the emissions market30. The continued viability of this market
is paramount. It is worth noting that the dependence of the environmental
policy goal on the success of the emissions market does not automatically
mean that a vibrant market equates a sustainable market. A buoyant emis-
sions market does not equal emissions reductions; that is decided by the
overall cap. However, the trading mechanism is intended to achieve long-
term emissions reductions by way of low-carbon development while at the
same maintaining the support of regulated entities, as the previous chapter
has argued31. Contracts between market participants can therefore act as a
support tool to further the primary public policy goal of the EU ETS.
Despite the indirect effect of contractual relationships on the levels of
emissions reductions that the EU ETS can achieve, there is arguably a sig-
nificant link between achieving cost-effective emissions reductions (which is
also a goal of the EU ETS)32 and adequately addressing risk in contractual
relationships between market participants trading for compliance purposes.
When deciding how to reduce their emissions in the most economically effi-
cient manner, regulated entities can choose between buying allowances in the
market and abating emissions. For the former option to be cost-effective, the
emissions price needs to be less than the cost of abatement. Regulated en-
tities therefore enter into contracts for the purpose of purchasing allowances
at a price level that allows them to achieve this cost-efficiency. Regulated
entities consequently need to hedge against the risk of the emissions price
increasing above that of abatement, so that the contract transacting in emis-
sions allowances retains economic sense. The risk of regulatory intervention
augments the risk of a price increase (potentially over and above the costs
of abatement) in the emissions market, and therefore needs to be addressed
in order to facilitate cost-effective emissions reductions, as aimed for by the
EU ETS. In a sense, therefore, the link between cost-efficient emissions re-
ductions and contractual protection of parties’ interests takes us back to the
30Peden, “Contractual Perspective of Climate Change Issues”, p. 1.
31A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050 .
32Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , art. 1.
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notion of the interaction between private contract law and public law high-
lighted by Collins. Specifically, in the present context, there is a need to
align the objectives of the EU ETS insofar as possible (for instance the goal
of achieving cost-effectiveness in reducing emissions) with the structuring of
contractual relationships between parties in the emissions market.
3.3.3 Contractual relationships as a mechanism of al-
locating risks between participants in the emis-
sions market
A key purpose of contractual relationships in general, beyond the formalisa-
tion of promises, is to allocate risks between parties33. That parties trading
with one another are concerned with the allocation of risks is the case in
any given market, not just the emissions market34. It is the responsibility of
market participants to carry out the requisite risk identification and alloca-
tion, necessarily by way of contract. This is true in the emissions market as
much as in other markets; the EU ETS provides no guidance on the mat-
ter35. There are various types of risk that participants in any market seek
to address by way of contractual arrangements. Trading in financial instru-
ments of all kinds inevitably involves various types of risk, some of which are
common to both emissions instruments and other tradable instruments (such
as equities, or commodities such as oil, gas and electricity). Counterparty
(or credit) risk is an example of such a common risk. This is the risk that a
party to a transaction may default on its obligation to pay for or deliver the
subject of the contract36.
There are, however, specific risks which are particular to emissions in-
struments, namely those risks which derive from the regulatory nature of the
33Peden, “Contractual Perspective of Climate Change Issues”, p. 1.
34Benjamin, Financial Law, pp. 12-13, argues that all financial transactions involve the
transfer of risk between parties, and that risk means the likelihood and extent of loss that
involvement in a particular transaction may bring about.
35A. Sanehi. “Market Contracts”. In: Climate Change: A Guide to Carbon Law and
Practice. Ed. by P. Watchman. London: Globe Business Publishing, 2008, pp. 111–126, at
114.
36Benjamin, Financial Law, pp. 27-28.
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underlying emissions allowances. These instruments have been established
primarily for public policy purposes, as a means of environmental regulation
aimed at reducing emissions. In this respect, they are different from con-
ventional market instruments, whose purpose is primarily to enhance private
wealth. It is argued that the public policy origins of emissions trading have
the potential to create two key types of risk for market participants: suscep-
tibility to regulatory intervention and use limitations. Firstly, susceptibility
to regulatory intervention means that, since the EU ETS is primarily a tool
of environmental regulation aimed at reducing emissions, it is potentially
subject to regulatory amendments which can substantially affect the emis-
sions market that it has created37. A second outcome is that it cannot be said
with certainty whether adequate protection and enforceability are available
for security interests over emissions allowances. This uncertainty places a
significant limitation on an important commercial use to which emissions al-
lowances can be put, and may ultimately impact on the incentives for trading
allowances in the market.
The remainder of the chapter examines how market participants address
the risks of susceptibility to regulatory intervention and use limitations when
contracting to trade in emissions instruments. It is argued that there is room
for improvement in the contractual provisions addressing the risk of regula-
tory intervention. In relation to use limitations, it is argued that greater
clarification at the EU level is required as to the protectability and enforce-
ability of security interests over emissions allowances. Practical market ex-
amples are offered where security interests may not be capable of benefiting
from sufficient legal protection, notably by way of registration, and may not
be adequately enforceable. Overall, it is posited that market participants
need to be capable (by way of carefully drafted contractual arrangements as
well as regulatory clarification) to address both types of risk. This is impor-
tant if contractual relationships between parties are to function, and in turn
enable the emissions market to achieve the ultimate environmental goal of
37M. Peeters and S. Weishaar. “Exploring Uncertainties in the EU ETS: “Learning by
Doing” Continues Beyond 2012”. In: Carbon and Climate Law Review 3 (2009), pp. 88–
101.
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the EU ETS.
The treatment of the two types of risk identified above is analysed by ref-
erence to the industry standard forms of contract which are most commonly
utilised in the secondary EU emissions market and which have been developed
due to the increase in the volumes and values of trading38. The most widely
used standard form agreements for trading in EU allowances originate from
three institutions: the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA),
the European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET), and the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). There are various versions of each
agreement; the discussion will focus principally on the most recent versions,
which apply to Phase III of the EU ETS (from 2013). The agreements are:
the IETA International Emissions Trading Master Agreement (IETMA)39
and EU ETS schedule40, the EFET allowance appendix for the gas frame-
work agreement41 and the allowance appendix for the electricity framework
agreement42, and the ISDA emissions schedule to the master agreement43.
Since the two EFET appendices contain similar provisions for the purposes
of the chapter, only one of them (namely the electricity appendix) will be
38Sanehi, “Market Contracts”, at 114, in the primary market for CERs and ERUs (mean-
ing where they are bought directly from the respective CDM and JI projects), bespoke
Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreements (ERPAs) are generally used. This type of agree-
ment is beyond the scope of the chapter, which focuses on the secondary trading of EU
allowances.
39International Emissions Trading Master Agreement. International Emissions Trading
Association. Version 1.0, 16 April 2012. url: http://www.ieta.org/assets/Legal-WG/
IETMARELEASEAPRIL2012/uk-2859472-v4-ietma_april_2012.pdf.
40International Emissions Trading Master Agreement, Schedule 4, EU ETS System
Schedule. International Emissions Trading Association. url: http://www.ieta.org/
assets/Legal-WG/IETMARELEASEAPRIL2012/uk-2866191-v7-ietma_schedule_4_-
_eu_ets_schedule.pdf.
41Allowances Appendix (Gas) to the EFET General Agreement Concerning the Delivery
and Acceptance of Natural Gas. European Federation of Energy Traders. Version 3.0, 3
April 2012. url: http://www.efet.org/Cms_Data/Contents/EFET/Media/Documents/
Public%20-%20Standardisation/Allowance%20Appendix%20(Gas).pdf.
42Allowances Appendix (Power) to the EFET General Agreement Concerning the Deliv-
ery and Acceptance of Electricity. European Federation of Energy Traders. Version 4.0, 3
April 2012. url: http://www.efet.org/Cms_Data/Contents/EFET/Media/Documents/
Public%20-%20Standardisation/Allowance%20Appendix%20(Power).pdf.
43ISDA EU Emissions Allowance Documentation Document. International Swaps and
Derivatives Association. Version 5, 23 May 2012. url: http://www.isda.org/publicat
ions/isdacommderivdefsup.aspx.
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analysed.
There are substantial similarities (although not a complete overlap) be-
tween the provisions of the three agreements44. This is because the three stan-
dard form agreements have different purposes. The IETMA is a specialised
emissions trading agreement, while the EFET appendices are designed to
govern the emissions trading activities of gas and electricity retailers and
traders. The ISDA master agreement is designed to govern trading in fi-
nancial instruments generally, and has been adapted to apply to emissions
trading by way of a schedule for EU emissions allowance transactions45.
3.4 The risk of regulatory intervention
The market for EU emissions allowances has been artificially created by regu-
lation to pursue the public policy goal of emissions reductions. The emissions
market is therefore potentially susceptible to regulatory amendments in order
to pursue environmental policy goals46.
The short-term goal of the EU ETS is to deliver the requisite level of
emissions reductions to address the problem of climate change in the most
economically efficient way. Its long-term goal is to create a sufficiently strong
incentive for investment in low-carbon technologies47. To date, while the EU
ETS has generally succeeded in achieving short-term emissions reductions,
emissions prices have been low, and therefore potentially unable to incentivise
such investment. The reason behind lagging prices has been an oversupply of
44R. Roberts and C. Staples. “Emissions Trading in the European Union”. In: Capital
Markets Law Journal 3 (2007), pp. 5–17, at 11-12.
45M. Wilder and L. Fitz-Gerald. “Carbon Contracting”. In: Legal Aspects of Carbon
Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and Beyond. Ed. by D. Freestone and C. Streck. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 295–309, at 299-300.
46M. Bartlam. “The Carbon Trading Market - Bold Political and Financial Decisions
Required”. In: Capital Markets Law Journal 6 (2011), pp. 470–481, at 472.
47Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , preamble, para. 20, and art. 1; The EU Emissions Trading System.
Vol. I. House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee. Tenth Report of
Session 2010-12. url: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmsel
ect/cmenergy/1476/1476.pdf, p. 10.
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allowances in the market, caused by decreased levels of industrial production
due to the worldwide economic crisis and the possibility of banking surplus
allowances left over from Phase II into Phase III48.
Low emissions prices have also given rise to concern from participants
(especially investment traders) as to the continued viability of the EU ETS
created market. Continued low prices have the potential to decrease confi-
dence in the emissions market (and even discourage investment traders from
taking part in it at all)49. Disillusionment with the market can substantially
reduce the volumes and values of trading and, if existent on a large scale,
undermine the continued functionality of the EU ETS. The continued via-
bility of the EU ETS created market depends on the active participation of
trading entities, which ensures adequate levels of liquidity. In turn, such liq-
uidity assists EU ETS regulated entities in mitigating the risks of emissions
price volatility by entering into a range of appropriate transactions, such as
forward contracts50.
The continued surplus of allowances in the market has prompted discus-
sion as to the possibility of recalibrating the supply in order to deliver an
increased price signal. Such regulatory intervention could conceivably oc-
cur in a number of ways in the EU ETS, and could potentially involve the
removal of allowances from the market. So far, it has been envisaged that
a recalibration of supply could occur by adjusting the level of decrease of
the cap and the cap-setting process, or by “setting aside” allowances (and
possibly cancelling them at a later date).
For its Phase III, the EU ETS Directive already provides for a decrease
in the annual level of the cap by a linear factor of 1.74% in relation to the
Phase II cap. This linear factor is set to continue to apply beyond Phase
III, for 2021 and beyond, and may be revised by 2025 at the latest. There
has been some discussion as to the possibility of decreasing the cap by a
larger amount, specifically in the context of the oversupply of allowances
48The EU Emissions Trading System, p. 11.
49“Carbon prices tumble to record low”. In: Financial Times. 24 November 2011.
50A. Merrill and V. Jain. “Europe Leads Way in New Era of Carbon Trading”. In:
International Financial Law Review 24 (2005), pp. 47–49, at 47-48.
106
caused by the economic crisis. IETA, for instance, has opined51 that the cap
trajectory should be changed and the cap-setting process reviewed in order
to achieve the requisite scarcity of allowances for the market to function
adequately52. The existing oversupply of allowances is said to be undermining
the confidence of both compliance and investment traders in the emissions
market and creating the false perception that the EU ETS is not working
(due to the low price, which simply means that the abatement target has
been reached)53.
Another way of intervening in the emissions market to reduce the over-
supply and thus artificially create greater scarcity is through setting aside
allowances. The option that the EU is currently considering is to set aside a
share of allowances from those intended for auctioning in Phase III54. This
would involve removing a number of allowances from those to be auctioned
by Member States55. However, under the current EU ETS legislative frame-
work, it appears that this measure would be temporary only; the allowances
would probably have to be released back into the market at a later date, un-
less the cap-setting rules are amended to allow for permanent cancellation56.
This form of direct intervention may increase the volatility of the emissions
market even further, warns IETA57. Set-aside and possible eventual cancella-
tion may negatively affect participants’ confidence in the market, which may
come to be seen as excessively susceptible to regulatory intervention without
sufficient warning.
51Position on the state of the EU ETS. International Emissions Trading Association,
2012. url: http://www.ieta.org/assets/PositionPapers/ieta_position_ets_14-0
2-2012%20final.pdf.
52Ibid., p. 3.
53Ibid., p. 2.
54A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050 , p. 11; Analysis
of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk
of carbon leakage, p. 6.
55The EU Emissions Trading System, p. 13.
56Legal Briefing: Setting The ETS Cap - The Set Aside Of ETS Allowances. ClientEarth,
2011. url: http://www.clientearth.org/reports/clientearth-legal-briefing-e
ts-cap-and-set-aside.pdf, pp. 2, 7-9, notes that a cancellation of surplus allowances
would breach the 1.74% emissions reductions trajectory and would thus require ex ante
legislative amendments to the EU ETS.
57Briefing on the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme, p. 3.
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In July 2012 the European Commission published a staff working doc-
ument on the functioning of the EU ETS58, a proposal for changes to the
timing of the auctioning process for allowances59 and a draft Regulation de-
termining the volumes of allowances to be auctioned in Phase III60. The
documents confirm the set-aside of allowances as the preferred course of ac-
tion. Allowances would be retained from auctions taking place during the
first few years of Phase III, to be included in auctions later in the Phase; exact
amounts of the set-aside remain to be decided61. The auctioning timetable
set out in the EU ETS Directive would be adaptable only in exceptional
circumstances (such as a significant short-term increase in the supply of al-
lowances) in order to ensure the orderly functioning of the emissions market62.
The Commission’s move to address the emissions surplus has been welcomed
by organisations such as IETA, who has nonetheless warned that “long-term
structural reforms” will be needed to restore market confidence in the EU
ETS and provide an adequate price signal63.
58Information provided on the functioning of the EU Emissions Trading Sys-
tem, the volumes of greenhouse gas emission allowances auctioned and freely al-
located and the impact on the surplus of allowances in the period up to 2020.
SWD(2012)234 final. European Commission Staff Working Document. 2012. url: http:
/ / ec . europa . eu / clima / policies / ets / auctioning / third / docs / swd _ 2012 _ 23
4_en.pdf.
59Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Directive 2003/87/EC clarifying provisions on the timing of auctions of greenhouse gas
allowances. COM(2012)416 final. European Commission. 2012. url: http://ec.europa.
eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/docs/com_2012_416_en.pdf.
60Commission Regulation (EU) No . . . / . . . of XXX amending Regulation (EU) No
1031/2010 in particular to determine the volumes of greenhouse gas emission al-
lowances to be auctioned in 2013-2020. European Commission. 2012. url: http :
//www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/envi/dv/draft_
/draft_en.pdf.
61Information provided on the functioning of the EU Emissions Trading System, the vol-
umes of greenhouse gas emission allowances auctioned and freely allocated and the impact
on the surplus of allowances in the period up to 2020 , pp. 20-23; Commission Regulation
(EU) No . . . / . . . of XXX amending Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 in particular to de-
termine the volumes of greenhouse gas emission allowances to be auctioned in 2013-2020 .
62Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Directive 2003/87/EC clarifying provisions on the timing of auctions of greenhouse gas
allowances, pp. 2, 4-5.
63IETA welcomes EC publication on ETS reforms: Commission signals start of process
to deliver a stronger EU ETS. International Emissions Trading Association, 25 July 2012.
url: http://www.ieta.org/assets/EUWG/ieta%20reaction%20on%20back-loading%2
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From the trading perspective, the possibility of regulatory intervention
to remove allowances from the market in the ways envisaged above would
most likely affect the emissions price. This would fluctuate according to the
perceived probability at any given time that the supply of allowances in the
market might decrease. Compliance traders could address the risk of price
fluctuations by entering into derivative transactions to purchase emissions
allowances needed for surrender under the EU ETS. However, another, more
significant risk inherent in such transactions could conceivably be a failure to
deliver the contracted allowances by the counterparty. Such failure could be
caused by suddenly soaring allowance prices or possibly even unavailability
following a centrally mandated reduction of the allowances in circulation64.
Two distinct points arise here which merit further elaboration. Firstly,
it is worth noting that investment traders are likely to benefit more from
a higher emissions price than compliance traders. This is unless the latter
have adequately hedged against the risk of price increases, or, in an ideal
world from the environmental perspective, reduced emissions so that they
need to purchase fewer allowances in the market. Secondly, it is arguably
unlikely that the amount of the set-aside will be such as to render it impossi-
ble for regulated entities to source sufficient allowances for compliance with
their surrendering obligations. Such compliance may, however, become sig-
nificantly more expensive. This may result in more regulated entities needing
to appropriately hedge against this risk. It will arguably also underscore the
importance of ensuring that regulated entities have implemented sound trad-
ing strategies (for instance using as much of their CER and ERU quota as
permissible and selling excess EU allowances)65.
Whether regulatory intervention may lead to non-availability or low avail-
ability of allowances in the market, it is important to calibrate the level of
discretion carefully. Regulatory intervention should allow for reductions in
0proposals.pdf.
64Unavailability would not be an issue in the context of exchange trading, where per-
formance of the trades is guaranteed by a central counterparty; however, the danger of
considerable price volatility remains.
65Many thanks to Jay Jagasia, formerly of Burges Salmon, Bristol (http://www.burges-
salmon.com/) for providing valuable insights into these issues (e-mail correspondence dated
2 July and 30 July 2012).
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the number of emissions allowances, while also avoiding unduly impeding
the functionality of the market. Negative effects on market functionality can
follow from the creation of excessive price volatility due to uncertainty as to
the timing and scope of intervention66. It is therefore necessary to examine
how the risk of non-availability or low availability of allowances in the market
(due to regulatory intervention) is handled in the contractual relationships
between buyers and sellers of allowances.
None of the three standard form agreements accounts for instances of
regulatory intervention in the supply of allowances in the market67. Where,
for instance, the Commission decides to set aside allowances in a particu-
lar trading period, there is a strong possibility that such action could affect
the parties’ contractual obligations towards each other. The primary obli-
gations set out in the standard form contracts are to sell and to buy the
allowances respectively68. If allowances are removed from the market by reg-
ulatory intervention, the price of the remaining allowances will logically rise
(as intended)69. This could cause problems for the seller, as it would become
more expensive to fulfil the obligation to deliver the contracted allowances.
It may even become difficult to source allowances in the market if the number
set aside is very high (although this is perhaps less likely, as outlined above).
Under the three standard form agreements as currently drafted, this type of
66Assessing U.S. Climate Policy Options: A report summarizing work at RFF as part of
the inter-industry U.S. Climate Policy Forum. R. Kopp and W. Pizer, 2007. url: http:
//www.rff.org/rff/Publications/upload/31923_1.pdf, pp. 83-84.
67ISDA EU Emissions Allowance Documentation Document, part 6(c)(iv), the ISDA
emissions schedule does, however, consider the abandonment of the trading scheme before
the date on which contractual delivery of the allowances is due. In such a scenario, either
party can terminate the affected transaction without the need for any further payments.
The seller will refund to the buyer any sums paid for the undelivered allowances.
68Sanehi, “Market Contracts”, at 122.
69Memorandum submitted by JP Morgan Chase & Co to UK Parliament Environmental
Audit Committee. JP Morgan Chase & Co, 2009. url: http://www.publications.parli
ament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmenvaud/290/290we21.htm, para. 16, although this
price rise could potentially be overshadowed by decreased interest from investment traders
in the emissions market due to its perceived political instability. JP Morgan submitted as
early as 2009 that “ad hoc interventions in the ETS would if anything increase policy risk
for investors: an international policy framework for the long-term, based on medium and
long-term emissions caps, are what the market needs to evolve to achieve its mitigation
role”.
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scenario could conceivably fall within one of two categories. There may be a
failure to deliver the contracted allowances on the part of the seller, or it may
be possible to invoke force majeure provisions (called settlement disruption
events in the ISDA allowances schedule).
Both the IETA IETMA and the EFET allowances appendix contain force
majeure provisions. This type of event is broadly defined as the occurrence of
any event beyond the affected party’s control which prevents that party from
delivering or accepting the allowances forming the subject of the contract70.
The ISDA allowances schedule does not expressly provide for force majeure
itself. Instead, it contains provisions covering so-called settlement disruption
events, whose definition follows that of force majeure events in the other two
agreements. A settlement disruption event is defined as an event beyond
the control of the affected party, which makes it impossible for that party to
deliver or accept allowances under the terms of the transaction71.
Although a shortage of allowances in the market due to regulatory inter-
vention would likely be classifiable as an event beyond the parties’ control,
it is questionable whether, in most instances, such a shortage would prevent
the seller from delivering the contracted allowances. It would admittedly
render the performance of the seller’s contractual obligations more onerous.
In the case of a contract for derivative instruments based on allowances,
where delivery is to be made at a set time in the future, the seller may
have to incur an unexpected cost by purchasing more expensive allowances
in the market in order to deliver them under the agreement. Increases in
market price are of course part and parcel of the risk involved in entering
into derivative arrangements. However, it is arguable that in other markets
which are less susceptible to regulatory intervention, the parties would be
using their trading expertise to make judgements about the potential direc-
tion of market movements. By contrast, the timing and scope of regulatory
intervention is not something which they can easily predict or control. For in-
70International Emissions Trading Master Agreement, schedule 1, definition of Force
Majeure; Allowances Appendix (Power) to the EFET General Agreement Concerning the
Delivery and Acceptance of Electricity, clause 7.1.
71ISDA EU Emissions Allowance Documentation Document, part 7(e), definition of
Settlement Disruption Event.
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vestment traders, it is arguable that the likelihood of regulatory intervention
forms the very essence of the financial speculation. However, for compliance
traders, who are compelled to participate in the emissions market in order to
reduce emissions in a cost-effective manner, the uncertainty surrounding reg-
ulatory intervention can be much more damaging. Nonetheless, an increase
in price due to a centrally mandated shortage of allowances would not gen-
erally equate to an impossibility to deliver, unless the demand for allowances
in the market far exceeds supply. Moreover, all three agreements state that
failure of a party to procure sufficient allowances to meet its delivery obli-
gations does not fall within the force majeure or settlement disruption event
definitions72. Whether this includes instances where such failure to procure
allowances has been caused by regulatory intervention is not clear. It may be,
therefore, that the force majeure provisions would not apply to most cases
where regulatory intervention has decreased the supply of allowances in the
market and has rendered it more onerous (rather than outright impossible)
for the seller to deliver under the contract.
A crucial consequence of an event falling under the force majeure umbrella
in the IETA IETMA and EFET allowances appendix is that the obligations of
both parties are suspended for the duration of the event, without a breach of
the agreement being deemed to have occurred. If the event continues for more
than a certain period of time, either party may terminate all (but not less
than all) transactions governed by the agreement which are affected by the
event73. Under the ISDA allowances schedule, the suspension of obligations
without liability is also triggered, with the difference that the termination
right applies to the transaction affected by the settlement disruption event
(not all the affected transactions)74.
The classification of an event as constituting a force majeure or settlement
72International Emissions Trading Master Agreement, schedule 1, definition of Force
Majeure; Allowances Appendix (Power) to the EFET General Agreement Concerning the
Delivery and Acceptance of Electricity, clause 7.1; ISDA EU Emissions Allowance Docu-
mentation Document, part 7(e), definition of Settlement Disruption Event.
73International Emissions Trading Master Agreement, clause 13.1; Allowances Appendix
(Power) to the EFET General Agreement Concerning the Delivery and Acceptance of
Electricity, clauses 7.2, 7.4(a).
74ISDA EU Emissions Allowance Documentation Document, part 7(d)(4)(B), (D).
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disruption event has serious consequences, as it can considerably disrupt the
emissions allowances transaction and eventually bring the parties’ relation-
ship to an end. On the other hand, the occurrence of a force majeure or
settlement disruption event also gives the parties the opportunity to exit
a commercial arrangement which has become unviable due to unforeseen
circumstances which are not attributable to either of them. The inability
to continue servicing the contractual obligations is of course not desirable.
Nonetheless, due to the unexpected and uncontrollable nature of the event,
the parties have the opportunity to end their relationship in a manner which
does not involve either party’s failure to perform its contractual obligations
and thus does not carry damages for breach of contract. If a seller of emis-
sions allowances became unable to deliver the contractually agreed number
of allowances due to cancellation by the issuing authority, and if this cancel-
lation were deemed a force majeure event, the seller would be able to take
advantage of the benefits conferred by the aforementioned provisions and
extricate itself from the transaction.
On the other hand, it must be questioned just how useful the possibility
to terminate the contract on the ground of a force majeure or settlement
disruption event is for a compliance buyer of emissions allowances. An in-
vestment buyer may choose to terminate the agreement if the force majeure
or settlement disruption event continues, and find a new seller. By contrast,
where the contracted allowances are needed for surrendering purposes in line
with EU ETS requirements, simply exiting the agreement and going back to
the market to attempt to find another seller may not be a viable option if
the supply of allowances in the market is low. Obtaining allowances from a
different source may incur excessively high costs, or may not be possible in
time for the surrender deadline. Assuming that the seller’s difficulty in deliv-
ering allowances can be classified as a force majeure or settlement disruption
event in the first place, a compliance buyer may not necessarily think it in its
best interests to terminate the agreement. However, the buyer may indeed
be forced to do so as the surrender deadline approaches, since the seller has
effectively declared itself unable to supply the requisite allowances. Deciding
whether or not to terminate the agreement could be regarded as an example
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of the “non-use” of contracts highlighted by Collins: “the contractual frame
of reference is used whenever it is rational to do so”, but will not be used
where it does not make commercial sense to insist on it75.
An alternative means of addressing the seller’s difficulty in delivering the
contracted allowances due to regulatory intervention in the market may be
under the “failure to deliver” provisions of the standard form agreements.
With the EFET allowances appendix, a failure to deliver the contracted al-
lowances by the due date stipulated in the agreement gives the delivering
party two business days from the due date to make delivery, with interest
charges being payable76. The IETA IETMA and the ISDA allowances sched-
ule provide that, upon the seller’s failure to deliver, the buyer may give notice
requesting delivery, which must then be made within one business day of the
notice, with interest being payable77. While the EFET grace period begins
automatically, the IETA and ISDA grace periods are triggered by notice by
the non-defaulting party78.
Failing delivery within the set timeframes, the receiving party may ter-
minate the affected transaction (with damages and interest being payable by
the non-delivering party)79. The “failure to deliver” provisions are potentially
more useful for parties in a situation where delivery has been rendered dif-
ficult due to regulatory intervention to decrease the supply of allowances in
the market80. The buyer can choose whether or not to terminate the agree-
ment, as the seller has not invoked the force majeure or settlement disruption
event provisions, and may therefore still be able to deliver the contracted al-
lowances, albeit not at the agreed time. The standard form agreements also
75Collins, Regulating Contracts, pp. 136-140, particularly at 140.
76Allowances Appendix (Power) to the EFET General Agreement Concerning the De-
livery and Acceptance of Electricity, clause 8.1(a).
77International Emissions Trading Master Agreement, clause 12(1)(x), and schedule 1,
definition of Final Delivery Date; ISDA EU Emissions Allowance Documentation Docu-
ment, part 7(d)(ii)(1)(A) and 7(e), definition of Final Delivery Date.
78Sanehi, “Market Contracts”, at 123.
79International Emissions Trading Master Agreement, clause 12(1)(y); Allowances Ap-
pendix (Power) to the EFET General Agreement Concerning the Delivery and Acceptance
of Electricity, clause 8.1(b); ISDA EU Emissions Allowance Documentation Document,
part 7(d)(ii)(1)(B).
80Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, at 309.
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provide that any grace period granted to the seller to deliver the allowances
must take into account the need to deliver by the so-called reconciliation
deadline. This deadline represents the time by which a compliance buyer
must hold the allowances ready for surrender under the EU ETS, and is gen-
erally earlier than the surrender date in order to ensure that the allowances
reach the buyer in plenty of time81. Investment buyers can choose to wait for
the delivery, or to terminate the agreement after the grace period has expired,
depending on which option they perceive as more economically advantageous.
It is worth noting that the possibility of regulatory changes in the EU
ETS rules had been expressly contemplated in a previous version of the IETA
agreement82, but was removed from the subsequent version83. Under the ini-
tial provisions a party could request negotiations with a view to amending
the mechanics of the agreement if there was a change to the rules with which
the party was unwilling or unable to comply84. Importantly, such changes to
the EU ETS rules were expressly stated not to amount to force majeure85.
Instead, the parties would negotiate in good faith any amendments that they
wished to effect to their contractual relationship and refer the matter to an
independent arbitrator if bilateral negotiations were unsuccessful86.
Similarly, a previous version of the EFET allowances appendix87 con-
tained express provisions dealing with the issue of so-called regulatory risk.
By contrast with the former IETA agreement provisions on changes in the
trading scheme, this type of event was classified under the general force
majeure provisions, and therefore effectively represented a particular type
of force majeure event88. Such a “Regulatory Risk Exemption” included a
81Sanehi, “Market Contracts”, at 119.
82Emissions Trading Master Agreement. International Emissions Trading Association.
Version 2.0, 2004, clause 14.
83Emissions Trading Master Agreement. International Emissions Trading Association.
Version 2.1, 2005.
84Emissions Trading Master Agreement, clause 14(1)(a).
85Ibid., clause 14)(1)(a).
86Ibid., clause 14(2).
87Allowances Appendix to the EFET General Agreement Concerning the Delivery and
Acceptance of Electricity. European Federation of Energy Traders. Version 1.0, 2004. url:
http://www.efet.org/Cms_Data/Contents/EFET/Media/Documents/Public%20-
%20Contracts/Carbon%20Allowance%20Appendix%20_FINAL%20VERSION_.pdf.
88Ibid., clause 7.1.
115
change in the trading rules that could not reasonably be anticipated or over-
come by a party and which rendered that party unable to perform its obliga-
tions under the agreement89. This provision could conceivably cover instances
where the delivering party would not be able to perform its obligation under
the agreement due to the allowances to be delivered having been cancelled
by a public authority. However, this provision was not carried over into the
current version of the appendix.
There has been little discussion as to why the provisions addressing
changes to the regulatory scheme in earlier versions of the IETA and EFET
agreements were not carried over into the current versions. The versions
which include the provisions on regulatory changes date from 2004, before
the EU ETS came into force. Moreover, these provisions were removed from
subsequent versions of the agreements, that is, when Phase I of the EU
ETS began. It is likely that the purpose of the provisions on regulatory
changes was to account for the possibility that the EU ETS framework may
be amended substantially before it came into force, or may even not go ahead
at all. If such changes occurred, the contractual provisions would allow the
parties to negotiate necessary amendments and to refer the matter to an
expert if agreement could not be reached. The provisions were therefore nec-
essary to give parties the pre-EU ETS certainty that they required to enter
into trading commitments, where the precise shape of the trading regime was
not yet definite. Once Phase I had begun, the rules of the scheme were fixed,
and a degree of permanence was granted to the EU ETS. What post-2005
versions do not account for is the possibility that the rules may be changed
again, which appears fairly probable in view of the continued negative effect
of the allowances surplus on the emissions price. If the EU ETS were sub-
stantially amended to the extent of making it impossible (rather than just
commercially unattractive) for a party to perform its trading obligations,
the party would only be able to rely on the force majeure provisions in the
current contract versions90.
89Allowances Appendix to the EFET General Agreement Concerning the Delivery and
Acceptance of Electricity, clause 7.5(a).
90Many thanks to Jay Jagasia, formerly of Burges Salmon, Bristol (http://www.burges-
salmon.com/) for providing valuable insights into these issues (e-mail correspondence dated
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The difference in the treatment of regulatory changes as between the
IETA agreement and the EFET allowances appendix can be explained on
the basis of the contrasting purposes of the two agreements. The EFET al-
lowances appendix had to be consistent with the EFET master agreement.
EFET wanted to ensure that the EFET master agreement and any other live
transactions entered under it did not unwind as a result of EU ETS regu-
latory changes which affected transactions under the allowances appendix.
There does not appear to be a concept of negotiating amendments under the
EFET machinery. The easiest way to ensure that EU ETS transactions did
not affect the integrity of the EFET master agreement and the transactions
was therefore to bring it within the force majeure provisions. Moreover,
when trading documentation is developed, it must go through a laborious
legal and commercial working group process. The representatives of these
working groups could conceivably have taken the view that it would have
been easier (mechanically and in terms of gaining the support of their mem-
bers) to bring such regulatory changes within the force majeure umbrella
than to develop bespoke wording (which would introduce new concepts to
the EFET framework). On the other hand, the IETA agreement started
afresh, and there was no comparable concern regarding existing transactions
or inconsistencies with a linked master agreement91.
The contemplation of regulatory intervention in the trading mechanism
which may affect the ability of the parties to fulfil their contractual obliga-
tions in earlier versions of the IETA and EFET agreements demonstrates
that this is a very real problem. The opposing conclusions which the two
agreements reach on the treatment of such scenarios suggest that there is no
easy answer as to how the parties should manage their obligations. On the
one hand, regulatory intervention to decrease the supply of allowances in the
market is an uncontrollable occurrence from the parties’ point of view, which
may make it similar to force majeure or settlement disruption events. On
the other hand, such intervention may not go as far as to cause impossibility
2 July and 30 July 2012).
91Many thanks to Jay Jagasia, formerly of Burges Salmon, Bristol (http://www.burges-
salmon.com/) for providing valuable insights into these issues (e-mail correspondence dated
2 July and 30 July 2012).
117
of performance on the seller’s part. Instead, in most conceivable cases the
seller would incur greater costs in sourcing allowances from the market than
it could have accounted for when entering into the contractual arrangement.
The issue is therefore one of pricing on the seller’s side, and of timely delivery
on the buyer’s side, in particular where the latter requires the allowances for
the purposes of complying with the EU ETS. In consequence, the “failure to
deliver” provisions in the three standard form agreements would arguably be
better suited to catering for the needs of the parties than the force majeure
and settlement disruption event clauses. The former provisions allow delivery
of the contracted allowances to be delayed if the parties so agree, with the
proviso that, where the buyer is a compliance trader, the grace period should
account for the deadline for surrendering allowances under the EU ETS.
These provisions could be refined further by the parties in order to specif-
ically cater for the pricing risk which affects the seller, as well as for a compli-
ance buyer’s need to receive the allowances in time for the surrender deadline.
For instance, the agreement could provide that, in the case of regulatory in-
tervention which increases the market price of allowances above a mutually
agreed level (X), the parties agree that delivery can be postponed until such
time that the price drops below X. This would help the seller as it would
mitigate the effects of a sudden sharp increase in the price of allowances that
it would need to obtain from the market in order to deliver under the agree-
ment. In addition, in order to protect a compliance buyer, the agreement
could stipulate that the grace period expires sufficiently before the surren-
der deadline to enable the buyer to either request delivery from the seller or
terminate the agreement and purchase allowances elsewhere.
A precedent as regards modifications to standard form contractual draft-
ing already exists in the shape of the newly introduced provisions on stolen
allowances. A number of phishing attacks on national registries in 2011, re-
sulting in the theft of emissions allowances, caused considerable uncertainty
in the emissions market and the suspension of trading92. This problem had
not been envisaged or provided for at the outset of the EU ETS. The theft of
92“Carbon trade cyber-theft hits €30m”. In: Financial Times. 20 January 2011; Bartlam,
“The Carbon Trading Market - Bold Political and Financial Decisions Required”, at 473.
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allowances affected both buyers and sellers, who attempted to put in place
custom-made amendments to address this situation. This bespoke exercise
has finally been superseded by formal changes to industry documentation,
initiated by IETA and followed by the other working groups93. Under IETA’s
approach, the liability of the seller to the buyer of stolen allowances depends
on the presence or absence of good faith on the seller’s part in acquiring the
allowances and also, where good faith exists, on whether a claim has been
brought against the buyer. The purpose of these new provisions is to dis-
courage the initiation of claims and thus restore confidence in the emissions
market94.
The importance of addressing the difficulties with delivery that can be
caused by regulatory intervention in the emissions market is substantial. It
may even be advisable to insert this type of provision into the standard
form agreements, rather than leaving it to the parties to negotiate on a case-
by-case basis. It may well be that parties trading in the emissions market
have not yet contemplated the possibility of regulatory intervention affecting
their contractual obligations, since the EU-level discussions on the various
options for reducing the allowance surplus and recalibrating the price have
only started fairly recently. Drawing market participants’ attention to the
need for adequate contractual protection in such scenarios could improve
their confidence in the emissions market and ensure continued support for the
EU ETS, so that it can ultimately achieve its environmental goals of reducing
emissions and promoting the development of low-carbon technologies.
It is interesting to note that investment traders in particular (especially
large banks and commodity houses) use bespoke drafting to address various
emissions trading scenarios, for instance CER trades. Investment traders
are concerned that the Commission might ban CERs from large hydropower
projects from eligibility within the EU ETS95 (as has already happened,
93“Carbon trade cyber-theft hits €30m”; Bartlam, “The Carbon Trading Market - Bold
Political and Financial Decisions Required”, at 473.
94FAQs on the International Emissions Trading Master Agreement. International Emis-
sions Trading Association, 2012. url: http://www.ieta.org/assets/Legal-WG/IETMAR
ELEASEAPRIL2012/ietma_faq.pdf, answer to question 11.
95Briefing Note, EU ETS Credit Restrictions: Prospects for restricting credits from large
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for instance, with CERs from projects involving the destruction of triflu-
oromethane, or HFC-2396), and therefore carve out hydro CERs from the
definition of Contract CERs. Force majeure provisions would not be of use
in such a scenario, as a ban by the Commission would not actually prevent
the trade from taking place; it will just be the case that the CERs would
not be eligible for use within the EU ETS. The buyer would therefore still
be required to purchase the CERs under the contract. As large investment
traders will generally compel counterparties to adopt their templates, such
tailored drafting is fairly widespread97.
In summary, the core argument made in this part starts by positing that
the risk of regulatory intervention which may unsettle the emissions market
is substantially greater than for other markets. This risk does not fit well
with the force majeure category of contractual exemption, as it is less likely
that (following a set-aside by the Commission) emissions allowances would
become unavailable in the market than it is that they would become unduly
expensive. The part has also argued that there is a need for further develop-
ment of contractual risk allocation provisions which adequately address the
specific context of emissions trading. Such development can be undertaken
in a bespoke fashion by parties to trades, but would be better done at a
central level in the standard form agreements which constitute the emissions
market.
On the other hand, it could be argued that contracting parties, who
are likely to have significant commercial experience, are essentially free to
negotiate and adopt those contract terms which best suit their own, self-
interested purposes. However, it must be remembered that the market in
which the parties operate differs in a fundamental respect from ordinary
hydropower projects. Climate Focus, 2012. url: http://www.climatefocus.com/docume
nts/files/eu_ets_large_credit_restrictions_for_large_hydropower_projects.p
df.
96Questions and Answers on use restrictions for certain industrial gas credits as of 2013.
European Commission Climate Action. url: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/e
ts/linking/faq_en.htm, answers to questions 16, 18(a), the use of HFC-23 destruction
credits in the EU ETS is prohibited as of 1 January 2013. This is because, inter alia,
crediting the abatement of HFC-23 could perversely incentivise the increased production
of HCFC-22, another greenhouse gas of which HFC-23 is the by-product.
97Ibid., answers to questions 16, 18(a).
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markets in economically valuable resources. By contrast with markets in
other tradable instruments (such as equities or commodities), the market in
emissions allowances created by the EU ETS does not exist primarily for
the financial gain of its participants. The purpose of this market is a public
policy one: it is a means of achieving emissions reductions and stimulating
investment in low-carbon technologies. As a leading legal practitioner in the
sphere of emissions trading has remarked, the problem with the emissions
market, with its regulatory origins, is that “there are no market tools to
hedge against the unpredictability of the legislator”98. “Therefore, how does
a participant in the carbon market manage risk and uncertainty arising from
a volatile and unpredictable legislative process?”99.
Even if we accept that it is the responsibility of individual market partici-
pants to hedge against the risk of legislative unpredictability (in the shape of
regulatory intervention in the emissions market) by way of adequate contrac-
tual drafting, such delegation of responsibility has the potential to be highly
counterproductive from the point of view of achieving the public policy goals
of the EU ETS. The environmental success of this trading regime of regula-
tion is premised on the continued viability of the emissions market, which in
turn depends on the continued broad participation of both compliance and
investment traders100. The regulator therefore needs to maintain trading
parties’ interest in the emissions market, where their continued participa-
tion is directly influenced by their ability to hedge against specific market
risks. Compliance traders may become disillusioned with the EU ETS, while
investment traders may move away from the emissions market altogether.
Such lack of industry support would seriously undermine the political ac-
ceptability of the EU ETS, as well as potentially lead to decreased market
liquidity and consequently market destabilisation (and in turn the failure of
the EU ETS as an instrument of environmental regulation)101. Consequently,
98P. Zaman. The Making of Emissions Trading Laws – Understanding the EU Legislative
Process. Reed Smith, 2013. url: http://www.reedsmith.com/the-making-of-emissio
ns-trading-laws--understanding-the-eu-legislative-process-05-09-2013/, p.
7.
99Ibid., p. 2.
100As argued in the introduction to the thesis.
101Jong and Walet, “Compliance Strategies in the US Acid Rain Program”, at 204.
121
it is argued that centrally orchestrated improvements to the drafting of the
standard form contracts would best serve to assist trading parties in manag-
ing the risk of regulatory intervention. Such improvements would incentivise
continued broad participation in the emissions market, thereby ensuring mar-
ket viability and contributing to the achievement of the environmental goals
of the EU ETS.
3.5 The risk of use limitations
Emissions allowances are a creature of EU regulation, which does not spec-
ify the legal characteristics of the entitlements that their holders can enjoy.
In particular, it is not clear whether third party interests over emissions al-
lowances can be protected and enforced to the same standard as for conven-
tional commodities that are tradable in the markets. The ability to protect
and enforce third party interests is commercially important, as it can enhance
the value of allowances by extending the range of uses to which allowances
can be put. The holders of allowances could thus grant security interests
over the instruments, where such interests have genuine legal value and en-
forceability from the perspective of their beneficiaries. There is little legal
or commercial value in being able to grant a security interest for the bene-
fit of another party, but which cannot be effectively protected and enforced
by the grantee102. Some legal practitioners have noted that clarity over the
mechanism of creating security interests would improve the functionality of
the emissions market103. In the context of the EU ETS, the functionality of
the market means the continued value of the market to investment traders,
102T. Telfer. “Statutory Licences and the Search for Property: The End of the Imbroglio?”
In: Canadian Business Law Journal 45 (2007), pp. 224–252, at 231, in the context of
statutory fishing licences in Canada, notes that a particular judgment of the Ontario
Court of Appeal threw serious doubt on the legal value and enforceability of security
interests over the licences, and thus imposed a significant hurdle on the creation of such
interests.
103P. Traylor and J. Morin. “An Allowance to Take to the Bank”. In: Environmental
Finance (2008), p. 37. url: http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/69
3a17c6-5142-4f65-bb82-146a2bfa1555/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/22e
2dfb9-e467-4ead-9828-1b4be760cbbf/TraylorPatrick.pdf.
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which in turn helps to achieve the environmental goals of the EU ETS104.
The importance of clarifying whether security interests over emissions al-
lowances can be sufficiently protected and enforced has also been highlighted
by the FMLC105. The FMLC notes the importance of strong security inter-
ests in the context of commercial dealings, and calls for EU-level clarification
as to whether or not allowances are capable of being the subject of such
interests106.
Conceivably, the continued existence of an emissions market may sug-
gest that, from the participants’ point of view, lack of clarity as to the pro-
tectability and enforceability of security interests over allowances does not
negatively affect trading. It is, however, argued that the continued existence
of a successful EU emissions market is essentially premised on a “no-default”
scenario, where a sudden failure or default of a significant market participant
would reveal the importance of the uncertainty surrounding security inter-
ests over allowances. In other words, acceptance by market participants of
a legally uncertain status quo does not automatically resolve the problem of
the inherent fragility of the emissions market infrastructure, fragility which
is exemplified by the lack of clarity as to the protectability and enforceability
of security interests107. In the words of the FMLC:
In response to these concerns, it might be argued that the fact
that trading in emission allowances is already taking place, and
that market infrastructure is being developed, indicates that there
are theoretical issues which will not, in practice, prevent the suc-
cessful development of a market where the commercial interests
of operators and financial institutions require it. The FMLC does
104As discussed in more detail in chapters 1.1.2, 2.1 and 2.3.
105Emissions Allowances: Creating Legal Certainty, pp. 5, 8, 10-13, 19.
106Letter to the European Commission, DG Environment. Financial Markets Law
Committee. 2012. url: http : / / www . fmlc . org / Documents / Issue116Letter
2Slingenberg.pdf, pp. 2-3.
107H. Simpson P. Cox and S. Turner. The Post-Trade Infrastructure for Carbon Emissions
Trading: A Report Prepared for the City of London Corporation. Bourse Consult for the
City of London Corporation, 2010. url: http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/busines
s/economic-research-and-information/research-publications/Documents/resea
rch-2010/The%20post%20trade%20infrastructure%20for%20carbon%20emissions%2
0trading.pdf, pp. 30, 32-33 and 42-43.
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not believe that this is the case: the reason why these uncertain-
ties have not so far impeded the early stages of the development
of the market is simply that they have not been appreciated108.
According to the FMLC, the worst-case scenario would be that the emis-
sions market develops in the absence of a resolution of such uncertainty, and
a default involving a market participant occurs, leaving the courts of in-
dividual Member States faced with reaching conclusions which may not be
applicable EU-wide. The risk inherent in such a piecemeal approach is no less
than market destabilisation109. Given the structure of the EU ETS as a trad-
able permit regime of regulation, such destabilisation would undermine the
achievement of the environmental goals themselves. Moreover, even without
such a default, “uncertainty and/or inconsistency in legal outcomes impose
costs on economic action and impede the efficiency of the market in emission
allowances contrary to the purpose of the Member States in establishing the
scheme”110. “A liquid or transparent market will not evolve unless some legal
certainty is provided in relation to the nature of an EU allowance and how
the trading of EU allowances fits within the existing legal regime across the
EU...The answer to these fundamental questions will have profound effects...
on the liquidity of the market as a whole. For example,... [h]ow can banks
and financial institutions take security over an EU allowance...?”111.
Taking the UK as an example of a Member State jurisdiction, in English
law a security interest is defined as involving “the grant of a right in an
asset which the grantor owns or in which he has an interest”, where the
said interest is a property one112. “A security interest in personal property
in English law is a right in rem granted by the owner of the property to a
creditor to secure an obligation [usually a debt]”113. Security is “a right in
108Emissions Allowances: Creating Legal Certainty, p. 15.
109Ibid., p. 16.
110Ibid., p. 16.
111A. Hobley and A. McCann. “International Emissions Trading: A Legal Context”. In:
A Guide to Emissions Trading: Risk Management and Business Implications. Ed. by C.
de Jong and K. Walet. London: Risk Books, 2004, pp. 23–40, at 36-37.
112R. Goode and L. Gullifer. Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security. London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 2008, pp. 3-4.
113L. Gullifer H. Beale M. Bridge and E. Lomnicka. The Law of Personal Property Se-
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another’s asset to secure performance of an obligation”114.
In English law, on the basis of the recent judgment in Armstrong v. Win-
nington115, where it was held that emissions allowances are intangible prop-
erty in which equitable interests can subsist116, it can consequently be said
that a third party interest such a security interest can also exist in them,
according to the aforementioned standard definitions. Armstrong v. Win-
nington involved a scenario where stolen allowances had been sold to a third
party. Armstrong operated EU ETS regulated installations in Germany and
consequently held accounts for emissions allowances with the German reg-
istry. Winnington was in the business of trading in allowances and commodi-
ties, and held an account for allowances with the UK registry. Armstrong’s
allowances account was hacked into by a Dubai-based company; allowances
were transferred out of the account without Armstrong’s permission and of-
fered for sale to Winnington. Before entering into the transaction, Winning-
ton repeatedly requested due diligence information on the allowances from
the seller. Despite the information never having been received, Winning-
ton entered into the transaction and purchased the allowances. Armstrong
brought a claim against Winnington in respect of the stolen allowances. The
court held for Armstrong. Winnington, as a buyer of stolen allowances, had
to compensate the victim of the theft, since the transfer of the allowances
from the fraudulent seller to Winnington amounted to an unconscionable re-
ceipt of trust property on Winnington’s part117. Alternatively, Winnington
had to compensate Armstrong on the basis of a proprietary restitutionary
claim at common law for the value of the allowances118.
The key issue raised by the case that is relevant for the purposes of the
thesis is the legal nature of an allowance, in particular whether it constitutes
a form of intangible property which is capable of supporting the existence
of equitable interests. This question had to be answered before the court
curity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 19.
114R. Goode and E. McKendrick. Goode on Commercial Law. London: LexisNexis, 2009,
p. 626.
115Armstrong DLW GmbH v. Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC (Ch) 10 .
116Ibid., para. 59.
117Ibid., paras. 277-286.
118Ibid., paras. 287-289.
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could rule on whether Armstrong was entitled to compensation, as the de-
fences available to Winnington depended on the legal nature of allowances
in the terms expressed above. The court applied the test elaborated by Lord
Wilberforce in National Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth119: “Before a right or
an interest can be admitted into the category of property, or of a right affect-
ing property, it must be definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its
nature of assumption by third parties and have some degree of permanence
or stability” , and held that an allowance was property at common law as
it satisfied the test. An allowance was definable as the sum total of entitle-
ments conferred on the holder under the EU ETS. It was identifiable by third
parties based on the unique reference number ascribed to each allowance in
the national registry. It was capable of assumption by third parties due to
its transferability. Finally, it had permanence and stability, as it continued
to exist in a registry account until transferred out either for surrender under
the EU ETS or sale, and was capable of subsisting from year to year120.
The court further held that an allowance constituted intangible property.
It noted the novel nature of allowances, in that they could only exist in
electronic form, as an entry in the national register, and that they were the
product of EU legislation121. This conclusion was based on the definition of
intangible property in Re Celtic Extraction122, which concerned the question
of whether a waste management licence constituted property for the purposes
of the Insolvency Act 1986123. Firstly, there had to be a statutory framework
conferring an entitlement: this was the case with emissions allowances in the
context of the EU ETS, which conferred an entitlement to exemption from
a fine upon timely surrender of the requisite number of allowances to cover
emissions. Secondly, the instrument had to be transferable, which allowances
were expressly deemed to be under the EU ETS. Thirdly, the instrument had
to have value, which was also the case with emissions allowances, which could
119National Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth [1965] 1 AC 1175, pp. 1247-1248.
120Armstrong DLW GmbH v. Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC (Ch) 10 , para.
50.
121Ibid., paras. 41, 49.
122Re Celtic Extraction Ltd (in liquidation) [2001] Ch 475.
123Insolvency Act 1986.
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be used to avoid incurring a fine under the EU ETS and were traded in an
active market. Although the definition of property in Re Celtic Extraction
concerned a particular statutory definition of property (namely under the
Insolvency Act 1986)124, the court in Armstrong v. Winnington held that
the reasoning applied equally to the characteristics of property at common
law125. Within the intangible property category, the court’s conclusion was
that emissions allowances were not choses in action, in the sense that they
were not recoverable by way of civil action:
[An emissions entitlement] is not a “right” (in the Hohfeldian
sense) to which there is a correlative obligation vested in another
person. It does not give the holder a “right” to emit CO2 in this
sense. Rather it represents at most a permission (or liberty in
the Hohfeldian sense) or an exemption from a prohibition or fine.
But for the entitlement to the [emissions allowance], the holder
would either be prohibited from emitting CO2 beyond a certain
level or at least would be required to pay a fine if he did so. In
this way, the holding of the [emissions allowance] exempts the
holder from the payment of that fine126.
Instead, allowances were deemed to amount to “other intangible property”
(though the absence of a more precise legal categorisation did not, in the
court’s opinion, affect the outcome of the present case)127.
Moreover, on the basis of Swift v. Dairywise Farms Ltd128, which ad-
dressed the question of whether EU milk quotas were property that could be
held on trust, the court in Armstrong v. Winnington held that allowances
were closely analogous with milk quotas and therefore similarly capable of
supporting the existence of equitable interests. The analogy lay in the ex-
emption that the respective instruments conferred on their holder: a milk
124Insolvency Act 1986 .
125Armstrong DLW GmbH v. Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC (Ch) 10 , paras.
49, 52-56, 58-59.
126Ibid., para. 48, see also preceding paras. 40-47 for an account of the types of property
recognised in English law.
127Ibid., paras. 60-61.
128Swift v. Dairywise Farms Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 1177.
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quota represented an exemption from a levy on milk production that would
otherwise be payable, while an emissions allowance exempted its holder from
a fine under the EU ETS for producing emissions. In Swift v. Dairywise
Farms it was stated that a milk quota had commercial value and a legal
effect, which meant that a trust could be imposed where equity so required.
The court in Swift v. Dairywise Farms gave the example of a party A (who
did not have a holding of land to which a quota could attach, and could
therefore not itself hold a quota), who asked party B to acquire a quota and
hold it on trust for A. Consequently, A could require B to sell the quota
and transfer the proceeds to A, or request B to transfer the quota should A
acquire land to which the quota could attach129.
The conclusion reached in Armstrong v. Winnington that emissions al-
lowances grant their holders rights in intangible property which is capable
of supporting the existence of equitable interests clarifies that, in English
law at least, other types of third party interests can conceptually exist over
allowances, notably security interests. However, although in theory security
interests can be created over emissions allowances, there are considerable un-
certainties as to the extent to which such interests can be effectively protected
and enforced by their holders.
The grantees of security interests over allowances need to be able to en-
force them against third parties (other than the grantor). Such enforceability
is generally achieved through “some form of public notice designed to bring
the security interest to the notice of subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers,
or unsecured creditors. This requirement of public notice can be called a
perfection requirement”130. Furthermore, “[t]he methods by which a security
interest can be drawn to public notice vary according to the type of inter-
est created”131. A key method of perfection is by registration of the security
interest, although there is no general rule in English law requiring registra-
tion of all personal property security interests, and there are exceptions in
some situations where registration is not required in order to perfect the in-
129Armstrong DLW GmbH v. Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC (Ch) 10 , paras.
57, 59.
130Goode and Gullifer, Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security, p. 78.
131Ibid., p. 78.
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terest132. Such exceptions typically (though not exclusively) arise where the
grantor of the security interest is a company, and include, for instance, oral
fixed mortgages or charges133. Moreover, “[r]egistration is also not required
where the security interest holder is in possession of the assets subject to the
security interest”, meaning that the security interest is in effect perfected by
possession134.
However, in cases where registration can be used as a method of per-
fection, an effective mechanism for such registration must necessarily be in
place. The framework for registration as a means of drawing to public notice
security interests over EU emissions allowances leaves much to be desired.
The Registry Regulations under the EU ETS framework appear to currently
permit for security interests to be registered in emission allowances. Member
States may allow national registry account holders to nominate “additional
authorised representatives”, in which case the account holder will not be able
to effect any transactions without the permission of such a representative135.
Although this system is not expressly labelled as referring to security inter-
ests, it is envisaged that it could accommodate their registration. Account
holders in the UK, Austria, Sweden and Finland have been expressly allowed
to register additional authorised representatives by their respective Member
States136. However, it is not yet clear how effective this system can be for the
binding registration of security interests, since in the UK, for instance, the
account holder is entitled to remove the additional authorised representative
at the former’s discretion137. It is probably the case that the system was
132Goode and Gullifer, Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security, pp. 78-84.
133Ibid., p. 81.
134Ibid., p. 83.
135Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004 of 21 December 2004 for a standard-
ised and secured system of registries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and Decision No 280/2004/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council [2004] OJ L386/1, art. 23(2); Commission Regulation (EC) No
994/2008 of 8 October 2008 for a standardised and secured system of registries pursuant
to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision
No 280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2008] OJ L271/3, art.
19(2).
136Pohlmann, “The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme”, at 352.
137Registry Terms and Conditions. Emissions Trading Scheme, UK Registry. Version 5.0,
30 November 2011, explanatory note 7.
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not devised with the requirements of security interests in mind. For Phase
III of the EU ETS, a proposal had been made that the applicable Registry
Regulation (commencing on 1 January 2013)138 should expressly provide for
the registration of security interests in emissions allowances, but this pro-
posal was not carried forward into the final text of the Regulation139. The
final text simply states that providing the ability to register security inter-
ests would be desirable, hence this issue should be examined in the context
of a future review of the Regulation140. The Phase III Registry Regulation
still contains provisions regarding the nomination of additional authorised
representatives in the same manner as the earlier Regulations141.
From the point of view of the standard form agreements, the absence of
the possibility of registration is potentially serious. All three agreements (the
IETMA and EU ETS schedule, the EFET electricity allowances appendix and
the ISDA allowances schedule) provide that the emissions allowances to be
transacted under their terms should be transferred free of any security inter-
ests granted in favour of third parties. Under all three agreements, a breach
of this provision amounts to a breach of the so-called “no encumbrances”
obligation. This is advantageous for the receiving party, but it makes the de-
livering party who might find itself in default liable to compensate the other
party for the loss arising from the breach142.
Ensuring that this obligation is not breached requires that the delivering
138Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1193/2011 of 18 November 2011 establishing a
Union Registry for the Trading Period Commencing on 1 January 2013, and Subsequent
Trading Periods, of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme pursuant to Directive
2003/87/EC and Decision 280/2004/EC and Amending Commission Regulations (EC)
No. 2216/2004 and (EU) No. 920/2010 [2011] OJ L315/1 .
139Letter to the European Commission, DG Environment, p. 2.
140Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1193/2011 of 18 November 2011 establishing a
Union Registry for the Trading Period Commencing on 1 January 2013, and Subsequent
Trading Periods, of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme pursuant to Directive
2003/87/EC and Decision 280/2004/EC and Amending Commission Regulations (EC)
No. 2216/2004 and (EU) No. 920/2010 [2011] OJ L315/1 , preamble, para. 13.
141Ibid., art. 21(3).
142International Emissions Trading Master Agreement, clause 5.3, schedule 4; Interna-
tional Emissions Trading Master Agreement, Schedule 4, EU ETS System Schedule, part
1(e); Allowances Appendix (Power) to the EFET General Agreement Concerning the De-
livery and Acceptance of Electricity, clause 6.3; ISDA EU Emissions Allowance Documen-
tation Document, part 7(d)(vii).
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party should have access to reliable sources of information regarding the in-
terests that subsist in the contracted emissions allowances. This statement
may seem trite in view of the fact that in the case of conventional types of
resources such as land, the existence or absence of security interests is readily
ascertainable from an inspection of the relevant register. However, it is con-
siderably more difficult to ascertain whether security interests exist in emis-
sions allowances. One could envisage a situation where the delivering party
itself purchased the allowances from another entity without making enquiries
as to the existence of security interests in them, and it subsequently (after
entering into the standard form agreement) emerged that the allowances were
thus encumbered. The difficulties in being able to discover whether an al-
lowance is subject to a third party security interest may therefore compromise
the transaction and potentially also the whole agreement143.
Another potential problem with taking security over emissions allowances
involves the fact that it is not possible from the outset to identify which spe-
cific allowances will be delivered under any given trade144. This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that, in the single Union registry for allowances that
will operate from Phase III of the EU ETS (2013 onwards), the serial num-
bers of allowances will not be visible to registry users. Although this measure
is intended to protect bona fide purchasers of allowances which may subse-
quently prove to have faulty title145, a (probably unintended) consequence
will be that it would be difficult to enforce security interests in particular
allowances since the instruments cannot be easily differentiated from one
another.
Another instance where the lack of clarity surrounding the protection and
enforceability of security interests in emissions allowances is of considerable
143M. Wilder, M. Willis, and M. Gulli. “Carbon Contracts, Structuring Transactions:
Practical Experiences”. In: Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms:
Making Kyoto Work. Ed. by D. Freestone and C. Streck. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005, pp. 295–311, at 297-298, highlight the importance of ensuring that the rights are
unencumbered.
144Many thanks to Jay Jagasia, formerly of Burges Salmon, Bristol (http://www.burges-
salmon.com/) for providing valuable insights into these issues (e-mail correspondence dated
2 July and 30 July 2012).
145General Questions and Answers on Registries, answer to question 7.
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relevance is in the context of loan financing. The case of emissions reduction
projects provides a particularly instructive example. Such projects take place
under the CDM umbrella of the Kyoto Protocol, and create CERs which are
exchangeable for tradable allowances in the EU ETS. CDM projects are gen-
erally financed by bank loans. Commentators (principally legal practition-
ers) have increasingly begun to remark that banks may wish to take security
over the CERs themselves, given that they are valuable project assets146.
Although the connection between the issue of security rights in CERs and
emissions allowances is indirect, it still becomes necessary to query whether
such security rights can be adequately protected and enforced, so as to be of
genuine legal and commercial value to their grantees.
The issue of the protection and enforceability of security interests in emis-
sions allowances is also important in the context of carbon capture and stor-
age (CCS). The key piece of EU legislation in this area is the CCS Direc-
tive147, which requires the provision of financial security by the potential op-
erator as part of the application for a storage permit, so as to ensure that all
obligations under the permit can be fulfilled148. The European Commission
has issued a guidance document to assist Member States with the imple-
mentation with the CCS Directive, more specifically with defining what can
amount to suitable financial security149. The available options include funds
(deposits), trust funds, bank guarantees, letters of credit and bonds150. More
importantly, emissions allowances under the EU ETS can also be offered as
equivalent to financial security, provided that they provide “sufficient cer-
tainty, amount, liquidity, and duration to be acceptable as equivalent to [fi-
146R. Grice and J. Guillory. “Green Currency: Financing and Perfection of Kyoto Emis-
sion Reductions”. In: International Financial Law Review 26 (2007), pp. 18–20, at 19;
Traylor and Morin, “An Allowance to Take to the Bank”.
147Directive 2009/31/EC of 23 April 2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive
85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC,
2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 [2009] OJ
L140/114.
148Ibid., art. 19(1).
149Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide.
Guidance Document 4: Article 19 Financial Security and Article 20 Financial Mechanism.
European Commission. 2011.
150Ibid., pp. 4-5.
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nancial security]”. The guidance also envisages that the emissions allowances
thus offered can be placed outside the operator’s control, for instance in a
trust fund151.
The assumptions made here are pertinent in view of the absence of clarity
in the EU ETS framework as regards the possibility of registering security
interests in emissions allowances. A system of using allowances as secu-
rity clearly exists, although the mechanics of registration have emerged in a
rather piecemeal manner and are only really applicable by default, given the
ambiguous “additional authorised representative” provisions of the Registry
Regulations. The possibility of placing emissions allowances used as financial
security in trust is also an interesting view, and may arguably suggest that
the ability of emissions allowances to form the subject matter of a trust could
be recognised at the EU level rather than on a country-by-country basis by
the Member States.
Whilst permitting the use of emissions allowances as financial security,
the guidance does draw out a series of caveats which relate to the stability
of this type of instrument. The requirement of certainty is particularly in-
formative. The level of certainty can be affected by the extent of regulatory
discretion in interfering with valid allowances. On certainty, the guidance
suggests questions about, inter alia, conditions under which the financial se-
curity interest might be cancelled or suspended. More precisely, the guidance
states that the preferred option should be that only financial security instru-
ments are accepted that may not be cancelled or suspended by their issuers.
If this approach would unduly narrow the market, thus increasing costs,
Member States should require sufficient notice of the issuer’s intent to cancel
or suspend the instrument, so that a replacement can be provided152. These
requirements serve to highlight the importance of articulating a construction
of reasonably secure emissions entitlements as well as clearly delimiting the
scope of potential regulatory intervention.
The various instances outlined above go to demonstrate that EU-level
151Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide,
p. 8.
152Ibid., p. 38.
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clarity that security interests in emissions allowances can be effectively regis-
tered would be welcomed. Clarity as to the possibility of providing effective
protection and enforceability of security interests can significantly improve
the viability of the EU emissions market by extending the range of commer-
cial uses to which allowances can be put by trading participants. In turn,
the strength of the emissions market ensures the continued popularity of the
EU ETS with trading entities. Support for emissions trading can assist with
achieving an adequate price signal in order to reduce emissions by way of
low-carbon technology development in the long term.
3.6 Conclusion
Using practical examples to examine the workings of the emissions market
as constituted by the contractual relationships between trading participants,
the chapter has sought to demonstrate that the dual public-private nature
of the EU ETS has a significant impact on the ways in which market par-
ticipants can protect their legitimate economic interests against the risks
inherent in emissions trading. Adequate protection against such risks main-
tains the functionality of the emissions market and, in turn, helps to achieve
the environmental goals of the EU ETS153.
The EU ETS has created a private market in emissions allowances. The
short-term purpose of the trading mechanism is to reduce emissions to the
levels of the decreasing cap in an economically efficient manner. The long-
term purpose of the EU ETS is to promote the development of low-carbon
technologies in synergy with the rest of the EU Climate and Energy Package.
This long-term view involves the maintenance of an adequate price signal
in order to incentivise market participation. In turn, a sufficient price level
entails the continued participation of both compliance and investment traders
in the emissions market. When trading in allowances, as with trading in
conventional instruments such as commodities, participants need to protect
themselves against a number of types of risk. With emissions trading, two
153Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, at 322-323.
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particular types of risk arise in view of its regulatory origins, which are
not present in conventional markets. These types of risk are susceptibility to
regulatory intervention and use limitations. Both need to be capable of being
addressed by trading parties in order for the functionality of the market to
be maximised.
The key danger posed by the susceptibility to regulatory intervention is
that the supply of allowances in the market is reduced, making it difficult
(although perhaps not impossible) for sellers to deliver allowances under a
contract. While the standard form contracts most commonly used in emis-
sions trading are able to accommodate the possibility of failing to deliver
allowances due to regulatory intervention in the market, it has been argued
that these arrangements could benefit from more specific drafting to ade-
quately address the risks for both parties. On the one hand, there is the risk
that a seller will have to procure substantially more expensive allowances
than originally hedged for. On the other hand, there is also the risk that
delivery will not be made in time for a compliance buyer to surrender the
allowances in accordance with the EU ETS requirements.
Moreover, the risk that the level of protection and enforceability afforded
to security interests in emissions allowances is unsatisfactory (the risk of use
limitations) can arguably restrict the commercial potential of these instru-
ments and may hold back the maximisation of market functionality. The
absence of clarity at the EU level as to whether security interests can be
registered in emissions allowances is not a desirable situation to be in. It
is of limited practical use to be able, conceptually speaking, to grant se-
curity interests in allowances, if the grantees cannot benefit from effective
mechanisms for protecting and enforcing such interests against third parties.
Uncertainties as to protectability and enforceability are hardly conducive to
equipping security interests with satisfactory legal and commercial value for
the benefit of their grantees. The potential usability of emissions allowances
as financial security which can also be placed in trust in the context of the
EU CCS programme further highlights the need for EU-level clarification as
to whether such interests can be effectively protected and enforced.
Delimiting the scope of regulatory intervention and the range of uses to
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which emissions allowances can be put requires the application of an analyti-
cal framework of the kind put forward in the introduction to the thesis. This
is in order to provide a construction of emissions entitlements which strikes
the correct balance between regulatory flexibility (in the scope of interven-
tion) and market certainty (in the shape of protection for participants, both
in terms of demarcating regulatory intervention and enabling the registra-
tion of security interests). As the final chapter of the thesis demonstrates,
the proposed categorisation of emissions entitlements as instrumental prop-
erty impacts significantly on the quality of emissions allowances as a valuable
market instrument to be transacted in commercial contracts, and thereby on
the continued viability of the emissions market and the environmental success
of the EU ETS154.
154Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, at 305-306.
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Chapter 4
The Constitutive Elements of
Property and Their Application
to Emissions Entitlements
4.1 Introduction
The chapter covers the first part of the analytical framework set out in the in-
troduction to the thesis, and explores the theoretical understanding of what
constitutes a property right. This question is important, as new valuable
resources are created all the time in contemporary societies. It has conse-
quently been suggested that the future of property law may depend on its
ability to analyse these new resources, of which EU emissions allowances
are an example, as potential objects of property. Such an exercise would
necessarily involve enunciating an analytical construction of the proprietary
interest in order to ascertain the extent to which it merits legal protection1.
Legal accounts of property are abundant, both in the common law and the
civil law traditions. Common law jurisprudence on property rights (which
1R. Cotterrell. “The Law of Property and Legal Theory”. In: Legal Theory and Common
Law. Ed. by W. Twining. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, pp. 81–98, at 89; T. Grey. “Property
and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice”. In: Stanford Law
Review 28 (1975), pp. 877–902, provides a valuable overview of the main positions on the
distribution of economic assets. Issues of distributive justice lie outside the scope of the
thesis.
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the chapter focuses on) presents sufficient tensions of its own which require
further investigation. For the sake of clarity, these tensions need to be anal-
ysed and reconciled in one type of legal system at a time, lest we risk not
comparing like with like. Moreover, the common law approach is of particular
importance in the context of the EU ETS, given the drafting of the jurisdic-
tional clauses in the standard form contracts that constitute the emissions
market, and which are predominantly governed by English law. The ISDA
agreement offers English or New York law, while the IETA agreement is gov-
erned by English law. The EFET electricity agreement defaults to German
law, while the EFET gas agreement permits the choice of English law2.
In common law systems, the notion of property “has no single, simple
meaning”; its conceptualisation depends on context3. The English law of
property does not readily permit the admission of new rights to its ambit,
unless certain criteria are satisfied4. The list of criteria is, however, not fixed
and universal in all contexts where novel types of right may arise. Swadling
notes that “the list of property rights... is predominantly judge-made”, re-
ferring specifically to the criteria for determining whether a right constitutes
property that were elaborated in National Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth5.
However, it has been remarked that “[r]easons offered for or against treating
each thing as property are usually ad hoc – there is no single set of tests or
considerations offered for deciding whether a thing ought to be treated as an
object of property that can be applied across contexts”6. Tests which have
been employed to define the scope of property include that in Ainsworth7, the
view that rights should fall into a previously recognised category of property,
and a list of minimal requirements that a right should entail before being
2Sanehi, “Market Contracts”, at 125.
3S. Roberts T. Murphy and T. Flessas. Understanding Property Law. London: Sweet
and Maxwell, 2004, pp. 38-39.
4W. Swadling. “The Proprietary Effect of A Hire of Goods”. In: Interests in Goods.
Ed. by N. Palmer and E. McKendrick. London: LLP, 1998, pp. 491–526, at 525.
5National Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth [1965] 1 AC 1175 , pp. 1247-1248, discussed in
more detail in chapter 3.5; Swadling, “The Proprietary Effect of A Hire of Goods”, at 526.
6L. Bennett Moses. “The Applicability of Property Law in New Contexts: From Cells
to Cyberspace”. In: Sydney Law Review 30 (2008), pp. 639–662, at 641.
7National Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth [1965] 1 AC 1175 , pp. 1247-1248.
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labelled property8.
A notable scenario where the interests under consideration do not satisfy
the Ainsworth test, but have nonetheless been designated as property by the
courts, is the right in preserved sperm samples. It has been commented that
in Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust9, the court concluded that the
claimants had property rights in their own sperm as they had a right to use
it at their discretion (right to use) and they could at any time require the
destruction of the sperm (right to destroy). However, on the Ainsworth cri-
teria, the right in the sperm was not definable, identifiable by third parties,
capable of assumption by third parties, and did not have a degree of per-
manence or stability10. Furthermore, in the case of human bodies and body
parts, the Ainsworth test is again not satisfied, so rights in them are said not
to fall within the category of property. It has been argued, however, that
“Ainsworth does not provide immutable criteria for property and applying
such a rule is counterproductive to biological forms of property”11. Conse-
quently, the Ainsworth test may not be universally applicable to determine
whether novel types of right fall into the property category.
EU emissions allowances have been expressly designated as property in
English law following the judgment in Armstrong v. Winnington12. The test
applied by the court in that case was the Ainsworth test, which such enti-
tlements were said to satisfy. To be admitted into the category of property,
a right needs to be definable, identifiable by third parties, capable of as-
sumption by third parties and have some degree of permanence or stability.
Moreover, in holding that allowances were intangible property, the court in
Armstrong v. Winnington applied the definition in Re Celtic Extraction13:
8Moses, “The Applicability of Property Law in New Contexts: From Cells to Cy-
berspace”, at 647-654.
9Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] All ER 33.
10R. Nwabueze. “Death of the “No-Property” Rule for Sperm Samples”. In: King’s Law
Journal 21 (2010), pp. 561–568, at 563-564.
11R. Nwabueze. “Biotechnology and the New Property Regime in Human Bodies and
Body Parts”. In: Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 24
(2002), pp. 19–64, at 52 and 54-55.
12Armstrong DLW GmbH v. Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC (Ch) 10 , discussed
in more detail in chapter 3.5.
13Re Celtic Extraction Ltd (in liquidation) [2001] Ch 475 .
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a statutory framework conferring an entitlement must exist, the instrument
must be transferable and it must have value. However, neither test addresses
the key question posed and examined by the thesis, namely the precise scope
and contents of emissions entitlements in view of the regulatory goals of the
EU ETS. The first limb of the Ainsworth test requires that an allowance be
definable, which the court in Armstrong v. Winnington held as being the
case: an allowance was definable as the sum total of entitlements conferred
on the holder under the EU ETS. This statement is not sufficient to answer
the key question of the thesis: it does not provide any information as to
what these entitlements actually are, and how their contents are shaped by
the environmental goals of the EU ETS. The Re Celtic test is similarly silent
on the exact contents of emissions entitlements as linked to their regulatory
goals.
The approaches taken in Armstrong v. Winnington and Re Celtic are
explicable on the basis that the sole concern of the court was to determine
whether or not the instruments under consideration were property, so that
they would be capable of supporting equitable interests (Armstrong v. Win-
nington), or fall under the relevant provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 (Re
Celtic). In neither case was there a need to determine the exact composition
of the property right at stake. Consequently, the tests employed in the two
cases do not elucidate how the scope and contents of emissions entitlements
can be determined and defined in accordance with the regulatory goals of
the EU ETS as well as other interests deemed worthy of protection. To con-
duct an analysis of this nature, we must necessarily look to other common
law conceptions of property, beyond those put forward in the aforementioned
cases.
Different types of property theories exist in the common law tradition.
Some legitimise14 or criticise15 (typically private) property. While their im-
14J. Locke. The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original,
Extent and End of Civil Government. Oxford: Blackwell, 1956, puts forward the idea of
entitlement to property rights over the fruits of one’s labour; G. Hegel. Philosophy of Right.
London: Bell, 1896, views property as an expression of personality.
15K. Marx. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. 1. Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1976, uses Locke’s labour theory of property as a point of reference and holds that, since
140
portance is acknowledged, these types of theories do not form the focus of the
chapter. Instead, the discussion concentrates on theories which examine the
constitutive elements of property: in simple terms, what makes a property
right a property right?
The strands of property theory which most directly address the consti-
tutive elements of property rights are the “bundle of rights” conception of
property (discussed in Part 4.2) and the view of property as rights with
certain requisite characteristics (Part 4.3). The analysis of property as con-
stituted of a number of requisite elements is the more functional tool for
determining the legal nature of new entitlements such as emissions entitle-
ments. However, it is noted that the view of property as a bundle of rights
has much to say about the importance (or otherwise) of property as a dis-
tinct type of right which can be clearly delineated from, notably, contract.
The requisite constitutive elements of property are identified as being exclu-
sion, use and (for commercially valuable rights) transfer (Part 4.4). While
emissions entitlements do exhibit all three characteristics, the elements of
exclusion and use entail significant limitations, which may affect their po-
tential characterisation as private property rights (Part 4.5). The conclusion
reiterates the importance of the constitutive elements of property (exclusion,
transfer and use) for determining the nature of novel types of interests, such
as emissions entitlements. The conclusion also signals the usefulness of these
three elements as benchmarks for comparing emissions entitlements with es-
tablished rights regimes in the second part of the analytical framework, which
is discussed in the following chapter.
4.2 Property as a bundle of rights
In the 18th century Blackstone articulated what became for some consid-
erable time the dominant understanding of property rights in common law
the fruits of labour belong to the workers who have engaged in the toil, the appropriation
by capitalist employers of the results of labour amount to wrongly alienating property
from its true owners, the workers; P.-J. Proudhon. What Is Property?: or, An Inquiry into
the Principle of Right and of Government. Princeton: Tucker, 1876.
141
systems. He theorised that the essence of property was the entitlement to
exclude all others from that which was the subject of ownership. These rights
were said to be in rem, that is, “those rights which a man may acquire in
and to such external things as are unconnected with his person”16. One pos-
sible interpretation of this approach suggests that Blackstone saw the rights
vesting in owners as akin to privileges, where the owner had absolute power
over the subject of ownership. This absolute power would include the rights
to use, transfer and generally do as one pleased with the subject of owner-
ship. This kind of right became known as the Blackstonian bundle of land
entitlements17.
The Blackstonian paradigm of property was, however, challenged in the
1920s, particularly in the US. Hohfeld developed a complex legal taxonomy of
rights matched up to corresponding duties, and in particular viewed property
rights as a nexus of personal rights held as against a large number of par-
ties18. Hohfeld’s taxonomy of legal relations signifies a key milestone in the
conceptualisation of property rights. The purpose of this taxonomy was to
put an end to the loose use of terms such as “rights” by lawyers and judges
without explaining what these terms meant in the respective contexts in
which they were employed19. Specifically, Hohfeld notes that “right” is often
used “generically and indiscriminately to denote any sort of legal advantage,
whether claim, privilege, power, or immunity”20.
Within this taxonomy, Hohfeld addresses in particular the notions of
rights in rem and rights in personam, which he calls “multital” relations and
“paucital” relations respectively. In order to discuss the nature of property
rights he uses the meaning of “right” in the narrow sense of the correlative
16W. Blackstone. Commentaries on the Laws of England II. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1979, chapters 1, 3.
17R. Ellickson. “Property in Land”. In: Yale Law Journal 102 (1993), pp. 1315–1400, at
1362-1363.
18Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”,
especially at 28-30; Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning”, especially at 710.
19Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”,
especially at 21-25; Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning”, especially at 710-712.
20Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”, at 717.
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of “duty”. He defines a “paucital” right (in personam) as being one vesting
in one person or group and held against another person or group, or alterna-
tively as one of a few similar, separate rights against a few definite persons.
On the other hand, a “multital” right (in rem) is one of a large class of sim-
ilar, separate rights residing in one person or group respectively as against
persons which are part of a large, indefinite class. The importance of this ap-
proach in property rights theory is that Hohfeld moves away from regarding
the fundamental characteristic of property as being a right to a thing, in other
words that property is defined as the relationship between the owner and the
owned thing, which is what Blackstone believed. Hohfeld’s approach instead
views property as a collection of relationships between parties, whether these
relationships are in rem (multital) or in personam (paucital)21.
Hohfeld has laid down the conceptual framework for analysing property
rights as a nexus of relationships between individuals rather than the relation-
ship between an owner and the subject of ownership. He does recognise that
there is a difference between rights in rem and rights in personam: rights
in rem are always constituted by a bundle of similar rights in personam.
However, he does not explain why it is that rights in rem are always thus
constituted, which some scholars consider to be the defining and distinctive
feature of property rights22.
Hohfeld’s interpretation of property rights has become universally known
as the “bundle of rights” (or “bundle of sticks”) theory of property. This the-
ory holds that there is no qualitative difference between rights in rem and
rights in personam; property rights simply mean a collection of various rights
in personam. Consequently, there are no requisite components which make
up a property right; if one or more “sticks” are missing, the right can still
be a property right. Grey goes as far as to state that the “bundle of sticks”
view of property which has been substituted for the “thing-ownership” con-
ceptions means that property is no longer an important legal category23. On
21Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”, espe-
cially at 712-720; Cotterrell, “The Law of Property and Legal Theory”, at 87.
22R. Grantham and T. Rickett. “Property Rights as a Legally Significant Event”. In:
Cambridge Law Journal 62 (2003), pp. 717–749, at 728-729.
23T. Grey. “The Disintegration of Property”. In: NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY. Ed. by
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the “bundle of sticks” view, property appears little different from contract,
the only difference being that property rights are held against a much larger
and less definite set of parties. Gray also holds that “there are remarkably
few rights of so-called ‘property’ which cannot be assimilated or rationalised
within some form of consensual theory”, since behind every property trans-
action or title lie contracts: “[n]o quantum step differentiates contract from
‘property’, for ‘property’ has no clear threshold”24.
Another aspect of moving away from the “real” versus “personal” rights
dichotomy is that property relations can be seen as more abstract than hith-
erto conceptualised. Bentham’s critique of Blackstone introduced the idea of
property as abstract and challenged the perceived physical nature of property
and its alleged connection to land. Hohfeld adopts this notion of property as
abstract legal relations and consequently views property rights as relative as
between persons. This shift from a strict division between real and personal
rights is said to imply a dephysicalisation of property25.
4.3 Property as a set of requisite constitutive
elements
Despite the dominance of the “bundle of rights” view of property (partic-
ularly in US jurisprudence), it has not been universally accepted by com-
mon law theorists. The view of property rights as distinct from personal
rights represents the classical stance which stems from Roman law, which
distinguished between rights in rem (against the whole world) and rights in
personam (against certain identified entities only) and is still held by some
common lawyers26. Another way of saying that property rights are different
J. Pennock and J. Chapman. New York: New York University Press, 1980, pp. 69–85, at
69-71.
24K. Gray. “Property in Thin Air”. In: Cambridge Law Journal 50 (1991), pp. 252–307,
at 47.
25N. Graham. Lawscape: Property, Environment, Law. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, pp.
136-141, 142-143.
26P. Birks. English Private Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; Penner, The
Idea of Property in Law.
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from other types of rights is that the former require the existence of partic-
ular “sticks” in the “bundle”. This means that property rights have certain
requisite (defining) characteristics without which they cannot properly be
called property rights. If one or more of these requisite characteristics is
or are missing, the right can at the most be called an incomplete property
right27.
The strict demarcation between rights in rem (property rights) and rights
in personam (for instance contractual rights) which was set out in Roman law
and has been adopted by civil law systems has its common law proponents, in
particular Birks28. He remains faithful to the traditional distinction between
the categories of property and obligations respectively, and states that this
distinction is important due to the different nature of the rights attaching
to each category. While property entails rights which are exercisable against
a wide class of persons and are said to attach to the thing, obligations are
by their very nature held against specified persons. Obligations are thus
personal rights (rights in personam), while property rights represent rights in
rem29. Birks’ taxonomy of rights has been criticised, notably, for not reflecting
or modelling social reality, in that it ignores the existence of other types of
rights which do not fall into it (such as social, economic and political rights)30.
Whatever one may conclude on the continued relevance or otherwise of this
taxonomy, it is a useful starting point for examining the view of property as
rights with minimum necessary characteristics which distinguish them from
personal rights.
Honoré’s theory of property sets out eleven standard incidents of owner-
ship which, if all present, effectively guarantee that a property right exists
in most Western market economy-based societies. This does not mean that
the absence of one or more of the incidents leads to a lack of recognition
of the ownership right in the particular legal system; together the incidents
27Merrill, “Property and the Right to Exclude”, especially at 734-737.
28Birks, English Private Law.
29Ibid., at xxxviii.
30G. Samuel. “English Private Law: Old and New Thinking in the Taxonomy Debate”.
In: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24 (2004), pp. 335–362, at 335.
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are sufficient conditions for ownership, but none is requisite31. To Honoré,
property represents both the legal relations between the owner of the thing
and others, and the legal relation between the owner and the thing owned.
The incidents include the right to use the thing for personal purposes, the
right to control its use (for instance by licensing the right to use to another
party), the right to transfer the interest in the thing, the right to security of
ownership and the incident of absence of ownership term32.
Even if one accepts Honoré’s contention that none of the above incidents is
necessary to constitute a property right, that is, one or more may be missing
and the property right would still exist, the question arises whether any of
the incidents could conceivably be seen as “more requisite” than the others
for the existence of a property right. Honoré’s analysis does not provide
guidance on this matter.
Merrill employs Honoré’s theory of ownership as the basis for stating
that “the right to exclude others from valued resources”33 is the essence of
property, and that without this incident of ownership no property right can
be said to exist. He holds that “the right to exclude others is a necessary
and sufficient condition of identifying the existence of property”. Merrill
gives three reasons for this contention. He argues, firstly, that all the other
incidents on Honoré’s list can be derived from this right, and that these
other incidents are not vital to the existence of a property right. Secondly,
he posits that the primacy of the right to exclude is historically justified,
as it was the first right to emerge in primitive property systems, with the
other rights developing only subsequently, once the right to exclude had been
comprehensively entrenched. Finally, Merrill cites the ubiquity of the right
to exclude and explains that, where the law confers a property right, this
generally entails a right to exclude34. Merrill defines and qualifies this right
to exclude. It is not necessarily absolute, though having this right means
31A. Clarke and P. Kohler. Property Law: Commentary and Materials. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005, pp. 4-5.
32A. Honoré. “Ownership”. In: Making Law Bind: Essays Legal and Philosophical. Ed.
by A. Honoré. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, pp. 161–192, at 166-179.
33Merrill, “Property and the Right to Exclude”, at 754.
34Ibid., at 731, 740-752.
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that one has a property right, and conversely not having this right means
that no property right exists. The primacy of the right to exclude is derived
from Blackstone’s view of property as the dominion which can be exercised in
exclusion of others, and is said to find support in the writings of Harris and
Penner. Furthermore, on the basis of US case law, the right to exclude can be
regarded as comprising the right to exclude public authorities: the hallmark
of property is an entitlement which cannot be removed except for cause. An
individual has the right to exclude the government from interfering with the
entitlement unless a particular condition (the finding of cause, in US law)
has been satisfied35.
Consequently, the right to exclude others from interference (including the
government, unless set conditions are satisfied) can be regarded as a necessary
constitutive element of a property right. Examples of such conditions include
(but are not limited to) the provision of compensation, for instance in the
US legal system36. Under general public international law, expropriation of
property is subject to a public purpose, and must similarly be accompanied by
adequate compensation37. More specifically, under the First Protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the state must not interfere
with property unless such interference is in the public interest38. What is
viewed as being in the public interest requires a fair balance between public
and private interests, and usually requires reasonable compensation; “we can
now say that the Protocol contains an implied right to compensation”39.
As a signatory to the ECHR (which has been incorporated into English
law40), the UK is bound by such protection of property. Gray, in a piece
discussing, inter alia, various rules surrounding state intervention in English
35Merrill, “Property and the Right to Exclude”, at 752.
36See chapter 2.5.
37P. Malanczuk. Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law. New York: Rout-
ledge, 1997, pp. 235-238.
38Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 20 March 1952, in force 18 May 1954. url: http://http://conventions.co
e.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=009&CM=7&DF=19/06/2013&CL=ENG, art.
1.
39T. Allen. “Compensation for Property under the European Convention on Human
Rights”. In: Michigan Journal of International Law 28 (2007), pp. 287–336, at 288.
40Human Rights Act 1998.
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law41, also remarks that, although the express protection of property against
uncompensated expropriation found in US law has
no precise parallel under the unwritten constitution of the UK ...
it would be wrong to suppose that, prior to the commencement
of the Human Rights Act 1998, the UK never had experience of
an entrenched prohibition on uncompensated appropriation. For
decades the Government of Ireland Act 1920 – which ranked of
course as a constitutional instrument – forbade the enactment
in Northern Ireland of any law which would ’either directly or
indirectly ... take any property without compensation”’42.
In conclusion, whether or not compensation is available in a particular
scenario of state interference with property (and in some circumstances it is
not, for instance where the absence of compensation is statutorily prescribed,
as noted by Gray in the case of certain town planning schemes43), such in-
terference must always necessarily comply with certain set rules, for instance
under the First Protocol of the ECHR it must satisfy tests of legality and
proportionality44.
Gray identifies the criterion of excludability as the core of property, and
holds that property “is not about enjoyment of access but about control
over access”45. Moreover, “[t]he limits on ‘property’ are fixed, not by the
‘thinglikeness’ of particular resources, but by the physical, legal and moral
criteria of excludability”46.
Harris defines property as “comprising items which are either the subject
of direct trespassory protection or separately assignable as parts of private
wealth”47. Property is thus made up of the key constituents of trespassory
41K. Gray. “Land Law and Human Rights”. In: Land Law: Issues, Debates, Policy. Ed.
by L. Tee. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2002, pp. 211–245.
42Ibid., p. 217.
43Ibid., pp. 240-241.
44Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 20 March 1952, in force 18 May 1954 , art. 1; Gray, “Land Law and Human
Rights”, pp. 233-236.
45Gray, “Property in Thin Air”, at 39.
46Ibid., at 44, 48.
47J. Harris. Property and Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, p. 13.
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rules and the ownership spectrum. Harris defines trespassory rules as mean-
ing any social rules imposing obligations on members of society to refrain
from using a thing without its owner’s consent. He defines the ownership
spectrum as “the open-ended relationships presupposed and protected by
trespassory rules”48. Harris thus allows for the various possible manifesta-
tions of property rights (such as, for example, freehold and leasehold interests
in land49, where all these manifestations have as their common denominator
the existence of the right to exclude others from the thing owned. Harris
notes that the existence of trespassory rules is necessary for the existence
of a property right, though not always (though in reality it generally is)
determinative thereof50:
The idea of a proprietary relationship entailing an open-ended set
of use-privileges and control-powers, that is, some version of an
ownership interest, is a separate and indispensable element of a
property institution51.
Consequently, the existence of the ownership spectrum is required in ad-
dition to trespassory rules in order for a property right to be constituted.
Penner endorses Harris’ view of property as a set of trespassory rules
protecting ownership, as well as Harris’ qualification that the right is prima
facie to do anything with the thing owned, with the qualification that some
uses are forbidden by the law and the set of permitted uses may fluctuate.
Penner thus allows for restrictions on use such as planning laws, and also
48Harris, Property and Justice, p. 5.
49Ibid., pp. 8-10.
50Ibid., pp. 58-59, “For an item to be fully comprehended within a property institution -
that is, a specific point of reference for the rules which constitute the institution - it must
either be the subject of direct trespassory protection, or else be separately assignable, or,
of course, both. An interest is ‘proprietary’ if either characteristic may be predicated of it.
Both characteristics are true of most ownership interests recognized in modern English law,
whether in land, goods, ideational entities, money, or cashable rights. But an ownership
interest could receive general trespassory protection at the same time that exploitation of
it is limited to the exercise of control-powers without powers of transmission, as was the
case with statutory tenancies under the English Rent Acts”.
51Ibid., p. 26.
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for state expropriation against adequate compensation52. The default rule is
that the owner may use the thing as he pleases, so long as there is no rule
restricting use; there are no pre-set categories of use which are allowed. This
approach seems logical, as it would be very difficult to draw up an exhaustive
list of all the permitted uses of an owned thing53.
Penner’s conceptualisation of property offers a critique of the standard
basis of property as embodied in the “bundle of rights” notion. He views
property through an interest-based lens. Specifically, his theory of property
focuses on the interest that people have in exclusively determining the use of
things, and thus examines how individuals relate to the objects of property54.
Penner posits that “property rights can be fully explained using the concepts
of exclusion and use”, which he states to be intertwined55. The crux of his
approach consists of the so-called separability thesis and the exclusion thesis,
which are said to form the joint conceptual foundations for the understanding
of property56. This particular view of property reveals certain key elements
which are required to constitute a property right (namely exclusion and use),
and can therefore assist with carrying out the analysis of the constitutive
elements of property proposed by the thesis.
Firstly, the concept of separability entails that only those things which
are contingently associated with the owner may constitute the objects of
property. For a right to be a property right, it needs to be conferred by way
of legal title57 rather than being intrinsically linked to or part of the owner.
In turn, this means that there is nothing special about the property right
held by a particular entity at any given time; the same right can be held by
someone else in an identical fashion if the right is transferred by its original
52Harris, Property and Justice, p. 95, sets out legal sources in US and English law of
the “no expropriation without compensation” principle.
53Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, p. 72.
54A. Gold. “A Property Theory of Contract”. In: Northwestern University Law Review
103 (2009), pp. 1–62, at 47-48.
55Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, pp. 68-69.
56Ibid., p. 129.
57J. Penner. “The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property”. In: UCLA Law Review 43
(1996), pp. 711–820, at 802, adopts the positivist view of property as set out by Mac-
Cormick: “a person can have a legal right to this or that thing as against some other
person only if he or she has some title which in law confers that right to that thing”.
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owner58. Consequently, aspects such as personality or talent, which are not
separable from the person, are not capable of constituting property59.
Secondly, property is primarily defined as the right of exclusion. This
is said to work negatively: the owner is protected from the interference of
others with this property, as opposed to the owner having the right to use the
property in any way he desires. Exclusion is further connected to the right of
use: an owner can selectively exclude some third parties from his property,
but is also entitled to allow others to acquire rights over the property (for
instance through licensing arrangements): “[t]he right to property permits
the owner not only to make solitary use of his property, by excluding all oth-
ers, but also permits him to make a social use of his property, by selectively
excluding others, which is to say by selectively allowing some to enter”60.
It is argued that the example of licensing offered by Penner can be sup-
plemented by the further instance of granting security interests over one’s
property for the benefit of another, which can be regarded as a way of using
the property by allowing others to access it under certain conditions. As Pen-
ner notes, “[p]ermitting others access is part and parcel of owning property,
and therefore understanding the social use of property by the owner with
others, or by the grant of the use of the owner’s property to others must
be as fundamental to understanding property as understanding the way in
which property excludes”61. The use of property takes place in a social set-
ting, not in a vacuum, and the interests of right holders are not confined to
using the property alone62. In this sense, actions such as granting a licence or
a security interest over property embody both a social use of the property by
its holder (in the shape of the grant), and at the same time a permission for
another to use the property in a set manner (meaning to use it in accordance
with the licence, or to have recourse to the property under the terms of the
charge)63.
58Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, pp. 111-112.
59Ibid., pp. 111-112.
60Ibid., pp. 74-75.
61Ibid., p. 75.
62Ibid., p. 75.
63Ibid., pp. 77-78, with licences, “the right of exclusive use serves ones use of ones
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On this view, property rights therefore amount to the right to exclude
in order to protect the right to use (where the latter includes the right to
use the property by granting others access to it, whereby such persons are
effectively permitted to use the property under certain set conditions). In
other words, the justification for granting the owner a right to exclude others
from his property is to safeguard his right to use the property64. The full
definition of property, according to Penner, is consequently said to be:
“the right to determine the use or disposition of a separable thing
(i.e. a thing whose contingent association with any particular per-
son is essentially impersonal and so imports nothing of normative
consequence), in so far as that can be achieved or aided by others
excluding themselves from it, and includes the rights to abandon
it, to share it, to license it to others (either exclusively or not),
and to give it to others in its entirety”65.
To the ingredients of exclusion and use we could add the right to transfer
the owned thing voluntarily. Penner himself does not regard this element
as a requisite constitutive part of property, as he views the right to make
property the subject of contracts as a different right from that of owner-
ship. The right to transfer property contractually derives from the presence
of rights of exchange, which arise when parties contract with each other66.
Moreover, property can be gifted, and contracts do not have to have property
as their object. Property can also be taken away by public authorities (so-
called “commanded transfers”); this does not involve a voluntary, consensual
transfer by the owner as it would be the case with a contractual property
transfer67.
property in the social context. Exclusion can be directed or relaxed to protect or facilitate
any particular use, by any particular persons, for any particular length of time”.
64Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, p. 71; J. Penner. “Hohfeldian Use-Rights in
Property”. In: Property Problems: From Genes to Pension Funds. Ed. by J. Harris. London:
Kluwer Law International, 1997, pp. 164–174, at 166-168.
65Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, p. 152.
66Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, p. 91; Penner, “Hohfeldian Use-Rights in Prop-
erty”, at 173; Penner, “The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property”, at 765.
67Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, pp. 91-92.
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However, other commentators consider the right to transfer essential to
the constitution of property rights, as it allows the owner to extract com-
mercial value from the thing. Bell and Parchomovsky note that, despite
Honoré’s statement of the incidents of ownership, the “bundle of rights” the-
ory of property continues to confuse legal theorists as they cannot agree as
to the relative importance of the various sticks in the bundle or as to the
bundle’s contents. They posit that the minimum contents of the bundle (for
the right to amount to property) consist of the rights to use, exclude and
transfer68.
It must be noted, however, that restrictions on transfer do not always
preclude the existence of a property right. Take for example tenancies in
English law, which can be of various kinds; a few (non-exhaustive) examples
follow. A council tenancy can only be assigned by secure tenants69 to certain
qualifying persons70. Housing association tenancies can only be assigned with
prior permission from the housing association71. Private tenancy agreements
can (but do not have to) stipulate that assignment is not permitted or is
only permitted with the landlord’s consent72. This does not preclude these
tenancies from being categorised as property rights (specifically legal interests
in land)73.
From the point of view of the commercial value of the right, however,
transferability is crucial. It is therefore more accurate to say that, generally
speaking, transferability is an important but not necessarily determinative
feature of property rights. When it comes to rights whose commercial value
is paramount as a necessary feature of their continued existence (such as
emissions entitlements, where transferability is the very foundation of the
EU ETS created market), it is argued that the right to transfer becomes a
key constitutive element of the respective rights regime.
68A. Bell and G. Parchomovsky. “A Theory of Property”. In: Cornell Law Review 90
(2005), pp. 531–615, at 587-588.
69Housing Act 1985, s. 82(1), (1A), a secure tenancy is one which cannot be terminated
by the landlord except by court order.
70Ibid., s. 91, these persons include other secure tenants and certain family members.
71Housing Act 1988, s. 15(1)(a).
72W. Woodfall. Landlord and Tenant. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2012, at 16.002.
73Law of Property Act 1925, s. 1(1)(b).
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In conclusion, the view of property discussed in this part suggests that
there are a number of requisite elements needed for a commercially valuable
property right to be constituted. Without these elements, or where the
elements are considerably restricted, the right in question may well be an
incomplete property right, or a different type of right altogether (for example
a personal right). The elements in question are the right to exclude others
from using the resource, the right to transfer the resource voluntarily and
the right to use the resource.
4.4 Which conception of property can pro-
vide the better framework for analysing
new entitlements?
The view of property as formed of requisite constitutive elements and the
view of property as a bundle of rights compete with each other as to which
can provide the more accurate and coherent account of property rights, and
which can better assist with analysing novel types of entitlements. It is
argued that the view of property as formed of requisite constitutive elements
provides the better conception on both fronts. The reasons for this choice
fall into two categories.
Firstly, the “bundle of rights” theory blurs the property rights/contractual
rights distinction, but in reality this distinction remains significant, particu-
larly in legal doctrinal discourse.
Secondly, the “bundle of rights” theory is not helpful in assessing the
scope of action that property rights provide. It is therefore not particularly
well suited to providing the conceptual basis for analysing the contents of
entitlements which is necessary for the purpose of the thesis.
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4.4.1 The distinction between rights in rem and rights
in personam
If it is accepted that property can be defined as a bundle of rights, where
each type of property right entails a number of various entitlements, the
issue remains whether certain rights in the bundle are more important than
others, and thus whether these rights need to be present in order to constitute
property. Taking the “bundle of rights” view at face value, without more,
would suggest that any bundle of rights which create relationships (made
up of corresponding entitlements and obligations) between parties, however
constituted, can amount to a property right. The effect of this view is to
blur the traditional legal distinction between property rights and personal
(principally contractual) rights.
There arguably remains a notable difference between rights in personam
and rights in rem. Rights in personam can be conceptualised in terms of the
obligation coming first, followed by the right to enforce this obligation, and
the two always go hand in hand. For instance, with contract, if a party has
promised to deliver something to another in return for payment, and the good
is not delivered even though payment has been made, the paying party can
take legal action against the payee (and either request specific performance,
meaning delivery, or damages). By contrast, with a right in rem the right
comes first, followed by the obligation. If I own a good, and you try to steal
it from me, you have no legal right to it (and will consequently face crimi-
nal sanctions); in other words, you have the obligation not to interfere with
my right. Moreover, this obligation is a negative (or passive) one; you must
abstain from interfering with my property74, whereas an obligation in per-
sonam is an active one (generally based on performance of the contractually
mandated obligations).
In consequence, a right in rem is not just a bundle of corresponding
right-obligation relationships, contrary to what the “bundle of rights” view
of property holds. A right in rem does not have to have a corresponding
obligation attached to it. Where it appears that rights in rem entail corre-
74Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, pp. 74-75.
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sponding obligations, for instance the situation where a party sells property
(for example a house) to another, this is not an accurate description of what
is happening. To interpret such a scenario as an instance of the right in
rem having a corresponding obligation (to effect payment for the house, in
our example) would be to superimpose a right in personam (created by the
sale-purchase contract) on the right in rem (the owner’s property right in
the house). The latter right exists already, independently and irrespectively
of the right in personam created by contract75.
Furthermore, the existence of a right in rem does not depend on its being
disturbed. Even if I am enjoying my property unchallenged by anyone, it does
not mean that I only have a property right when I enter into a relationship
with someone else over the thing owned (for instance if I sell it, or if someone
steals it). I have a property right already, independently of any subsequent
relationship that I may enter into with someone else as regards the thing76.
Another way of articulating this strand of criticism is that, according to
the “bundle of rights” theory, every legal relation can only exist as between
individuals, meaning that this theory is not able to accurately describe a
general duty owed to everyone, such as the duty not to interfere with the
property of others77.
There is, moreover, a need to draw a line between what a property right
is and how it is actually used in practice. Hohfeld et al conflate the latter
with the former: they confuse contracts dealing with property rights with
the property rights themselves78, and then only concern themselves with the
contracts. The nature and the application of a property right are two very
different things which are independent of each other. The application of a
75Grantham and Rickett, “Property Rights as a Legally Significant Event”, at 730-
732, posit that rights in rem give rise to rights in personam, for instance where there is
interference with the right in rem, a corresponding sanctioning right in personam arises;
Penner, “The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property”, at 752-753, posits that property
and contract are not intrinsically linked: “the concept of property does not depend on the
existence of a right to create binding agreements. Neither does the concept of contract
depend on property rights”.
76Penner, “The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property”, at 807-808.
77Penner, “Hohfeldian Use-Rights in Property”, at 166.
78T. Merrill and H. Smith. “Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle”. In: Yale Law Journal 110 (2000), pp. 1–70, at 5-6.
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property right in practice arguably equates to the sticks in the bundle, which
tell you what you can do with the subject of the right (for instance you can
use it or transfer it). These various possible applications do not necessarily
exist at the time when the right per se arises, but can be created ex post. This
is an instance of the “bundle of sticks” view being inaccurate: not all sticks
exist from the beginning and are simply divested out of the bundle. Instead,
the various sticks get created by virtue of the existence of the residual right
in the thing. They are arguably a consequence of ownership, not examples
of the manifestation thereof79.
Another way of testing the helpfulness of the two competing views of prop-
erty rights is to examine which view is closer to the treatment of such rights
in legal doctrine. In practice, legal systems will only recognise pre-established
forms of property rights. Although the notion of numerus clausus80 is not
as strong in common law systems as it is in civil law ones, it is generally
accepted and complied with de facto by courts81. The common law tradition
has generally viewed property as “denoting only ‘molecular’ combinations
of rights”, rather than as a bundle of numerous and potentially indefinite
rights82. The “bundle of rights” view may therefore be unhelpful to parties
litigating against each other, as a court may not consider all rights that fall
within the ambit of this theory to be property, and will generally distinguish
between rights in rem and rights in personam. Moreover, unless we can
do with these rights what we expect to be able to do with property rights
(for example use them as security, which is a very important application
in commercial dealings), there is little practical usefulness in labelling them
79Penner, “Hohfeldian Use-Rights in Property”, at 172, “Property does not endow an
owner with a right to any particular set of uses of a thing. . . but rather protects his pre-
existing non-legal powers to determine the use of a thing according to his own intelligence,
talents, and magnanimity. . . ” Penner, “The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property”, at
758-759.
80Merrill and Smith, “Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle”, at 4, “In the common law, the principle that property rights must
conform to certain standardized forms has no name. In the civil law, which recognizes the
doctrine explicitly, it is called the numerus clausus - the number is closed”.
81Ibid., at 21-22, 24.
82Gray, “Can Environmental Regulation Constitute a Taking of Property at Common
Law?”, at 14.
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property rights83.
If the “bundle of rights” approach cannot tell us what we can do with the
right and cannot predict how courts will categorise it, this theory arguably
holds limited critical power. It does not assist with determining the con-
tents of the right for the benefit of its holder, and may be unhelpful in legal
doctrinal discourse as it cannot differentiate between property and personal
rights84. The “bundle of rights” theory may view property as abstract, but
the consequences of the existence and distribution of property rights for their
holders are very real and material85.
4.4.2 The usefulness of the competing theories in de-
termining the contents of new entitlements
The “bundle of sticks” view of property opens up the floodgates to most
kinds of bilateral rights created between parties being potentially construed
as some form of property. However, one does not have to inhabit the Birksian
universe of clear divisions between rights in rem and rights in personam to
posit that it may be necessary to probe deeper into the nature of property
rights than the “bundle of rights” theory would allow. The purpose of this
chapter and the next is to determine the scope of action that the ownership of
a thing (in this case, emissions allowances) provides. Such an exercise entails
an investigation into the constitutive elements of property rights86. The iden-
tification of these elements will serve to discover whether new and previously
uncategorised entitlements can be regarded as property rights, or should in-
stead be classified as another category of rights. However, the abstract and
amorphous nature attributed to property by the “bundle of rights” theory
renders it virtually impossible to deduce an analytical framework which can
help with assessing the nature of a new entitlement. As Penner notes, the
83Merrill and Smith, “Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle”, at 8-9, part II.
84Penner, “The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property”, at 819-820.
85Penner, “Hohfeldian Use-Rights in Property”; Cotterrell, “The Law of Property and
Legal Theory”.
86Penner, “The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property”, at 741.
158
“bundle of rights” view only tells us that property is vague and at the most
that there are different kinds of property87. It is difficult to see how we can
ascertain the scope of ownership encompassed in a new entitlement on this
basis.
In conclusion, the first part of the analytical framework put forward by the
thesis views property as a set of requisite constitutive elements, namely the
right to exclude, the right to transfer and the right to use. The remainder
of the present chapter will assess the scope of these three elements in the
context of emissions entitlements: do these entitlements exhibit the identified
elements, and are there any restrictions on exclusion, use and transfer? In
the following chapter, the three elements will form the basis of investigation
of emissions entitlements as compared to three established rights regimes
(namely intellectual property rights, EU milk quotas and spectrum rights)88.
4.5 How does a “constitutive elements” ap-
proach inform our understanding of emis-
sions entitlements as property rights?
The first port of call regarding the contents of emissions entitlements is the
EU ETS Directive89. It states that one emissions allowance equals one tonne
of CO2 and is valid only for the purposes of meeting the requirements of
the Directive90. This provision of the EU ETS Directive does not directly
address the legal nature of emissions entitlements, although it does place
a potentially important restriction on the right to use emissions allowances
(namely only for the purposes of meeting the requirements of the Directive).
As noted in the introduction to the thesis, the legal nature of emissions al-
87Penner, “The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property”, at 774.
88See Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, part 5.
89Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 .
90Ibid., art. 3.
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lowances was briefly considered at the EU level in preparation for the crafting
of the EU ETS Directive. An earlier draft proposed to view them as admin-
istrative authorisations, but this categorisation was ultimately rejected, and
the finalised Directive remained silent on the matter91. The result is that
the issue of the legal nature has been left at the latitude of individual Mem-
ber States. In the absence of centralised guidance in this respect, Member
States can technically ascribe to emissions entitlements whatever character-
istics they deem suitable under their respective legal systems. In Hungary,
for instance, the legislation which has implemented the EU ETS Directive
stipulates that emissions entitlements are tradable rights and constitute part
of the treasury property of the Hungarian state92. Other Member States,
such as the UK, have not specifically articulated the nature of emissions
entitlements in their national legal systems.
The rest of the EU ETS framework offers additional guidance on the
contents of the entitlement.
Firstly, the EU ETS Directive does not address the issue of whether emis-
sions entitlements are secure as against the issuing authority (the European
Commission)93. It is therefore not clear whether the Commission is entitled
to cancel or expropriate emissions allowances during their period of valid-
ity. Moreover, it is also not clear whether, in effecting such interference, the
Commission has to comply with certain set conditions (for example a test of
legality, or the provision of adequate compensation), as would be the case
with the expropriation of traditional property94. The security of the right
or, in other words, the right to exclude is potentially limited.
Secondly, emissions allowances can be bought and sold in the market,
meaning that a right to transfer exists in these instruments. The EU ETS cre-
91Wemaere, Streck, and Chagas, “Legal Ownership and Nature of Kyoto Units and
EU Allowances”, at 49; Button, “Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an
International Carbon Market Based on the Currency Model”, at 575.
92The International Comparative Legal Guide to Environment Law. Global Legal Group,
2009. url: http://www.legal500.com/assets/images/stories/firmdevs/oppe1427
1/environment.pdf, p. 229.
93Questions and Answers on the Revised EU Emissions Trading System, answer to ques-
tion 25, the relevant authority consists of individual Member States in Phases I and II of
the EU ETS Directive, and the EU Commission from Phase III onwards.
94See chapter 4.3.
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ated emissions market is open to anyone who wishes to participate, whether
EU ETS regulated entities trading for compliance purposes, financial insti-
tutions and other operators trading for speculative purposes, or even indi-
viduals95.
Thirdly, a regulated entity can use emissions allowances by surrendering
them in order to fulfil its EU ETS obligations96. However, entities not trading
for compliance purposes, such as financial institutions or individuals, cannot
use the allowance; as the EU ETS Directive states, the allowance can only
be used in order to comply with the Directive97. Moreover, it is not clear
whether emissions allowances can be used in the same manner as resources
in which property rights can subsist, notably whether allowances can be used
as protectable and enforceable security, which is an important issue in the
commercial contractual context, as the previous chapter has demonstrated.
A limited right of use therefore exists in emissions allowances.
As it has been discussed above98, the right to exclude generally extends
against public authorities, who may only interfere with property rights un-
der strictly defined conditions, which can include the payment of adequate
compensation. However, it is not clear from the EU ETS framework whether
or not the Commission can cancel emissions allowances at will. Can the
entitlement in the allowance still be a property right? Cole posits an affirma-
tive answer, on the “bundle of sticks” view; just because one of the sticks in
the bundle is missing (meaning that the entitlement is not good against the
issuing authority) does not necessarily preclude the existence of a property
right. On this view, the entitlement is perhaps not a full property right (a
right of full ownership), but it still sits within the property spectrum as a
lesser right akin to, for instance, a leasehold or a defeasible fee99. Since the
95Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC
[2003] OJ L275/32 , arts. 12(1), 19(2).
96Ibid., art. 6(2)(e).
97Ibid., art. 3(a).
98See chapter 4.3.
99Cole, “New Forms of Private Property: Property Rights in Environmental Goods”,
at 284-285: “Holders of property rights typically cannot be defeased involuntarily. When
a person holds property rights in something, that means that everyone else has a corre-
sponding duty not to interfere (see Hohfeld, 1920). The government may take the property
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“bundle of sticks” view does not prescribe certain contents of the bundle for
the entitlement to amount to property, the interpretation is consistent with
this view.
On the view of property as constituted of the elements of exclusion, trans-
fer and use, the issue as regards exclusion is whether the public authority’s
potentially unlimited right of cancellation affects the legal nature of emissions
entitlements. As noted earlier in the chapter, a number of theorists (notably
Merrill, Harris and Penner) view exclusion as a crucial constituent of prop-
erty rights. They point out that common law systems entail a key entrenched
view that, where property rights are expropriated by public authorities, this
can only be done under certain legally defined conditions, which often include
the payment of adequate compensation. If a public authority has the power
to expropriate a right without limitations, the question arises whether this
right can be categorised as property. The EU ETS is silent as to whether and
how the Commission may interfere with emissions allowances. If a framework
of rules were devised to regulate such interference by making it subject to
certain conditions (as is the case, for instance, under the ECHR), the right of
exclusion pertaining to emissions entitlements would not be curtailed to the
extent that such entitlements fall outside of the private property category.
Another potentially problematic aspect of the entitlement in emissions
allowances lies in the right to use. As the previous chapter has discussed,
emissions allowances can conceptually support the existence of security in-
terests (a key commercial use), although the practical value of such interests
is currently limited due to problems of protection and enforceability. Fur-
pursuant to Eminent Domain, but only upon payment of just compensation. What, then,
is the status under property law of rights to pollute that can be confiscated by the govern-
ment without compensation? Are they really property rights? As noted earlier, whenever
the government regulates for environmental protection, it is (if only implicitly) assert-
ing public rights in environmental goods. And when the government creates a market in
transferable pollution rights, this can be viewed as a conveyance of some of the public’s
property rights in the atmosphere to market participants. What the private firms receive is
something akin to a usufruct, a leasehold, or a defeasible fee on the environmental goods.
These are certainly valuable property rights, though they amount to something less than
fee-simple ownership. To say they are not property rights simply because they are neither
absolute nor perpetual would be akin to saying that fee simple is the only legitimate estate
in land”.
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thermore, from a conceptual perspective, a thing which is owned can be used
in a variety of ways; that is indisputable, whichever theory of property one
adopts. For a property right to exist, it is not necessary for the owner to
have the right to all the possible uses of the “thing”. Penner, for instance,
posits that:
“restrictions on the scope of property rights diminish one’s recog-
nition of a right as a property right only where the purpose of
the restriction is just that, to prevent holders of the right from
treating it as a property right”100.
In other words, where the restriction is intended to alter the relationship
between the owner qua owner and the thing owned, that is, “strike at the
property-like character of the right”, we can no longer speak of property.
Penner gives examples of restrictions which strike at the property-like char-
acter of the right: the state turning all freeholds into 99-year leases, or listed
buildings (where the property right to a piece of land is said to be replaced
with a property right to a historic building to which a number of obligations
are attached). A general ban on contractual dealings involving houses, but
not other types of property, would also strike at the heart of the property
right in houses, as “the true intention of the act is to render property-holders
mere occupiers”. However, if the motivation for the restriction were for in-
stance to prevent disease, this would not be sufficiently closely connected
to the property-like character of the right, so would not preclude its cate-
gorisation as such101. On the other hand, speed limits or planning laws are
considered as not being intrinsically linked with ownership, since even non-
owners are bound by them (for example the driver of the car does not have
to be the owner to be bound by speed restrictions)102.
Furthermore, Gray notes than regulatory intervention may amount to a
taking of property where such intervention removes all reasonable uses of a
particular asset:
100Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, p. 101.
101Ibid., p. 102.
102Ibid., p. 101.
163
whilst a regulatory interference with single incidents of land own-
ership does not normally or intrinsically merit classification as
a deprivation or taking of ‘property’, it remains feasible that
the abstraction or destruction of a strategic combination of a
landowner’s user rights and privileges may bring about precisely
this kind of impact103.
The point is made in the context of the availability of compensation for
regulatory intervention, but is equally valid in the context of determining
whether or not an entitlement can be viewed as property. If removing all
reasonable uses of an asset or, alternatively put, a strategic combination of
its property characteristics, amounts to a regulatory taking (which attracts
compensation), then it can be deduced that such removal strikes at the heart
of the property nature of the particular entitlement.
The idea that some restrictions on use can preclude the categorisation
of an entitlement as property seems fairly logical. If I cannot use the thing
towards the intrinsic purpose for which it has been created, how can I have a
property right in it? This much can be adopted from Penner’s view. What is
not entirely coherent is his method of determining which restrictions preclude
this categorisation and which do not. For the right holder, the end result is
the same, whether he is forbidden to transfer his property for the purpose of
depriving him of the right per se, or for some other extraneous, public policy
reason. This end result is namely that he cannot use the thing for one of
the intrinsic purposes for which it has been created: that it should be freely
transferable so as to allow its owner to benefit from the commercial value
of the good owned. Penner’s view does not necessarily provide a convincing
answer to the question of what constitute invalidating restrictions on use.
To answer this question, it must be examined what amounts to an intrin-
sic use. Logically, if that use is precluded or considerably curtailed, it can
potentially be concluded that the right cannot be conceptualised as property.
As part of the investigation, it is worth deconstructing what “owning” an al-
lowance means. There are two possible alternatives. It can mean owning a
103Gray, “Can Environmental Regulation Constitute a Taking of Property at Common
Law?”, at 9, 11, 15.
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permit to emit 1 tonne of CO2, or it can mean owning an asset which has
value in the market, as it can be bought and sold.
However, on closer inspection the choices are not alternatives, but are
closely linked. Surely the asset has market value only if it encapsulates the
right to emit 1 tonne of CO2, otherwise there is no reason why any market
participant (EU ETS regulated or not) should choose to trade it in the first
place. It follows that the core (or intrinsic) purpose of an allowance is to
permit the emission of 1 tonne of CO2. If this right to intrinsic use does
not extend to non-EU ETS regulated entities, it becomes potentially more
difficult to establish that the entitlement in emissions allowances amounts
to property. Of course, this restriction is entirely logical, as the Directive
cannot conceivably allow non-EU ETS regulated entities to emit CO2; the
very rationale of the EU ETS framework is to restrict the emissions of its
regulated entities.
It is consequently argued that emissions entitlements can be categorised
as a species of property, in line with the conclusion of the court in Armstrong
v. Winnington. This categorisation is, however, subject to certain significant
qualifications, namely uncertainty over the scope of regulatory intervention
and limitation of use. These qualifications represent significant limitations
on the key constitutive elements of exclusion and use, which the chapter has
identified as necessary for the existence of a property right. Moreover, the ra-
tionale for the qualifications lies in the environmental goals that the EU ETS
has set out to pursue. The composition of emissions entitlements is therefore
dependent on the purpose of the regulatory framework that has created them.
In this respect, useful parallels with comparable rights regimes can be drawn,
as the following chapter demonstrates. These parallels will ultimately assist
with the categorisation of emissions entitlements as instrumental property,
as elaborated in the final chapter of the thesis.
4.6 Conclusion
The chapter has compared and contrasted two leading strands of common law
property theory in order to assess their respective usefulness in articulating a
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construction of new types of legal interests, such as emissions entitlements. It
has been argued that the view of commercially valuable property as consisting
of the requisite elements of exclusion, transfer and use provides a more helpful
tool in this respect than the “bundle of rights” theory of property. It has also
been argued that property rights are capable of fairly precise construction,
and may not be as abstract and amorphous as the “bundle of rights” theory
would have us believe.
In the context of emissions entitlements, the elements of exclusion and use
exhibit limitations which impact on the conceptualisation of these interests
within the ambit of private property. The scope and limitations of the key
characteristics of emissions entitlements are shaped, first and foremost, by
their regulatory purpose, rather than by the need to accord legal protection
to their holders, as is the case with traditional private property. Emissions
entitlements do, however, exhibit crucial elements of property: the right of
exclusion (though its strength against the regulator is unclear), free trans-
ferability and the possibility of supporting security interests (which is an
important commercial use). These attributes warrant the categorisation of
emissions entitlements as a special category within private property, namely
instrumental property, as the remaining two chapters discuss. Before such a
categorisation can be fully elaborated, the scope of the requisite elements of
property will be tested in the context of rights regimes which are compared
to emissions trading on the basis of these elements, a task which is carried
out in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5
The Constitutive Elements of
Property: A Comparison
between Intellectual Property
Rights, Milk Quotas, Spectrum
Licences and Emissions
Entitlements
5.1 Introduction
Thus if the categorization of rights as property rights is to be of
continuing value in legal doctrine it is necessary to identify what,
if anything, such rights have in common in modern law.
(Cotterrell)1
The chapter covers the second part of the analytical framework put for-
ward by the introduction to the thesis, and explores three rights regimes
1Cotterrell, “The Law of Property and Legal Theory”, at 90.
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which are comparable with emissions entitlements: intellectual property rights,
EU milk quotas and spectrum rights. These regimes have been chosen for
analysis because milk quotas and spectrum rights entail the granting of pri-
vate rights in otherwise public resources in a similar manner to emissions
entitlements. Moreover, the milk quota system is a form of production reg-
ulation which restricts the supply of a good onto the market. Emissions
trading similarly aims to restrict the output of emissions and help to achieve
EU-wide decarbonisation (which are regulatory goals). In addition, all three
regimes have been created by legislation and entail rights in intangible in-
struments: expressions of ideas, production quotas and the radio spectrum
respectively. Furthermore, the three regimes cover a wide range of possible
entitlements: intellectual property rights are private property2, milk quotas
lie somewhere between property and personal rights, and spectrum rights
have recently been designated as administrative rights which also have some,
but not all, property rights characteristics.
Each of the regimes of intellectual property rights (Part 5.2), milk quotas
(Part 5.3) and spectrum rights (Part 5.4) is analysed on the basis of the
requisite constitutive elements identified in the first part of the framework
elaborated in the previous chapter, namely exclusion, transfer and use. The
three rights regimes are then compared to one another, again from the point
of view of the said key constitutive elements (Part 5.5). Part 5.6 draws
parallels between the scope of these elements in the three aforementioned
regimes and emissions entitlements, and finds that such entitlements are most
similar to milk quotas. That part further suggests a pragmatic approach to
articulating a construction of emissions entitlements which adequately takes
into account their regulatory nature and the consequent need to reconcile
the multiple and potentially conflicting goals of the EU ETS. The chapter
2Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, pp. 109, 118-120, considers intellectual property
to be rights to monopolies; F. Easterbrook. “Intellectual Property Is Still Property”. In:
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 13 (1990), pp. 108–118, pp. 108-118, especially
at 118, by contrast, views intellectual property as property rights. A vigorous debate
thus exists regarding the legal nature of intellectual property rights. However, for present
purposes, intellectual property rights will be considered property, since this is how they
are expressly categorised in the UK, the jurisdiction in respect of which these entitlements
are examined in the thesis.
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concludes that emissions entitlements are best viewed as a special category
of private property rights: their contents are determined by regulatory goals
and shift according to different contexts, as further elaborated in the final
chapter.
5.2 Intellectual property rights
5.2.1 The legal nature of intellectual property rights
The principal3 categories of intellectual property rights are copyright, trade
marks and patents. Intellectual property rights are generally governed by
statute and are dealt with by each EU Member State within their respec-
tive jurisdictions, although the European Commission is currently seeking to
achieve some degree of harmonisation by creating a single market for such
rights4. For this reason, the chapter focuses on the UK legal system as an
example of how intellectual property rights are treated in the national law of
a Member State. EU law is also discussed where relevant.
In the UK, copyright, patents and trade marks are all property rights.
This has been expressly drafted into the respective key statutes5.
Copyright encompasses the rights that authors have in literary and artis-
tic works, which include the right to reproduce the work and the right to
perform it in public. Trade marks are protected representations (both visual
and non-visual, for example olfactory and aural) which are used in com-
mercial contexts to distinguish particular goods or services. Patents protect
inventions which fulfil certain requirements centred around novelty6.
3Other categories exist, such as design rights, trade secrets, geographical indications
and plant variety rights, but they will not be considered as they do not raise any additional
issues relevant for the purpose of the thesis.
4A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights: Boosting creativity and innovation to
provide economic growth, high quality jobs and first class products and services in Europe.
COM(2011)287 final. European Commission Communication. 2011. url: http://ec.eur
opa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/ipr_strategy/COM_2011_287_en.pdf.
5Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 1(1); Patents Act 1977, s. 30(1); Trade
Mark Act 1994, ss. 2(1), 22, 27.
6P. Drahos. A Philosophy of Intellectual Property. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing
Company, 1996, pp. 9-10; W. Cornish and D. Llewelyn. Intellectual Property: Patents,
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These types of rights are different from rights in tangible property. The
nature of the property that is the subject of intellectual property rights does
not necessarily lead to competitive exclusionary effects, like with tangible
property. Knowledge and ideas are public assets. The competitive exclusion
arises artificially when the intellectual property right is created, and the in-
ventor or creator is thereby given exclusive use of the invention or creation7.
Copyright, for instance, leads to the creation of a property right in the ex-
pression of the idea by the author, a right that the author can use to secure
profit in the market. Intellectual property rights are therefore artificially cre-
ated rights (by way of legislation) to regulate competition at the innovation
and creation level. They are different from traditional property rights, which
simply recognise a situation in law, for instance the physical possession of
and control over goods8.
5.2.2 What are the justifications and goals of intellec-
tual property rights?
Intellectual property rights have been justified on a variety of grounds, which
vary as between copyright, patents and trade marks. The various rationales
that have been offered as explanations for the existence of intellectual prop-
erty rights are highly relevant as they throw light on why the contents of
these rights have been crafted in the way that they have. Even if the legisla-
ture and courts have not always expressly paid attention to these theoretical
justifications in creating and interpreting intellectual property rights respec-
tively9, it is argued that in reality a balancing exercise is always inevitably
necessary when articulating the contents of and in particular the limitations
placed on intellectual property rights.
Some key theoretical rationales for intellectual property rights are ex-
Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2010, pp. 7-9.
7Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Al-
lied Rights, pp. 36-37; P. Torremans. Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 11-12.
8Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law, p. 17.
9L. Bently and B. Sherman. Intellectual Property Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008, p. 39.
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plored below. They have been selected as they are have been specifically
referred to in legal doctrine.
Copyright
Reward-based justifications view copyright as intended to act as reward and
protection for individuals who put substantial effort into turning an idea (a
public good) into their own work, which subsequently becomes protected.
Copyright thus protects innovations and creations, and rewards innovative
and creative activity10. Incentive-based theories hold that copyright encour-
ages the creation and dissemination of works, which is beneficial for society
as a whole; the legal protection incentivises authors to produce creations
which they may otherwise not produce if others could freely avail themselves
of their efforts. Authors are thus given an economic (a monetary) incentive
to create works that have public value11.
A variant of reward theory is evident as a justification for copyright in
a number of cases in the English courts. As early as 1900, it was stated in
Walter v. Lane12 that the law could not permit someone to appropriate the
labour, skill and capital of another13. More than 100 years later, it was held
in Designers Guild v. Williams14 that the person who created an original
work using his own skill and labour had the exclusive right to copy that work.
This was said to be the principle on which the law of copyright was based15.
Patents
One of the dominant lines of justification for the existence of patents is
information-based, and in particular relates to public interest considerations.
Patents are said to be useful to society as they involve the disclosure and
circulation of valuable technical information in return for legal protection for
10Bently and Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, p. 36.
11Ibid., p. 37.
12Walter v. Lane [1900] AC 539.
13Ibid., p. 545.
14Designers Guild v. Williams [2001] FSR 11.
15Ibid., para. 2.
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the inventor. Patents have also been persuasively justified on the ground
that they provide incentives for the production of new inventions16.
The latter justification was employed to explain the rationale of the patent
system in Asahi Kasei Kogyo17 as being “the encouragement of improvements
and innovation”: the inventor received a monopoly over the exploitation of
the invention in return for disclosing it publicly. This view can also be
interpreted as endorsing the perception of patents as a public policy service,
whereby valuable information is made public, while the inventor is rewarded.
The incentive-based theory and the public interest justification of the patent
system are therefore closely intertwined.
Trade marks
The most prevalent line of argument in favour of trade marks is based on
the information that they relay. Trade marks are said to provide valuable
information to consumers regarding the particular product so that they can
make informed choices in the market. This information reveals the origin of
the product, and also serves as an indicator of quality which can be easily and
quickly assessed by the consumer. Trade marks are also said to incentivise
firms to maintain certain standards of quality and compete with one another
in doing so. In this sense trade marks recognise the investment that has been
put into promoting the particular product in the market18.
Both UK and EU cases have addressed the justifications for the existence
of trade mark protection. In L’Oreal v. Bellure19 it was noted that, as well as
identifying and guaranteeing origins, a trade mark also serves to indicate that
its owner has a “legitimate interest” in protecting its subject.20. This stance
seems to combine the recognition of the trade mark owner’s investment with
16Bently and Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, pp. 339-340; Cornish and Llewelyn,
Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights, pp. 133-140; Tor-
remans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law, pp. 42-44.
17Asahi Kasei Kogyo [1991] RPC 485.
18Bently and Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, pp. 718-719; Cornish and Llewelyn,
Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights, pp. 620-626; Tor-
remans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law, pp. 388-389.
19L’Oreal v. Bellure [2007] ETMR 1.
20Ibid., para. 99.
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the information-providing function of trade marks, placing particular em-
phasis on the former as a justification for this sort of protection. At the EU
level, the Opinion of the Advocate-General in Arsenal21 states that a trade
mark represents an indication of quality and, more than that, as such repre-
sents the value of the investment that its owner has made22. The guarantee
of origin and quality and the value of the trade mark owner’s investment
are therefore closely linked; the latter effectively ensures that the former can
exist and be accurate. Another way of looking at this relationship is that
the trade mark owner benefits (and can recoup his investment) from the fact
that the trade mark indicates a reputable origin and a certain standard of
quality to the consumer. Of course, the issue that the trade mark addition-
ally guides the consumer in making informed choices is also valid. Indeed, it
has been suggested that it has become the key function of trade mark law,
where initially it had been the protection of the trade mark owner that had
provided the crucial legislative impetus23.
5.2.3 How do these justifications and goals fit in with
the contents of intellectual property rights?
The existence of certain exceptions to intellectual property rights renders it
necessary to delve a little deeper and examine the rationales behind allowing
such exceptions to the right holder’s expected entitlements of exclusion, use
and transfer. It is posited that the goals of intellectual property rights and
the scope of these limitations on their constitutive elements are closely con-
nected. The justifications given for the existence of the various intellectual
property rights that have been discussed above can be summarised in terms
of two key elements. On the one hand, there is the perceived need to offer the
right holder the requisite protection merited by his investment (whether the
personalisation of an idea in copyright, the creation of a new invention pro-
tected by a patent, or the resources expended to promote a product through
21Arsenal Football Club plc v Reed [2003] ETMR 19.
22Ibid., paras. 46-47.
23Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law, pp. 388-389.
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the use of a trade mark). On the other hand, intellectual property rights
are seen as bringing some sort of value to society in general: copyright fa-
cilitates the creation and dissemination of literary and artistic works, the
patent system enables the disclosure of useful inventions, and trade marks
help consumers make informed choices.
The balancing exercise when crafting the contents and specifically the
limitations of intellectual property rights is thus carried out between the
need to protect the right holder and the need to provide value to society. It
is posited that trade offs between these two potentially competing goals of
intellectual property rights are evident in the articulation of the limitations
on their key characteristics of exclusion, transfer and use. In particular, since
the starting point for all intellectual property rights is the conferment of an
effective monopoly on the right holder, it is logical that derogations from
this premise may be necessary in order to prevent this proprietary monopoly
from adversely affecting the circulation of valuable ideas and information in
society. In other words, the limitations on the property rights represented by
copyright, patents and trade marks can be regarded as seeking to restore the
balance that the existence of these rights in the first place has skewed heavily
towards the right holder. However, it must not be forgotten that any deroga-
tions from the property right are just that: derogations, and thus exceptions
which apply in carefully defined, limited circumstances. This accords with
the legal characterisation of copyright, patents and trade marks as property
rights. They are defeasible only if it has been persuasively demonstrated
that a more important value is at stake which warrants a certain degree of
renouncement of the proprietary monopoly.
Exclusion
This characteristic of intellectual property rights manifests itself very strongly
as these rights are negative rather than positive entitlements. They are ef-
fectively exclusionary rights through which third parties are prohibited from
using and exploiting the protected subject. Intellectual property rights give
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their owner exclusive use of the invention or creation24. The ability of the
author to exploit his creation is not dependent on the existence of a protect-
ing intellectual property right; the right simply serves to add the benefit of
excluding others25.
There are, however, a number of carefully defined exceptions to the right
holder’s entitlement to exclude third parties from making use of or interfering
with the intellectual property right. These exceptions act as defences that
a third party may rely upon when sued for infringement of an intellectual
property right. In other words, they exonerate a defendant from liability
for acts that would otherwise constitute an infringement of the intellectual
property right at stake. The defences can only apply once an infringement
has been established, and have been referred to by some commentators as
derogations from property rights26. Defences differ as between the various
intellectual property rights.
In the context of copyright, the most important defences in relation to
private third parties are those related to fair dealing, which can be invoked
only when such dealing was carried out for research or private study, for
criticism or review, or in order to report current events27. In relation to the
acts of public authorities, exceptions to copyright infringement exist under
the umbrella of public administration. Copyright will not be infringed by
anything done for the purpose of Parliamentary or judicial proceedings28, for
the purpose of Royal Commission proceedings or statutory inquiries29, for the
purpose of copying public records and material on a statutory register30, for
the purpose of the copying and issuing by the Crown of unpublished works
communicated to it in the course of public business31, and by acts done under
24Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Al-
lied Rights, p. 6; Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law, p. 11.
25Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Al-
lied Rights, p. 6.
26Bently and Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, pp. 199-200.
27Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 , ss. 29, 30.
28Ibid., s. 45.
29Ibid., s. 46.
30Ibid., ss. 47, 49.
31Ibid., s. 48.
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specific statutory authority32.
The key exceptions to the monopoly conferred by a patent are the notions
of private non-commercial use, experimental use and prior use33. In addition,
there are statutory provisions governing Crown use. This means that the
government, through its authorised representatives, may make use of the
patent for the services of the Crown34: these include the supply of things for
foreign defence purposes, the production or supply of certain medicines, and
the production, use or research into atomic energy of a patented invention
without needing prior consent from the patent owner in the manner set out
in the Patents Act 197735. The uses listed therein are largely similar to those
acts which would in any other circumstances be considered an infringement
of the patent by the aforementioned statute36. Moreover, during a period
of declared national emergency, the Crown may do anything which would
otherwise amount to patent infringement37. The conditions for payment of
compensation to the patent owner are detailed in the Act; compensation is
to be agreed between the relevant government department and the patent
owner, and in default of agreement it will be settled by the High Court38.
The exceptions available in the context of registered trade marks include
the use of one’s name or address, use of the trade mark to indicate the char-
acteristics of a good or service, and use of the trade mark to indicate the
intended purpose of a good or service39. There are no specific statutory or
common law provisions regarding the interference with trade marks by public
authorities. However, trade marks may be removed from the register alto-
gether and thus cease to receive the protection of registration on a number
of possible grounds which include, inter alia, proven invalidity of the regis-
32Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 , s. 50; Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitle-
ments in the Constitution of the EU Emissions Trading System”, at 319.
33Patents Act 1977 , ss. 60(5), 64(1); Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the
Constitution of the EU Emissions Trading System”, at 319.
34Patents Act 1977 , s. 56(2).
35Ibid., s. 55(1).
36Ibid., s. 60.
37Ibid., s. 59.
38Ibid., s. 55(4).
39Trade Mark Act 1994 , s. 11(2).
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tration40, as well as lack of genuine use and misleading nature41. Trade mark
rights may also be suspended in times of war where the owner is an enemy
subject, and where another person needs to use the trade mark to describe
goods or services42.
Given the inherently exclusionary nature of intellectual property rights,
it is not surprising that derogations from the exclusion characteristic are
crafted as defences. The “wrong” committed by the interfering third party
is acknowledged as it is accepted that a breach of the intellectual property
right has occurred. The onus is on the third party to prove that its actions
fall within one of the permitted defences, otherwise liability exists for the
breach. The location of the burden of proof indicates that the availability
of derogations from the exclusion entitlement is very strictly limited, in line
with the nature of strong private property rights. The exceptional nature
of the defences to intellectual property rights infringement is exemplified by
the scope of these derogations. While seeking to rectify potential harm to
society through the monopolisation of valuable information, the defences are
also carefully drafted to ensure that any uses of the object of the rights are
of such nature as not to unduly harm the interests of the right holder.
The fair dealing defences to copyright infringement are narrowly restricted
to particular purposes, where such use by a third party is made in a context
which does not interfere with the right holder’s ability to successfully exploit
his creation commercially. Making use of a copyrighted work for one’s per-
sonal benefit does not affect the value of the work in the commercial sphere.
Where the infringing use clearly indicates that its purpose is to criticise, re-
view or relay news, this makes it clear to the public at large that the work
in question remains very much protected by copyright, while demonstrating
that the infringing use is carefully restricted to ensure that it is providing a
valuable public service. In the context of defences to copyright infringement
on public administration grounds, the justification offered is once again the
public interest: copying or otherwise dealing with the work is permitted for
40Trade Mark Act 1994 , s. 47.
41Ibid., s. 46.
42Patents, Designs, Copyright and Trade Marks (Emergency) Act 1939, s. 3.
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the specified purposes as they are deemed necessary for public administra-
tion. It is also considered that the copyright owner will not have his rights
affected in a substantial negative manner43.
Defences to patent infringements are either limited to the non-commercial
sphere or permitted on the grounds that they are bringing a benefit to so-
ciety and achieving an equitable balance of interests between patent holders
and third parties. Testing the workability of the patented invention (exper-
imental use) is of substantial value as it facilitates scientific development.
Allowing persons who were legitimately and bona fide carrying out activities
which were subsequently patented to continue doing so achieves an equitable
settlement; it is not considered fair that such persons should be negatively
affected by the patenting of their activities, which they could not have pre-
dicted. The provisions for Crown use only exist in the context of patents,
not of copyright or trade marks, and are fairly extensive, as it has been seen
above. This correlates with the notion of patents as being granted by the
Crown and therefore subject to certain reservations of rights by the same44.
The idea of reserved Crown use indicates the nature of patents as restrictions
which keep a particular invention out of the public domain, but which do not
apply in this manner where it is necessary to make use of the invention for
certain matters deemed to be in the national interest. It also highlights the
need to balance the rights of patent owners with matters in the national in-
terest which may warrant these rights being overridden in statutorily defined
circumstances.
The defences available for trade mark infringement are somewhat differ-
ently motivated than those for copyright or patent infringement. It has been
seen above that the main purpose of the trade mark regime is to provide
information to consumers, while at the same time to recognise and protect
the investment of the trade mark owner. Any exceptions to this dual infor-
mative and protective role of trade marks must therefore logically be crafted
to apply in circumstances where there is little risk of confusion on the part
43K. Garnett, G. Davies, and G. Harbottle, eds. Copinger and Skone James on Copy-
right. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2011, at 9-140.
44R. Miller et al., eds. Terrell on the Law of Patents. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2010,
at 23-02.
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of consumers and of unfair competition with the trade mark owner. This
was the position taken in Reed Executive v. Reed Business Information45,
where it was stated that a person could use his own name even if it infringed
a registered trade mark, provided that the amount of confusion caused did
not lead to unfair competition with the trade mark owner. In practice, there
would have to be actual deception for such unfair competition and confusion
to arise, which is a fairly high threshold46. The rationale behind trade marks
helps to explain why there are no specific provisions regarding interference
with trade marks by public authorities, as is the case with copyright and
patents. Trade marks are specific to their owners, who have developed them
to promote specific products in the commercial context. As such, it would
be difficult to envisage circumstances where the state would be justified in
interfering with such rights.
This view highlights the risk that the monopoly granted by a trade mark
can stifle the business of third parties if applied too strictly. It could also be
argued that the defences on the whole may in fact aid the provision of accu-
rate information to consumers, for example where a third party legitimately
uses a registered trade mark (thereby breaching it) to describe the purpose of
a product or service, rather than associating that product or service with the
trade mark in a distinctive way which could lead consumers to believe that
the trade mark belongs with that product or service. The test is whether,
once the consumer is provided with all the facts, he would conclude that the
advertisement is not honest47.
In addition to the defences available for certain infringements of intellec-
tual property rights, the relevant regulators also possess the ability to revoke
those rights which are registrable. Statutory provisions regarding revocation
thus only apply to patents and trade marks, not copyright.
Trade marks are premised on use, in order to provide information to con-
sumers and thereby warrant legal protection. It is due to this purpose that
trade mark revocation may occur on three principal grounds, namely where
45Reed Executive v. Reed Business Information [2004] RPC 767.
46Ibid., per Jacob LJ.
47L’Oreal v. Bellure [2007] ETMR 1 , para. 169.
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a trade mark is not being used (so as to avoid stockpiling of trade marks
which do not serve any informative purpose), where a trade mark has be-
come generic in nature (so that it no longer clearly identifies one product
or service over others), or where a trade mark has become deceptive (and
is thus likely to mislead consumers)48. The rationale behind allowing revo-
cation of registered trade marks in these types of scenarios is based on the
notion of trade mark protection being dependent on their ability to inform
consumers49. Where a trade mark is no longer fulfilling its (primary) infor-
mative purpose, it consequently no longer merits legal protection.
Revocation is also possible for patents in the limited circumstances pre-
scribed by the Patent Act 197750, notably where the invention proves not
to be patentable, where the patent was granted to someone who was not
entitled to it, where the patent does not make adequate disclosure of the in-
vention, and where the material in the actual patent goes beyond the patent
application. The purpose of these scenarios where a registered patent can be
revoked is to deny legal protection to those patents which do not provide the
public with valuable information regarding an important invention, and to
prevent people from benefiting from the patent where this is not warranted.
Transfer
Copyright, patents and trade marks are assignable without any limitation on
this entitlement51. This is logical; as commercially valuable private property
rights, they need to be capable of transfer between parties.
Use
The range of uses and types of exploitation that an owner can undertake
as regards his intellectual property right is extensive. Intellectual property
rights can be exploited by their owners for their personal benefit, licensed to
48Trade Mark Act 1994 , s. 46(1).
49Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Al-
lied Rights, p. 728.
50Patents Act 1977 , s. 72.
51Although there are certain requirements for the assignment to be valid; it must be in
writing and signed by or on behalf of the assignor.
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third parties, used as security, or passed by way of will or intestacy rules.
This is the same spectrum of activities that the owner of a property right in
a tangible resource (such as land) would expect to have.
There are, however, a number of limitations on the way in which an
owner can use his intellectual property right. These limitations include com-
mon law grounds for intervention in contractual bargaining based on public
policy grounds (for example undue influence and restraint of trade rules),
as well as UK and EU competition rules. These are the same kinds of lim-
itations that would apply to contracts with any subject, not just those for
the exploitation of intellectual property rights. These types of contractual
limitations will therefore not be discussed here. The key limitations on the
use of intellectual property rights which are relevant here are compulsory
licensing and temporality. These categories of limitations have been chosen
for discussion as they are closely linked to the perceived purpose of each of
the three types of intellectual property rights.
Compulsory licensing Despite the proprietary nature of the rights, which
means that the owner is entitled to grant licences for the use of the rights
to third parties on freely negotiable terms, in certain exceptional situations
the grant of a compulsory licence may be ordered. Compulsory licensing
is available for copyright and patents, but not for trade marks. Overall, a
compulsory licence may be granted where there is a breach of competition
law (namely an abuse of a dominant position) in the context of copyright or
of a patent, or to prevent under-exploitation of patents.
It is logical that copyright and patents are liable to compulsory licensing
as they are in essence monopolies which, although intended to foster creativ-
ity and inventiveness, at the same time have the potential to unduly restrict
competition in their relevant markets, as well as prevent access to valuable
inventions in the case of patents. As it will be seen below, compulsory licens-
ing for copyright is significantly less extensive than for patents, which are
perceived as more potentially damaging due to the unavailability of valuable
information to the public. There is no compulsory licensing for trade marks,
arguably because by their very nature they have been created in order to
181
mark out a particular product or service and to enable the trade mark owner
to benefit from his investment in the product or service by continuing to
associate the trade mark with it52.
With copyright, compulsory licensing can principally occur in certain ex-
ceptional circumstances which amount to a breach of competition law, more
precisely of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU)53 (formerly Article 82 of the EC Treaty)54. If a number of
conditions are satisfied, the copyright owner can be compelled by the Euro-
pean Commission to license the right, where a refusal to do so would amount
to an abuse of the right holder’s dominant position in the relevant market.
In order for such a compulsory licence to be granted, the copyright owner
must be dominant in a particular market, and the refusal to grant a licence
on voluntary terms must amount to an abuse of this dominance. It must be
remembered here that the very notion of compulsory licensing strikes at the
heart of the intellectual property right as it prevents the owner from freely
determining the terms of exploitation of the right. A refusal to grant a li-
cence to a third party is part and parcel of the exclusionary nature of the
intellectual property right. As such, the circumstances where such a refusal
is not legitimate as it is in breach of competition law must necessarily be
very limited and wholly exceptional.
This was recognised in a line of EU cases which gradually articulated
the requisite conditions (so-called “exceptional circumstances”) where such a
refusal would amount to an abuse of a copyright owner’s dominant position
in the market55. For an abuse to exist, three cumulative conditions have
to be met: the refusal to grant a licence is preventing the emergence of
a new product for which there is potential consumer demand, there is no
objective justification for the refusal, and the refusal excludes competition
52H. Hovenkamp, M. Janis, and M. Lemley. IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust
Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law. Aspen Publishers Online, 2001, pp. 6-40.
53Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47, art. 102.
54Treaty establishing the European Community (Nice consolidated version) [2002] OJ
C325/1, art. 82.
55Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent
Television Publications Ltd v. EC Commission [1995] ECR I-743 ; Case C-418/01 IMS
Health v. NDC Health [2004] 4 CMLR 1543.
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on a secondary market (which is connected to the primary market where the
right owner holds a dominant position)56. This is a very well defined and
closely restricted view of the scenarios where a copyright owner’s freedom to
refuse to license his right can be justifiably disregarded in favour of upholding
competition. That such conditions would have to be satisfied before the
exercise of an intellectual property right could be held to amount to abuse of
dominance was confirmed as also applicable to patents, not just copyright57.
With patents, more extensive compulsory licensing can occur under the
general provisions of the Patent Act 197758 in the UK (which incorporate
provisions to this effect in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)59). The
principal aim of these provisions is to compel the patent owner to exploit it
where he cannot or will not do so, and where the public would therefore be
unduly deprived of access to a valuable invention. The statutory provisions
envisage that circumstances may arise where, for instance, the patent owner is
not capable of developing or exploiting the patent, but is preventing others
from doing so by not licensing it to them. Other types of circumstances
may exist where, for example, public policy grounds exist for licensing to
be required, for instance in the case of essential drugs. The point of this
sort of compulsory licensing is to rebalance the interests of society as against
the monopolistic protection that a patent confers on its owner. It must be
again remembered that, as a property right, a patent confers on its owner the
entitlement to grant licences on chosen terms or to not grant licences at all.
Any derogations from this entitlement are therefore necessarily limited60.
Temporality Intellectual property rights are subject to temporal limita-
tions prescribed by statute. Copyright is limited to the life of the author
plus 70 years61 for original as opposed to entrepreneurial works (that is, lit-
56Case C-418/01 IMS Health v. NDC Health [2004] 4 CMLR 1543 , pp. 1579-1580.
57Sandisk v. Philips Electronics [2007] IL Pr 22.
58Patents Act 1977 , ss. 48, 48A, 48B.
59Patents and Trade Marks (WTO) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/1899).
60Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law, p. 106.
61Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 , s. 12.
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erary, dramatic, musical and artistic works as opposed to, for instance, sound
recordings and broadcasts). Patents are limited to 20 years from the filing
date62. There are no temporal limitations for trade marks; they are granted
with an initial term of 10 years and need to be renewed every 10 years, but
renewals can technically be made indefinitely63.
The setting of these temporal limitations constitutes an attempt to bal-
ance the need to protect right owners against the public interest in having
access to the work or invention. The temporal limitations do not invalidate
the property categorisation of intellectual property rights64. With copyright,
it was felt that the author’s successors as well as the author himself were
deserving of legal protection. As for patents, the idea behind setting the
20-year term seeks to balance the need to give the owner sufficient time to
profitably exploit his invention, and the need of society at large to gain ac-
cess to this invention so that others can use it to bring about improvements
as well as new products. Trade marks are arguably much more personal to
their owner as the owner has created the particular trade mark in order to
promote a specific product, which is what may justify their indefiniteness.
However, the need remains to ensure that trade marks are not stockpiled
indefinitely if they are not actually needed by their owner, hence the need to
renew them every 10 years. This gives the owner the opportunity to regularly
review whether the trade mark is still needed or not.
5.2.4 Conclusion
The discussion of intellectual property rights above is necessarily limited to
a brief incursion into this vast area of law. It is not intended to provide ex-
tensive coverage of the case law and statutes governing intellectual property
in the UK. It is, however, intended to highlight the correlation that has been
expressly made in intellectual property law between the goals ascribed to the
various sets of rights (copyright, patents, trade marks) and the limitations
62Patents Act 1977 , s. 25.
63Trade Mark Act 1994 , ss. 42, 43.
64Gray, “Property in Thin Air”, at 41, “I may have ‘property’ in a resource today, but
not tomorrow”.
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placed on the scope of these rights. The aforementioned examples of limi-
tations on the scope of these property rights have been selected in order to
illustrate how the limitations are in essence exceptional and carefully drafted
derogations which leave unaffected the legal characterisation of copyright,
patents and trade marks as property rights. Intellectual property law has
had the benefit of plentiful discussion of the correlation between its goals
and the limitations on its scope. The conclusion that can be drawn is that
the competing interests of the right owner and of the public have been in the
minds of both legislators and courts when drafting and interpreting this area
of law.
5.3 EU milk quotas
Milk quotas were introduced in the European Community in 1984 to deal with
the continuing oversupply of milk, which was causing substantial disposal
costs65. The currently applicable legislation is the Single Common Market
Organisation (CMO) Regulation.66. Milk quotas form part of the structure of
the European common market, of which the common organisation of markets
in milk and milk products forms a part. The quota system is scheduled to
continue until 2015, when it is envisaged that it will finally be phased out67.
The rationale for this regulatory system is to restrict milk production on
policy grounds and to protect the viability of the European common market
in milk and milk products. Wholesale national quotas are allocated by the
European Commission to Member States, who are subsequently responsible
for setting up a national quota reserve and carving it up into smaller quotas
to be allocated to individual milk producers68 in accordance with historical
65Council Regulation (EEC) No 857/84 of 31 March 1984 adopting general rules for the
application of the levy referred to in Article 5c of Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 in the milk
and milk products sector [1984] OJ L90/13.
66Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common or-
ganisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural prod-
ucts (Single CMO Regulation) [2007] OJ L299/1.
67Milk and milk products. European Commission, Agriculture and Rural Development.
url: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/milk/.
68Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common or-
ganisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural prod-
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levels of each Member State’s choice (for instance, the UK based its allocation
on 1983 production levels)69. If the national quota of a particular Member
State is exceeded in any given year, those individual producers who have
exceeded their quota are liable to pay a levy (although this may be offset to
some extent by the reallocation of quota from producers who have not made
full use of it)70.
The details regarding the methods of allocation and other internal work-
ings of the quota system are complex and outside the scope of the thesis. The
present part will focus on the issues surrounding the legal status of quotas
in EU law and the two common law systems in the EU, namely the UK and
Ireland71. EU law is considered since the milk quota system is entirely a
creature of EU common market policy. The jurisdictions of UK and Ireland
will also be considered as they have witnessed cases which throw light on the
judicial perception of the legal nature of milk quotas. In Ireland, in partic-
ular, the issue of the nature of the rights in milk quotas has been discussed
in some detail by national courts, including the Irish Supreme Court. This
is probably because the market for milk and milk products is particularly
sizeable in Ireland, so it is significantly affected by the EU quota system.
Specifically, this part examines the legal nature of milk quotas in view of
their regulatory purpose. In doing so, the discussion will concentrate on the
three elements which have been identified as key to constituting a property
right in legal theory, namely exclusion, transfer and use, in the same way as
for intellectual property rights above.
ucts (Single CMO Regulation) [2007] OJ L299/1 , arts. 68, 71.
69Practice Note 7: Part 1: The History and Development of Milk Quota Legislation.
Valuation Office Agency. url: http://www.voa.gov.uk/corporate/Publications/
Manuals/InheritanceTaxManual/pnotes/s-iht-man-pn7-pt1.html.
70Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common or-
ganisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural prod-
ucts (Single CMO Regulation) [2007] OJ L299/1 , art. 78.
71Consequently, whenever references are made to national legal systems in this chapter,
this means the UK and Irish systems unless stated otherwise
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5.3.1 Exclusion
The milk quota scheme is a creation of EU law, with the quotas being granted
and allocated by the Commission to Member States, who then allocate them
amongst their national milk producers. It was specifically stated in Maher
that the scheme is “an integral part of the common organisation of the market
in the milk sector”72. This raises the question of whether national authorities
can confiscate quotas or otherwise interfere with them in a manner which
negatively affects their value. Furthermore, if this is possible, it must be
asked whether compensation is owed by the national authority to the milk
quota holder. The answers to these two questions are extremely important in
determining whether milk quotas can be categorised as property rights, as any
interference by public authorities with property rights is usually prescribed
in some detail and accompanied by a certain level of compensation73.
The Single CMO Regulation provides for a number of instances when the
national authority can interfere with the milk quota. Member States may
retain part of a quota which has been transferred (with or without land) and
add it to their national quota reserve; this is referred to as siphoning. The
part of the quota that has been retained in this manner is no longer avail-
able to the parties to the transfer74. Moreover, Member States can confiscate
quotas from producers who are no longer active in milk production and have
not been so for 12 months; the quota is then transferred to the national re-
serve. If production restarts within two years of confiscation, all or part of
the quota is returned to the producer75. Also, where production is less than
72Maher v. Minister for Agriculture, Food and Rural Development [2001] IESC 32, para.
237; J. Usher. General Principles of EC Law. Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998, p.
96.
73Pennings, Heijman, and Meulenberg, “The Dimensions of Rights: A Classification of
Environmental Rights and Production Rights”, at 59-60.
74Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common
organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural
products (Single CMO Regulation) [2007] OJ L299/1 , art. 76; see also Manea, “Defin-
ing Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions Trading System”, at
320, n. 118.
75Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common or-
ganisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural prod-
ucts (Single CMO Regulation) [2007] OJ L299/1 , art. 72(1).
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70% of the allocated quota, the unused portion of the quota can be confis-
cated and added to the national reserve, with the possibility of reallocation
upon recommencement of production76. No provisions as regards compensa-
tion are stipulated in these types of scenarios. By contrast, where a producer
has surrendered his quota to the national reserve voluntarily, Member States
can stipulate rules for compensation to be provided by those producers to
whom this quota is reallocated77.
The absence of compensation appears logical in the instances where pro-
duction has ceased or has been interrupted, since the producers are not actu-
ally making use of the quotas, so there is no real quantifiable loss arising from
the discontinuation of the quota. In any case, should production resume, the
quotas can be reallocated back. Since the rationale of the quota scheme is
to support milk producers by regulating the price of milk and milk products
in the common market, it makes sense that those who are no longer engaged
in production should not be able to retain their quotas. The grounds for
allowing siphoning are said to be to encourage or discourage certain types
of quota transfers, such as disincentivising transfers out of certain regions or
incentivising producers who are new to the market78. That no compensation
is available to the parties to the transfer may seem unfair, but it must not
be forgotten that the primary aim of the quota system is to regulate the
common market, and the interests of private parties affected by this scheme
certainly appear to be subordinated to this regulatory aim. The kinds of
justifications that have been formulated in defence of siphoning provisions in
Member States have been discussed by national courts. In the Irish case of
Condon v. Minister for Agriculture and Food79 the court found the siphoning
provisions implemented in Ireland to be fair and reasonable, as their aims
were to prevent the accumulation of substantial milk quotas in the hands
76Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common or-
ganisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural prod-
ucts (Single CMO Regulation) [2007] OJ L299/1 , art. 72(2).
77Ibid., art. 75(1)(a), (b).
78Evaluation of the Environmental Impacts of Milk Quotas, Final Deliverable Report
prepared for DG Agriculture. Alliance Environnement. 2008. url: http://ec.europa.e
u/agriculture/eval/reports/milk_quot_ei/fulltext_en.pdf, p. 25.
79Condon v. Minister for Agriculture and Food (1993) 2 IJEL 151.
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of a few farmers and to encourage an equitable distribution of the quotas.
These aims were said to be in line with the Single CMO Regulation and
necessitated by Ireland’s obligations as a Member State.
The crucial importance of the ultimate regulatory goal in articulating the
contents of the right in milk quotas was further emphasised inMaher in terms
of the expectation involved in transferring such quotas. One of the points
raised by the claimants was that they had been compelled by the relevant
national regulations to sell their milk quotas at a particular price set by the
Irish Minister for Agriculture, and that this price had been below what they
would have obtained in the open market. They had ceased milk production
and had subsequently surrendered their quota to the national reserve. The
Minister had set the reallocation price (that is, the price that other farmers
to which the quota would be reallocated would have to pay as compensation
to the surrendering party) at a certain level, which the claimants argued was
too low. In effect, the claimants were arguing that their milk quota had been
expropriated in return for an inadequate level of compensation. The Irish
Supreme Court held that the measures for surrendering quotas and setting
the reallocation price did not bring about a forfeiture of a substantive right
(such as a property right). Rather, they were mere regulatory adjustments
which were inherent in the market organisation, which participants could not
legitimately expect to remain static. This inherent potential for adjustments
was something that market participants had effectively signed up to by being
in the market in the first place80.
The court also noted that the milk quota system could not be accurately
described as part of the open market: “the market in milk and hence its price
is a creature of the particular market conditions created by the regulatory
regime itself”81. It was said to create “an artificial market for milk products
since the regime was designed at all times to counteract the negative effects
of prevailing market forces in open unregulated national markets”82. The
Minister was therefore entitled to set the price at the level which was rational
80Maher v. Minister for Agriculture, Food and Rural Development [2001] IESC 32 ,
paras. 256-257.
81Ibid., para. 258.
82Ibid., para. 238.
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and suitable for the continuing functionality of the common market in milk
and milk products, with a view to achieving the regulatory objectives of this
common market83.
5.3.2 Transfer
Milk quotas were not initially designed to be transferable, but over time they
developed in this direction, for instance in the UK. Other Member States,
such as France and Germany, continued to have a much more rigid quota
system, with substantially less transferability84. Transferability is permitted
insofar as it provides a means of avoiding “undesirable effects on the struc-
ture of milk production”85. Beyond this regulatory goal, the judicial response
has been one of effective hostility against unbridled transferability, which is
perceived as only permissible insofar as it promotes the goal of the quota
system, that is, to help optimise the workings of the common market by ade-
quately regulating milk production. That milk quotas have over time become
transferable and have acquired significant commercial value in themselves is
apparent from the case law discussed below. However, neither the EU nor
the national courts in the UK and Ireland have taken the additional step
of equating the attributes of transferability and commercial value with the
existence of property rights, despite this link having been made rather more
easily by some academic commentators86.
In Wachauf 87,one of the early cases on milk quotas, the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) was very critical of the development of a system of trading
in such regulatory instruments, especially where this was perceived as involv-
ing speculation on the quota market for the purpose of pure profit-making.
83Maher v. Minister for Agriculture, Food and Rural Development [2001] IESC 32 , para.
260.
84Ibid., para. 183.
85M. Cardwell. Milk Quotas: European Community and United Kingdom Law. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 92-93.
86L. Slangen and N. Polman. “Land Lease Contracts: Properties and the Value of Bun-
dles of Property Rights”. In: Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences 55 (2008), pp. 397–412,
at 405.
87Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609.
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This view was reiterated in subsequent cases, notably Von Deetzen II 88 and
Bostock89. In particular, in the latter case the ECJ held that “[t]he right
to property safeguarded by the Community legal order does not include the
right to dispose, for profit, of an advantage, such as the reference quantities
allocated in the context of the common organisation of a market, which does
not derive from the assets or occupational activity of the person concerned”90.
The reluctance to condone transferability for its own sake was also reflected
in the judgment of the Irish Supreme Court in Maher91. It was stated therein
that “[t]he milk quota system is an integral part of the common organisation
on the market in the milk sector. . . the conditions of trade. . . are fash-
ioned by the regulatory regime. . . ”92. The legal characteristics of the milk
quota rights system, of which transferability is one, are therefore defined and
limited by the ultimate regulatory goal.
Another limitation on the holder’s right to transfer a milk quota is that,
as a general principle, the quota is attached to the land for which it has
been granted93. There are a number of exceptions to this general rule which
allow for quota transfers to be effected between milk producers without cor-
responding land being transferred at the same time, but these are limited in
number and narrowly defined94. The reason for attaching milk quotas to land
holdings is that it prevents them from being traded for purely commercial
or speculative purposes; this has been confirmed by the ECJ95 as well as by
88Case 44/89 Von Deetzen [1991] ECR I-5119.
89Case 2/92 R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p. Bostock [1994]
ECR I-955.
90Ibid., at I-984.
91Maher v. Minister for Agriculture, Food and Rural Development [2001] IESC 32 .
92Ibid., paras. 237, 239.
93Case C-98/91 Herbrink v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [1994]
ECR I-223, at I-253.
94Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common
organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural
products (Single CMO Regulation) [2007] OJ L299/1 , art. 73 (Member States can au-
thorise temporary transfers of quotas without land), art. 75 (Member States are given the
choice of a number of types of scenarios where they can permit so-called Special Transfers,
meaning the transfer of quotas without the corresponding land being transferred as well).
95Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609 , at 2618.
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the Irish96 and English97 courts.
5.3.3 Use
That milk quotas can be used by farmers to produce milk is indisputable.
What is interesting is whether additional use can be made of quotas beyond
this function of production regulation. Milk quotas were notably being used
as security for a loan in Swift v. Dairywise Farms98. This use was acknowl-
edged by the court with no objections, which would lead to the conclusion
that milk quotas are capable of being employed in this manner. This view
accords with the notion of milk quotas as commercially valuable, in spite
of the remaining uncertainty as to whether they are property rights or not.
However, it is perhaps a little strange that a milk quota is linked to the
land, but at the same time can be used on its own as security. A number of
English cases have raised the issue of whether milk quotas may be the sub-
ject of a mortgage or charge, meaning that they would need to be capable
of categorisation as interests in land under the Law of Property Act 1925.
This legislation was of course not drafted with such idiosyncratic interests in
mind, hence the ensuing problems of interpretation99.
In Huish v. Ellis100, the plaintiff (a milk producer) alleged that the bank
to whom the land with its attached quota had been mortgaged had sold the
land and the quota for less than the expected price. The plaintiff argued
that the land and the quota should have been sold separately rather than as
one. The court held that the bank could not have sold the quota separately,
but only together with the land, so long as it took reasonable care to obtain
a proper price. The bank had no power or right to deal separately with
the quota as the bank was said to have no charge over the quota. Any sale
of the milk quota separate from the land required the cooperation of the
mortgagor (the milk producer) and the bank, since the quota was registered
96Lawlor v. Minister of Agriculture [1990] 1 IR 356.
97Faulks v. Faulks [1992] 15 EG 82.
98Swift v. Dairywise Farms Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 1177 , discussed in further detail below.
99Cardwell, Milk Quotas: European Community and United Kingdom Law, p. 130.
100Huish v. Ellis [1995] BCC 462.
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in the mortgagor’s name101. However, the court did not generalise that a
milk quota, being attached to land, would not fall under a charge over the
land per se. Interestingly, the court held that a transfer of the land would
automatically involve a transfer of the quota attached to it, but concluded
that this did not mean that a charge over the land automatically also covered
the quota, without elaborating on why this might be the case. The court
did not wish to bind the bank to a position where it would have had to take
the risk of entering into negotiations with the mortgagor to sell the quota
separately, but gave the bank the option to choose between this avenue and
that of selling the land with the quota attached102.
A rather different outcome was reached in Harries v. Barclays Bank
plc103. A milk producer had charged his land (to which a milk quota was
attached) to the bank, which subsequently took possession of the land and
was registered as the quota holder. The bank proceeded to lease the quota
to other producers and eventually sold the land together with the attached
quota. The questions before the Court of Appeal were whether the bank was
entitled to become the registered producer, and whether it could keep all the
proceeds of the sale, which included the milk quota (including the proceeds
from quota leasing). The court started by noting that considering the true
nature of a milk quota in general, abstract terms was not a particularly
helpful approach. Since the notion of milk quota was a creature of EU as
well as implementing domestic legislation, this legislation had to be applied
to the facts of the case in hand. This meant that labelling a milk quota as
a particular type of asset was also not helpful as this may be different under
the laws of other Member States. In the present case, when the bank took
possession of the farm it became entitled to be registered as the owner of
both the land and the quota. The quota attached to the land necessarily
passed with it, as under the relevant EU and UK regulations the quota
could not remain with the producer while the land passed into the bank’s
possession. Moreover, the bank’s ability to lease the quota was an incident
101Huish v. Ellis [1995] BCC 462 , at 464.
102Ibid., at 466.
103Harries v. Barclays Bank plc [1997] 2 EGLR 15.
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of possession of the land and therefore permitted104. Possession of the land
was thus perceived as paramount in determining whether the legal charge
over the land extended to the quota.
However, this approach avoided the need to address the separate issue of
whether the quota itself could conceivably be capable of forming the subject
of a legal charge, independently of the land. It has been suggested that this
was the correct result, as a separation between the land and the quota would
have caused undue difficulty. If the charge had only covered the land, but not
the quota, this would have diminished the extent of the bank’s security and
would even have made it more difficult for the mortgagor (the milk producer)
to sell the quota to a third party, as it may be that the mortgagor would
have been seen as holding the quota on trust for the bank105. As noted by
the court, the outcome reached here was inevitably one on the facts of the
case, given the regulatory nature of the milk quota system. It does therefore
not necessarily mean that, just because the quota here fell within the ambit
of the land charge, a more general pronouncement could be extrapolated to
the effect that a milk quota can be the subject of a legal charge and therefore
entails property rights.
Another notable aspect of the milk quota system is that it is wholly
dependent on continuing authorisation under EU law106; it is currently set
to expire in 2015. This makes the quotas temporally limited, although, as
seen with intellectual property rights, this by itself would not invalidate the
possibility of categorising them as property rights.
5.3.4 The legal nature of milk quotas
That quotas are intended as instruments which regulate the common market
in milk and milk products has been stressed repeatedly in both EU and na-
tional case law. It has also been noted that, if a farmer exceeds the allocated
quota, this does not amount to an illegality; the farmer is simply obliged to
104Harries v. Barclays Bank plc [1997] 2 EGLR 15 , at 18-20.
105Cardwell, Milk Quotas: European Community and United Kingdom Law, pp. 130-131.
106M. Cardwell. “Milk and Livestock Quotas as Property”. In: Edinburgh Law Review 4
(2000), pp. 168–190, at 169.
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pay the levy imposed by the relevant EU legislation107. It thus becomes un-
economical to exceed the quota, though technically speaking it is not legally
banned108.
So what exactly are milk quotas? In Maher, Mrs Justice Denham opined
that they were analogous to licences created by law (as opposed to licences
created by private parties), and were therefore subject to the implication that
the creating law may change the conditions of the licences in a discretionary
manner, even where such changes would negatively affect the value of the
licence. This was because the rationale for creating the licences in the first
place was to give effect to a regulatory goal, such as regulating the market
for milk and milk products in the case of milk quotas. The quotas were
said to exist purely for the purpose of the public interest in regulating this
market, and the holders’ rights in them were therefore necessarily limited by
the (changing) requirements of this public policy goal109.
By contrast, Keane CJ concluded in Maher that milk quotas were not
licences as they did not permit their holders to do something which would
otherwise be illegal110. On this view, milk quotas are more accurately de-
scribed as an exemption from levy, or a right to produce a fixed amount of
milk without having to pay a levy111. In Irish law the EC (Milk Quotas)
Regulations 2008 expressly state that a milk quota does not give rise to a
property right112. This does seem to accord with EU law, and that Irish
law should follow this line of judicial reasoning was specifically endorsed in
107Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common or-
ganisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural prod-
ucts (Single CMO Regulation) [2007] OJ L299/1 , arts. 55, 78(1).
108J. Snape. “Transfers of Milk Quotas: Law and Tax”. In: Private Client Business 2
(1995), pp. 150–161, at 151.
109Maher v. Minister for Agriculture, Food and Rural Development [2001] IESC 32 ,
paras. 201-208.
110Ibid., para. 108.
111Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common or-
ganisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural prod-
ucts (Single CMO Regulation) [2007] OJ L299/1 , art. 78; Practice Note 7: Part 1: The
History and Development of Milk Quota Legislation.
112European Communities (Milk Quota) Regulations 2008 (SI 227/2008 (Ireland)), s.
4(1), “The fact that a milk quota has been allocated to a producer or allotted to a milk
purchaser does not confer a property right on that person”.
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Maher. The ECJ has in the past referred to milk quotas as an advantage
and a reference quantity which is attached to the land for which it has been
allocated113.
In Faulks v. Faulks114, an English case, the court specifically discussed
the nature of a milk quota, in the sense of whether it could be considered
an asset separate and independent from the land, and concluded that it was
not a separate asset for the purpose of the rules governing the transfer of
quotas115. It should be noted that the situation is somewhat different from
the point of view of tax. In Cottle v. Coldicott116, another English case, it
was held that a milk quota was an asset per se for the purposes of capital
gains tax, but this categorisation was stated to be expressly limited to the
tax context of the case as opposed to being applicable to the transfer context
as well.
An interesting point of comparison as to the treatment of milk quotas
is provided by the English cases of Swift v. Dairywise Farms117 and Re
Celtic Extraction Ltd (in liquidation)118. While the judgments in Re Celtic
Extraction and Swift v. Dairywise Farms have been interpreted by some
commentators as proof that the English courts view milk quotas as entailing
property rights (albeit non-transferable ones)119, it is argued that these cases
should be seen in their particular context, namely that of insolvency. In
Re Celtic Extraction Morritt LJ held that the notion of “property” took its
meaning from its context rather than being a term of art120.
Re Celtic Extraction involved a company in liquidation that held a waste
management licence. The liquidator wished to disclaim the licence on the
113Case 2/92 R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p. Bostock [1994]
ECR I-955 , at I-984.
114Faulks v. Faulks [1992] 15 EG 82 .
115Ibid., at 88.
116Cottle v. Coldicott [1995] SpC 40.
117Swift v. Dairywise Farms Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 1177 .
118Re Celtic Extraction Ltd (in liquidation) [2001] Ch 475 .
119A. Hudson. “The Unbearable Lightness of Property”. In: WG Hart Workshops, Insti-
tute of Advanced Legal Studies (2002). url: http://www.alastairhudson.com/equity/
The%20Unbearable%20Lightness%20of%20Property.pdf, p. 15.
120Re Celtic Extraction Ltd (in liquidation) [2001] Ch 475 , at 486.
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basis that it constituted property under the Insolvency Act 1986121 and was
therefore capable of amounting to “onerous property” for the purposes of
the same Act. The latter provision states that onerous property can be dis-
claimed by a liquidator, so that the assets of the company in liquidation are
not diminished by being used to deal with the liabilities arising from such
property122. The said rules have as their purpose the protection of the assets
of the company in liquidation which are to become available for distribution
to creditors123. Not being able to disclaim the waste management licence
would have significantly depleted the company’s assets, as the liabilities un-
der the licence were extensive. Counsel for the liquidator argued that such an
outcome would effectively amount to giving priority to the licence liabilities
in contravention of the scheme of distribution of assets set out in the Insol-
vency Act124. Morritt LJ examined analogous instances where interests had
been deemed property in a variety of contexts, for example in the context
of acquisitions of interests in land enforceable against third parties and in
the context of theft of textile export quotas. In these cases the courts had
articulated certain characteristics which led them to conclude that in the
particular contexts in question the interests amounted to property. Morritt
LJ extrapolated from these instances that, in the context of the Insolvency
Act, the interest amounted to property if it had been created by a statutory
framework, it was transferable and it had value. The waste management li-
cence fulfilled all three conditions125. Both in Re Celtic Extraction itself and
in the cases that it quotes there is particular and repeated emphasis on the
importance of context when defining what amounts to a property right. The
implication is arguably that the contents which are requisite for the existence
of such a right are not fixed, but are potentially dependent on extraneous,
contextual aspects, which may even go beyond the goals of the regulatory
framework which has created the said rights.
121Insolvency Act 1986 , s. 436.
122Ibid., s. 178(3).
123Re Celtic Extraction Ltd (in liquidation) [2001] Ch 475 , at 486, quotes a principle of
public policy which states that the entire property of a bankrupt must be appropriated
and made available for his creditors.
124Ibid., at 479.
125Ibid., at 486-489.
197
In Swift v. Dairywise Farms, Jacob J applied the thinking in Re Celtic
Extraction by analogy and concluded that in equity milk quotas were capable
of forming the subject matter of a trust, despite their attachment to the
land and consequent non-transferability on an individual basis126. In Swift v.
Dairywise Farms, a company (D) had been formed in order to lend money
to farmers in exchange for taking security over their milk quotas. D itself
could not hold quotas as it did not produce milk, so the quotas would be
transferred to a sister company (F) pending repayment of the loans. D went
into liquidation, and the question arose as to whether the liquidators could
have recourse to the milk quotas held by F. This could only happen if it
could be said that F held the quotas on trust for D. The quotas would thus
have to be capable of forming the subject matter of a trust, which meant
that they would have to constitute property within the meaning of section
436 of the Insolvency Act 1986. This provision defines property for the
purposes of the Insolvency Act 1986 as including “money, goods, things in
action, land and every description of property wherever situated and also
obligations and every description of interest, whether present or future or
vested or contingent, arising out of, or incidental to, property”127. If milk
quotas could be held as falling within this definition, it meant that they were
able to form the subject matter of a trust and were therefore being held
on trust for the company that had gone into liquidation. The proceeds of
the sale of the quotas should therefore go to the liquidators to form part
of the assets for distribution to creditors. Jacob J noted that milk quotas
had commercial value and legal effects, and the existence of limitations on
how they may be held or conveyed did not prevent equity from imposing
a trust where this was conscionable. He applied the principle in Don King
v. Warren128, where non-transferable contracts had been held capable of
forming the subject matter of a trust. By analogy, just because quotas were
not freely transferable did not mean that they could not be the subject of
a trust. Faulks was distinguished as the quota was not actually owned by
126Swift v. Dairywise Farms Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 1177 , at 1185.
127Insolvency Act 1986 , s. 436.
128Don King v. Warren [2000] Ch 291.
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the partnership in that case. Jacob J also applied the reasoning in Re Celtic
Extraction, where it had been held that a waste management licence fell
within the “property” definition in section 436 of the Insolvency Act 1986
and satisfied the three-pronged test set by Morritt LJ129.
An analogy could be drawn between Swift v. Dairywise Farms and Re
Celtic Extraction, both insolvency cases, and Cottle v. Coldicott, where it was
specifically stated that the categorisation of milk quotas as assets separate
from land was strictly limited to the tax (capital gains) context. Similarly,
in Swift v. Dairywise Farms and Re Celtic Extraction the context was a spe-
cific one, namely that of insolvency, and in the given circumstances it would
have been patently unfair if a valuable instrument such as the quotas or the
waste management licence in question could be set aside from the company
assets available to creditors. Whether a quota (or the analogous instrument
that is a waste management licence) can be given the property label in the
context of the rules on transfer (where there are no tax or insolvency issues
present) is not addressed in Swift v. Dairywise Farms and Re Celtic Ex-
traction. Moreover, in Swift v. Dairywise Farms the court was specifically
interested to find out whether milk quotas could form the subject matter of
a trust, rather than to examine whether quotas were assets separate from
land and constituted property in this respect. Jacob J acknowledged that
quotas had no separate existence independently of the land, and held that
this attachment meant that the trustee holding the land would have to ac-
count for the existence of the trust (with the quotas as its subject matter)
when dealing in this land130.
129Swift v. Dairywise Farms Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 1177 , at 1183-1185.
130Ibid., at 1185.
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5.3.5 Summary overview of the connection between
the legal nature of milk quotas and their reg-
ulatory goal
EU case law has defined milk quotas as an advantage which is allocated to
producers in the context of the common organisation of a market131. The
public origin element of milk quotas is therefore emphasised as being key to
their legal nature. They have not been created or earned by their holder, but
rather have been granted by a public authority. It is also highly significant
that the ultimate purpose of the quota scheme is to regulate that part of the
common market to which they refer (namely the market in milk and milk
products) by limiting production so as to control prices. As such, the scheme
sets out to fulfil goals which are wider than the interests of market partic-
ipants. If the activities of such participants in relation to the milk quotas
cannot be seen as fulfilling the regulatory goal of production regulation, such
activities cannot be justified and are therefore susceptible to curtailment.
This has been reflected, for instance, in the limitations placed on transfer
and speculation in milk quotas that have been discussed above . Any (inci-
dental) outcomes of the milk quota scheme (such as the fact that quotas have
acquired substantial commercial value) are this subordinate to the primary
goal, which is a regulatory one. Similarly, it has been seen that any excep-
tions to the general principle that milk quotas run with the land in respect
of which they have been allocated have as their purposes the mitigation of
adverse effects on producers and the promotion of flexibility where this is
beneficial for the quota system as a whole.
The primacy of the regulatory goal of the milk quota scheme and the fact
that it belongs firmly in the sphere of the common market are the reasons
why both EU and national courts have been unwilling to provide generalised
categorisations of quotas as property or another type of right. Instead, the
contents of the rights created by the quota scheme have been analysed on a
case-by-case basis, depending on the interactions between the regulatory goal
131Case 2/92 R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p. Bostock [1994]
ECR I-955 , at I-984.
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and the facts of each particular context, in particular any additional interests
at stake which may require protection (for instance those of creditors in
circumstances of insolvency). This is why the cases examined above establish
that milk quotas may well be assets independent from land, or property that
can be the subject of a trust, but only in a context-by-context manner,
whether in cases involving for instance insolvency or tax. These judgments
do not necessarily reveal whether milk quotas are property rights (and if not,
which legal category of rights they fall in); they may be akin to property in
some contexts, but not in others. According to some commentators, they are
best characterised as sui generis rights which defy easy categorisation given
their inherently precarious nature132. This view throws light on a crucial
aspect of milk quotas, which is that their characteristics are dictated by the
regulatory goal as well as by other interests which are deemed worthy of
protection in each specific context.
5.4 Spectrum licences
Spectrum rights are authorisations to transmit radio signals, which are needed
to conduct activities such as telephony and broadcasting. The rationale for
these rights is to carve up a resource which, although intangible, is concep-
tually finite. If too many users of the spectrum emit on the same frequency,
communication becomes impossible because of excessive interference133. Con-
sequently, there exists in effect a physical limitation on the resource that is
radio spectrum, hence the policy (public interest) need to restrict access to
it134.
Within the EU there is a harmonised framework in the context of Elec-
tronic Communications Networks and Services, which sets out a number of
generally applicable principles and rules that all Member States’ spectrum
132Snape, “Transfers of Milk Quotas: Law and Tax”, at 153-154.
133Spectrum Usage Rights. Office of Communications. url: http://stakeholders.ofc
om.org.uk/consultations/sur/summary.
134Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, s. 3(1), (2); Data Broadcasting International Limited
and Simpleactive Limited v. The Office of Communications (OFCOM) [2010] EWHC 1243,
para. 7.
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legislation must comply with135. The substantive legal frameworks for spec-
trum rights are regulated at national level. Information about spectrum
utilisation across the Member States can be obtained centrally using the
European Frequency Information System (EFIS), which provides details on
issues such as spectrum allocation and applications for the use of the spec-
trum136.
As for the other types of rights considered in this chapter, the law on
spectrum rights in the UK will form the subject of investigation. The regime
of spectrum rights in the UK (as in the other Member States) is entirely a
creature of public policy (primarily set out in statute)137, and is a regula-
tory means of managing the access of operators to the radio spectrum. In
this jurisdiction, the spectrum is managed by the Office of Communications
(Ofcom) using the UK Frequency Allocation Table (UKFAT), which covers
the range of frequencies in the national radio spectrum138. In addition, the
UK Plan for Frequency Allocation (UKPFA) offers information regarding
the frequencies available for allocation, the purposes for which frequencies
have been allocated and whether the rights in the particular frequencies are
tradable139. Information regarding the licence holder’s details, class of licence,
whether the licence is tradable and the frequencies held is set out in the Wire-
less Telegraphy Act Register (WTR)140. Since holders of certain licences are
135The EU’s framework for Radio Spectrum Policy. European Commission Information
Society. url: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/radio_spe
ctrum/eu_policy/index_en.htm.
136ECO Frequency Information System. European Communications Office. url: http:
//www.efis.dk/.
137Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 , s. 125(1), schedule 9; Communications Act 2003, part
2, chapter 2, ss. 152-184, repealed and replaced in similar terms by former.
138Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 , s. 1(1); About the Ofcom Spectrum Information System.
Office of Communications. url: http://spectruminfo.ofcom.org.uk/spectrumInfo/ab
out; UK Frequency Allocation Table. National Frequency Planning Group on behalf of the
Cabinet Official Committee on UK Spectrum Strategy. url: http://stakeholders.ofc
om.org.uk/binaries/spectrum/spectrum-policy-area/spectrum-management/ukfat
2010.pdf.
139Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 , s. 2; About the Ofcom Spectrum Information System;
Ofcom spectrum management (UKPFA). Office of Communications. url: http://spect
ruminfo.ofcom.org.uk/spectrumInfo/ukpfa.
140Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 , s. 31; About the Ofcom Spectrum Information System;
Wireless Telegraphy Register. Office of Communications. url: http://spectruminfo.o
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allowed to trade them (if this is duly authorised by Ofcom141), the details
of this trading are recorded in the Transfer Notification Register (TNR)142.
Spectrum licences are categorised in the UKPFA by sector (the licence type,
for example business radio, amateur radio, broadcasting services) and class
(for example area-defined, temporary use, full licence).
The terms of the licences granted in the spectrum set out the rights that
the licence holders have as regards the utilisation of their allocated spectrum
frequencies. The primary purpose of delimiting these rights is to prevent
disruptive levels of interference between the users of the frequencies143. For
the purposes of this chapter and the thesis, these rights are analysed from
a legal perspective (rather than a technical one, which includes issues such
as the precise geographical delimitation of the frequency or the maximum
permitted interference). A spectrum licence is an authorisation to do some-
thing which would otherwise be unlawful, namely to provide or use wireless
telegraphy144 (defined, in brief, as the use of radio frequencies to emit)145.
Operators who wish to utilise the spectrum are not automatically entitled to
licences therein. They need to apply to Ofcom for such licences and pay the
appropriate licence fees as determined by the regulator in accordance with
the relevant statutory guidance146. A spectrum licence entails significant lim-
itations on the three types of entitlements (exclusion, transfer and use) that
have been identified above as key to the constitution of property rights.
5.4.1 Exclusion
A spectrum licence gives its holder the right to utilise the allocated frequency
or frequencies to the exclusion of other operators who do not hold such a
fcom.org.uk/spectrumInfo/licences.
141Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 , s. 30.
142About the Ofcom Spectrum Information System; Spectrum trading. Office of Commu-
nications. url: http://spectruminfo.ofcom.org.uk/spectrumInfo/trades.
143Spectrum Usage Rights: A Guide Describing SURs. Office of Communications. 2008.
url: http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/spectrum/spectrum-policy-ar
ea/spectrum-management/spectrum-usage-rights/sursguide.pdf, p. 1.
144Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 , s. 8(1).
145Ibid., s. 116.
146Ibid., ss. 12, 14.
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licence for the particular frequency. However, the licence can be varied or
revoked by Ofcom subject to certain conditions, for example notification of
the proposed variation or revocation (with reasons) and the opportunity for
the licence holder to make appropriate representations147. Once a licence has
been revoked, it must be returned to Ofcom if so required148.
5.4.2 Transfer
Following a recent review of the applicable legislative framework, the trad-
ability of spectrum rights has been considerably improved.
Under the previous regime, spectrum trading had to be specifically au-
thorised by Ofcom, otherwise the transfer of rights and obligations under the
licence would be void. According to the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006149,
regulations may be made authorising the transfer of a spectrum licence, and
may set rules as to how such transfer should be effected. For instance, such
regulations may require the consent of Ofcom for the transfer to be valid150.
To this effect, regulations had already been made in 2004 under the earlier
Communications Act151, and remained in force under the 2006 Act152. The
2004 Regulations required the approval of Ofcom for a licence transfer to be
valid153.
However, a recent process of liberalisation has removed the need for Of-
com’s consent for most licences. In initiating and implementing this liberal-
isation process, the intention of Ofcom was that the trading process should
be simplified so as to permit necessary developments in the radio spectrum
market154. The 2004 Regulations have now been revoked by the 2012 Regu-
147Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 , s. 10, schedule 1.
148Ibid., s. 11.
149Ibid., s. 30(3).
150Ibid., s. 30(3)(c).
151Communications Act 2003 , s. 168.
152Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 , s. 30, which superseded s. 168 of the Communications
Act 2003 without amendment.
153Wireless Telegraphy (Spectrum Trading) Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/3154), regs. 7(f),
8(3)(a) and 9.
154Simplifying Spectrum Trading - Spectrum leasing and other market enhancements.
Office of Communications. url: http://http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/consult
ations/simplify/statement-spectrum-leasing/.
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lations155, which no longer require consent by Ofcom for licence transfers to
be valid.
5.4.3 Use
There are a number of statutory restrictions on spectrum use. Notably,
Ofcom can restrict access to the spectrum by stipulating that only a lim-
ited number of licences will be made available for a particular frequency, as
well as restrict the types of use for which licences of particular frequencies
will be granted156. Moreover, Ofcom can also impose limitations in the li-
cence terms, for instance provisions which restrict the content of the licence
holder’s transmission, or restrictions as to the times of use, or provisions for
frequency sharing between licence holders157. Utilising the spectrum without
a licence is an imprisonable criminal offence158. Contraventions of the terms
of a spectrum licence are taken very seriously and can amount to criminal
offences in respect of which Ofcom may bring proceedings159.
Spectrum licences are temporally finite; upon expiry, they may be re-
newed, otherwise they must be surrendered back to Ofcom if so required160.
5.4.4 The legal nature of the rights granted under spec-
trum licences
As noted above, since the spectrum use regime is a regulatory (and specifi-
cally statutory) creation, spectrum licences are necessarily statutory licences.
That this is their true nature has been confirmed by the courts, notably in
Data Broadcasting v. Ofcom161. In that case, Ofcom intended to vary the
terms of the so-called commercial additional services licences held by the
claimants. This type of licence allowed the claimants to broadcast using the
155Wireless Telegraphy (Spectrum Trading) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/2187).
156Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 , s. 9.
157Ibid., s. 29.
158Ibid., s. 35.
159Ibid., ss. 39-44.
160Ibid., s. 11.
161Data Broadcasting International Limited and Simpleactive Limited v. The Office of
Communications (OFCOM) [2010] EWHC 1243 , para. 68.
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spare capacity in some analogue terrestrial television frequencies, so as to
ensure that none of the frequency space would be wasted. In the light of
the impending UK-wide digital switch-over, which would involve the gradual
phasing out of analogue signals, the whole of the frequencies used for ana-
logue transmission would be required to accommodate the new, high power
digital signal. Ofcom therefore notified the claimants that it intended to
substantially vary their licences, as there would no longer be spectrum space
for the additional services once the digital switch-over came into effect. The
claimants argued, inter alia162, that the proposed variations would amount
to a breach of contract on Ofcom’s part which would make it liable to pay
damages. They argued that the licences constituted legally binding contracts
with particular terms, since in entering into the licences the parties intended
to create legal relations and agreed upon all the terms which were essential
to the formation of a contract.
Cranston J disagreed. He held that the licences in question were not
contracts, but rather “public law instruments... [which] constitute statutory
authorisation permitting the licensees to undertake activities which would
otherwise be unlawful”. Ofcom did not intend to enter into private law le-
gal relations with the claimants, but acted within the remit of its statutory
duties and functions163. Moreover, the substantially important terms of the
licences were expressly stated to be, respectively, either non-negotiable or
determined by the relevant statutory regime. Whatever (limited) freedom
of negotiation the parties had, it remained the case that the licences were
issued pursuant to a statutory scheme which governed the relationship be-
tween the parties. The judge felt that it was crucial that the issue of the
licences was an administrative act, which authorised something which would
162Data Broadcasting International Limited and Simpleactive Limited v. The Office of
Communications (OFCOM) [2010] EWHC 1243 , paras. 95-96, they also argued that Of-
com’s variations of the licences breached their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their
possessions under Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention of Human
Rights (ECHR). When discussing this point, Cranston J used “possessions” and “prop-
erty” interchangeably, and held that this right had not been infringed. He held that licences
were “possessions” under the ECHR provision. This does not mean that they were held
to be property rights, as the provision does not require what in law would be termed such
rights; “possessions” represent a lower threshold.
163Ibid., para. 88.
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otherwise be unlawful. That some of the licence terms were similar in nature
to contractual terms was held not to automatically mean that a contract
had come into existence; the statutory scheme replaced existing common law
rights and duties164. Finally, Cranston J was very concerned that, by treating
the licences as contracts, Ofcom would be open to substantial damages lia-
bility for breach of contract. He deemed this inconsistent with the statutory
spectrum scheme and with Ofcom’s regulatory role, which would be unduly
fettered; this was not what Parliament could have intended165.
It would therefore appear that spectrum licences are better described as
regulatory permissions or authorisations to do something which requires prior
administrative authorisation, otherwise it would be unlawful. That licences
originating from regulatory permission are to be seen in this manner had
been confirmed earlier in Floe Telecom v. Ofcom166. This case concerned
mobile operator licences and was cited in Data Broadcasting in support of
the statement that the issue of the spectrum licences was an administrative
act, irrespective of the parties’ ability to insert some terms of their choice
(rather than statute-mandated) into those licences167. Attaching the label
of “public law instruments” to spectrum licences was an exercise that was
carried out by analogy in Data Broadcasting. Counsel for Ofcom referred
to cases involving statutory electricity agreements168 and the statutory right
to buy council properties169, and argued that the spectrum licences in the
present case had not been negotiated as a true contract would have been170.
164Data Broadcasting International Limited and Simpleactive Limited v. The Office of
Communications (OFCOM) [2010] EWHC 1243 , paras. 91-93.
165Ibid., para. 94.
166Floe Telecom v. Ofcom [2009] EWCA Civ 47, para. 103, per Mummery LJ: “The
decision of the national regulatory authority to grant a licence and the carrying out of
that decision is an administrative act done under and in accordance with the law. A
licence is obtained to do things which it is unlawful to do without that licence. It is the
legal mechanism for authorising something which is required by the general law to be
officially authorised”.
167Data Broadcasting International Limited and Simpleactive Limited v. The Office of
Communications (OFCOM) [2010] EWHC 1243 , para. 92.
168Norweb v. Dixon [1995] 3 All ER 952.
169Rushton v. Worcester City Council [2001] EWCA Civ 367.
170Data Broadcasting International Limited and Simpleactive Limited v. The Office of
Communications (OFCOM) [2010] EWHC 1243 , para. 89.
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The regulatory origin and public policy function of spectrum licences thus
emerge as paramount when undertaking an exercise of legal categorisation.
Since the case law on the point of whether such licences were private law
contracts or administrative authorisations was practically non-existent before
Data Broadcasting, the conclusion in that case is of substantial importance
in determining the nature of the rights created by a spectrum licence. The
conclusion in Data Broadcasting does not, however, answer the question of
whether spectrum rights are property. From the discussion of the elements
of exclusion, transfer and use above, it appears that these rights have some,
though not all, characteristics of property, while at the same time exhibiting
notable limitations as required by the regulatory purpose of the spectrum
management regime.
5.5 Interim summary of the findings regard-
ing the constitutive elements of intellec-
tual property rights, milk quotas and spec-
trum licences
5.5.1 Exclusion
Although the limitations on the entitlement of exclusion held by the owner
of an intellectual property right differ as between copyright, patents and
trade marks, generally speaking this entitlement is very strong, and any
restrictions on it are articulated as narrow exceptions to the monopoly that
has been granted. Such exceptions can only legitimately exist where the
general public has an overriding interest in accessing the protected creation
or invention. Consequently, the limited derogations from the entitlement of
exclusion do not invalidate the proprietary nature of this rights regime.
The strong exclusionary element present in the context of intellectual
property rights contrasts with the position in the case of milk quotas. The
latter regime permits a substantially wider extent of interference with the
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rights on the regulator’s part. The Single CMO Regulation sets out specific
circumstances when national authorities can reduce or confiscate milk quotas,
not necessarily in exchange for compensation. This position is a conclusive
indicator of the regulatory nature of the milk quota regime, as contrasted
with the private value-enhancing purpose of intellectual property rights.
The spectrum rights regime is even less accommodating of the private law
entitlements of right holders than the milk quota regime, as spectrum rights
can be revoked or amended by Ofcom with relative ease. Since spectrum
rights constitute a regime regulating access to a formerly public resource, it
has been held in Data Broadcasting that they are not contractual rights and
cannot therefore give rise to an action for damages as against the regulator.
5.5.2 Transfer
The degree of transferability present in the context of the three rights regimes
varies considerably as between them. Intellectual property rights are freely
transferable, as would be expected with strong private property rights.
Milk quotas exhibit limited transferability, whose extent is determined
by the pursuit of the goal of regulating the market in milk and milk prod-
ucts. Similarly, the transferability of spectrum rights is determined by the
public authority in charge; spectrum licences are only tradable if they have
been designated as such by Ofcom (although the requirement of consent by
Ofcom for tradable licences to be transferred has now been removed). The
transferability of milk quotas and spectrum rights is thus subordinated to
the overriding regulatory goal of the respective regime.
5.5.3 Use
The range of uses to which intellectual property rights can be put by their
owners is extensive. The system of compulsory licensing for copyright and
patents is carefully and narrowly defined so as to ensure that it only applies
in circumstances where the public interest dictates that access to the pro-
tected resource should be provided. Moreover, the temporal limitations on
intellectual property rights do not affect their proprietary nature, but rather
209
embody the need to balance public access to the resource with adequate
protection of the right holder.
By contrast, the uses available in the context of milk quotas are more
limited. Milk quotas cannot logically be licensed to third parties, for example,
as such use would effectively exhaust them altogether. They cannot be used
by parties who are not milk producers; in Harries v. Barclays Bank, they
could be held by the bank as they were attached to the mortgaged land, but
the bank could obviously not use them in the same way as a milk producer.
It also remains uncertain to what extent milk quotas can be used beyond the
production of milk (which is their primary regulatory purpose), as it is not
clear whether they can form the subject of a legal charge. Like intellectual
property rights, milk quotas are finite as the regime is due to expire in 2015.
However, unlike intellectual property rights, milk quotas become exhausted
once they have been used (meaning once the permitted quantity of milk has
been produced).
The spectrum rights regime permits a very limited range of uses. Spec-
trum licences can only be issued to operators who utilise the radio spectrum,
so they cannot be used outside this regulatory ambit. The numbers, scope
and contents of spectrum licences are regulated by Ofcom, and the terms
of the licences set out the permitted uses of the spectrum and also limita-
tions on use. Spectrum licences are also temporally finite, as dictated by the
terms of the licence, though they are not exhaustible in the way that milk
quotas are; there is technically no maximum amount of spectrum that may
be emitted under a particular licence.
5.5.4 Regulatory aspects of the three rights regimes
Two of the rights regimes analysed in the present chapter, namely milk quotas
and spectrum rights, have as their primary purpose the regulation of milk
production and the radio spectrum respectively. The value of milk quotas
and spectrum licences has therefore been created artificially by the regulator.
They are not intended to have private commercial value beyond the confines
of the regulatory regimes which they constitute. The impact of the regulatory
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origins of milk quotas on the scope and contents of the right was highlighted
in Bostock, where the ECJ held that milk quotas did not “derive from the
assets or occupational activity” of the milk producer171. This crucial aspect
of milk quotas, namely that their value has not been created or “earned” by
their holder, fits with the primary regulatory purpose of the aforementioned
rights regime, which has been decisive in shaping their respective scope and
contents. For instance, milk quotas are only transferable insofar as this
promotes the goal of maintaining the functionality of the milk market, and
spectrum licences can be relatively easily revoked by Ofcom.
By contrast, the justification behind intellectual property rights is pri-
marily focused on affording private law protection to the creator of the work.
The value of such rights has been created privately, namely as a result of the
endeavours of the author or inventor. The fundamentally private nature of
intellectual property rights therefore reduces the potential effects of overar-
ching regulatory goals on the scope and contents of such rights. However,
such regulatory goals still exist and do affect the scope and contents of the
rights, albeit in a more limited manner than is the case with milk quotas and
spectrum rights. For instance, the requirements of competition law dictate
the circumstances which make available the compulsory licensing of copyright
and patents. It remains, however, clear that such limitations are carefully
and narrowly delimited, so as to prevent undue restrictions on competition
while at the same time preserving the proprietary nature of the rights172.
171Case 2/92 R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p. Bostock [1994]
ECR I-955 , at I-984.
172Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, at 319.
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5.6 Emissions entitlements: parallels with in-
tellectual property rights, milk quotas and
spectrum licences
This part examines the scope of the three essential elements of commercially
valuable property rights drawn from legal theory (exclusion, transfer and
use) in the context of emissions entitlements. Determining the contents of
emissions entitlements further involves a comparison with the three rights
regimes discussed previously. As regards the respective scope of exclusion,
transfer and use, what are the similarities and differences between emis-
sions entitlements and each of intellectual property rights, milk quotas and
spectrum licences? The answer to this question will help to determine the
legal categorisation of emissions entitlements. We must also be prepared for
the possibility that emissions entitlements exhibit characteristics taken from
more than one or possibly all of the aforementioned rights regimes173.
Determining the contents of and categorising emissions entitlements will
necessarily involve a consideration of the various goals of the EU ETS. This
exercise mirrors the impact of the rationales behind the different regimes on
the contents of the rights analysed above. What is apparent for all three
rights regimes is that the scope of each key element (exclusion, transfer and
use) is directly related to the goals ascribed to each of the different regimes.
This connection is very strong in the case of the two regimes which are
motivated by a primary regulatory goal, namely milk quotas and spectrum
licences. It would therefore be logical to say that determining the respective
scope of exclusion, transfer and use in the context of emissions entitlements
also depends on the goals of the EU ETS, and notably on its primary environ-
mental goals of achieving emissions reductions and supporting an EU-wide
move towards a low-carbon economy.
173Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, at 311.
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5.6.1 Exclusion
In the case of intellectual property rights, the limitations on exclusion differ as
between copyright, patents and trade marks. However, for all three types of
intellectual property right it can be said that any restrictions on the owner’s
entitlement to exclude others (including public authorities) from interfering
with the subject of the right are carefully and narrowly articulated as excep-
tions to the presumed monopoly. This is due to the expressly stated nature
of copyright, patents and trade marks as strong private property rights. In-
tellectual property rights exist principally in order to grant legal protection
to their owner by way of creating a monopoly on access to the creation or
invention. Any derogations from this monopoly seek to rebalance to some
extent the rights of the public in retaining access to the valuable subject of
the rights. These derogations are exceptional and strictly limited to either
instances where the rights of the owner are not unduly affected, or to in-
stances where interference with the rights is paramount on public interest
grounds and is carried out by the state. The distinctive proprietary nature
is balanced against the needs of the public in additional ways. Trade marks
and patents can be revoked in circumstances where they no longer fulfil their
informative purpose and thus are no longer deserving of (monopolistic) legal
protection.
By contrast, the powers of exclusion available to milk quota holders are
significantly more limited, with a string of scenarios being set out in the
Single CMO Regulation where national authorities can reduce or confiscate
the quota, not always in exchange for compensation. It must be remembered
that such interference with the quota is perceived as amounting to regulatory
adjustments in order to maintain the continuing functionality of the common
market in milk. As the case law demonstrates, the ultimate regulatory goal
of the milk quota regime is therefore paramount in determining the level of
public authority encroachment on the holder’s entitlement to exclude third
parties from interfering with the rights in the quota. This regulatory goal
effectively trumps any private law claims that quota holders may have if their
quota is reduced or confiscated.
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The situation in the case of spectrum licences is similar and even more
skewed in the favour of the public authority; it is specifically set out in
statute that the licences can be varied or revoked by Ofcom. This is because
the licences are, according to case law, administrative authorisations to carry
out an activity which would otherwise be illegal. They are not contractual
rights, and thus do not give rise to a private law claim for damages for inter-
ference by the public authority174. Spectrum licences are essentially part and
parcel of a system which regulates access to a (previously) public resource.
Such regulation is deemed necessary as otherwise interference between radio
signals would occur and broadcasting would be disrupted. There is thus a
physical externality that the regulatory system seeks to prevent by creating
an artificial cap on the right to emit. In this way, spectrum licences can
be regarded as similar to emissions entitlements. By contrast, the notion of
externality prevention is not present in the context of intellectual property
rights or milk quotas. The former seek to reward and protect authors or
inventors, while the latter are a means of price regulation, not of protect-
ing an endangered physical resource such as livestock or land. As such, the
regulatory goal of the spectrum rights regime is once again paramount in
determining the restrictions on the scope of the licence holders’ entitlement
of exclusion, particularly as against the issuing authority.
The EU ETS Directive does not address the issue of the scope of regula-
tory intervention in the emissions market, leaving open the possibility that
emissions entitlements could be cancelled during their period of validity if
the environmental goal so requires. However, it is submitted that such in-
tervention cannot logically occur as easily as with milk quotas or spectrum
licences, as emissions allowances are more than a regulatory tool, whose
public policy objective is paramount. It is difficult to make the objective
of having a workable emissions market entirely subordinate to the goals of
emissions reductions and decarbonisation, as is the case with milk quotas,
where the goal of common market regulation always trumps the interests of
quota holders. This is due to the fact that emissions reductions and decar-
174Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, at 321.
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bonisation depend on the continuing functionality of the market created by
the EU ETS. On the other hand, neither is it feasible to grant the holders
of emissions allowances the same level of rights protection afforded to the
owners of intellectual property, given that the EU ETS is striving to achieve
a regulatory goal, rather than focusing directly on protecting the emissions
entitlements vested in market participants.
5.6.2 Transfer
The rights regimes examined above exhibit different levels of transferability
according to their respective goals and rationales. Intellectual property rights
are freely transferable, as would be expected with all strong private property
rights. Milk quotas are only transferable insofar as this promotes the goal
of maintaining the functionality of the common market in milk and milk
products. In fact, from a regulatory perspective it is preferable that the
tradability of milk quotas is as restricted as possible. The same is the case
with spectrum licences, which are tradable only if designated as such by
the regulator, Ofcom. Transferability is thus directly subordinated to the
primary regulatory goals of the milk quota and spectrum regimes.
The trade in emissions allowances constitutes a private market which
exists and functions independently of the regulatory goals of emissions re-
ductions and decarbonisation pursued by the EU ETS175. At the same time,
the primary function of this market is to pursue the said environmental goals.
The participants in this market include industrial entities trading in order
to comply with the EU ETS, as well as firms trading for investment pur-
poses, such as commodity traders, financial services providers and banks.
The environmental credentials of the EU ETS depend on the continued and
unfettered tradability of emissions allowances in the market. This direct and
inextricable link between market viability and the environmental success of
the EU ETS necessarily renders the scope of transferability of emissions al-
lowances more akin to that of intellectual property rights than milk quotas
175Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, at 321.
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or spectrum licences.
5.6.3 Use
Emissions allowances can only be used to emit CO2 by EU ETS regulated
entities, which means that non-regulated entities can only make use of al-
lowances by trading them in the market. This restriction on the use enti-
tlement is significant since the emission of 1 tonne of CO2 is a core purpose
of an allowance. It is also not clear whether security interests in emissions
allowances can be protected and enforced through registration.
The range of uses to which emissions allowances can be put are conse-
quently less extensive than in the case of intellectual property rights. The
latter can be licensed to third parties, something which does not conceptually
work with either emissions allowances or milk quotas. The rationale of licens-
ing is that a third party can make use of the subject of the right. However,
“making use” of emissions allowances means either emitting corresponding
amounts of CO2 or trading them in the market. It would not make sense to
license an allowance to someone else, since the third party’s subsequent use
of it would involve either emitting 1 tonne of CO2 or selling the allowance on
to someone else. In both cases, the subject of the licence (the allowance) is
effectively exhausted and cannot be recovered by the licensor. The same is
the case with milk quotas. The restrictions on the use of intellectual prop-
erty rights embodied in the system of compulsory licensing for copyright and
patents therefore do not offer direct parallels with emissions entitlements176.
What these restrictions do highlight, however, is the distinctive proprietary
nature of copyright, patents and trade marks, which markedly distinguishes
them from emissions entitlements. The premise of this proprietary nature is
that the owner can license the rights as desired and with no limitations, ex-
cept in narrowly defined instances where public interest so demands (mainly
176If compulsory licensing of emissions entitlements were possible, by analogy with copy-
right and patents it could be imposed on entities found to be excessively banking (“hoard-
ing”) emissions allowances. The existence of the possibility of compulsory licensing would
not invalidate the potential existence of property rights in emissions allowances, in the
same way that it does not invalidate the proprietary nature of copyright and patents.
216
to prevent breaches of competition law or the under-exploitation of patents).
Furthermore, the temporal limitations on intellectual property rights do
not deprive them of their proprietary nature, but are once again an expression
of the trade off between protecting the right holder and allowing sufficient
public access to the creation or invention. Emissions allowances are similarly
valid for the duration of a particular Phase (though they can be banked to
some extent into the following Phase). This is also the case with milk quo-
tas, which are set to be abolished in 2015, and spectrum licences, which are
temporally finite in accordance with what has been set out in the licence
terms. However, emissions allowances are exhausted once equivalent emis-
sions have been produced, and the requisite number of allowances has to be
surrendered at the end of every year. This lifespan is more limited than that
of intellectual property rights, which are not extinguished upon use. This as-
pect of emissions allowances exhibits similarities with milk quotas: once the
stipulated amount of milk has been produced in any one period, the quota
is effectively used up for that period. Spectrum licences are not exhaustible
per se in the same way that emissions allowances and milk quotas are; there
is technically no maximum amount of radio spectrum that may be emitted
under a particular licence.
The absence of the entitlement to an intrinsic use of emissions allowances
(namely the emission of CO2) in the case of entities not regulated by the
EU ETS is not reflected in the intellectual property rights regime, as these
rights can be used by their holders in a multitude of largely unrestricted
ways. On the other hand, the milk quota regime exhibits similarities with
emissions entitlements in this respect, as only producers can use the milk
quota to produce milk. When the quota is transferred to a non-producing
third party such as a bank, this third party does not thereby acquire the
right to engage in milk production within the bounds of the quota. This
was evident in Harries v. Barclays Bank, where the bank took over the land
mortgaged to it, which had a milk quota attached, and was also registered as
the quota holder. The bank could hold the quota together with the land, but,
for obvious reasons, could not make use of it in the way that a milk producer
could have done. Spectrum licences can only be issued in the first place
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to operators who are engaged in utilising the radio spectrum, so this issue
does not exist. The scope and contents of spectrum licences are stringently
regulated by Ofcom in terms of the number of licences available, the types of
permitted uses of the spectrum and the limitations on use set in the licence
agreement. These restrictions accord with the nature of spectrum licences as
publicly issued permissions to carry out an activity which would be illegal if
unlicensed.
While security interests can be created in intellectual property rights, this
is not so clear with milk quotas. As it has been seen above, there is potentially
conflicting case law on this issue in respect of milk quotas. However, as it
was noted therein, the cases in point did not deal directly with whether
a quota could be the subject of a legal charge. Both Huish v. Ellis and
Harries v. Barclays Bank involved situations where land to which a milk
quota attached had been mortgaged to a bank. The question that arose was
whether the milk quota could be regarded as separate from the land for the
purposes of the charge, which was answered in the negative. The issue of
whether a milk quota can be used as security therefore remains unresolved.
Swift v. Dairywise Farms involved a situation where milk quotas were being
used as security for a loan, which was not objected to by the court. One
could extrapolate that this resolves the uncertainty, although the court in
Swift v. Dairywise Farms did not concern itself with this issue. Armstrong
v. Winnington has established that emissions allowances, being intangible
property, can support the existence of equitable interests. Consequently, it is
also the case that, conceptually speaking, security interests can also subsist
in allowances (although the protectability and enforceability of such interests
remains disputed).
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5.6.4 Parallels between emissions entitlements and the
regimes of intellectual property rights, milk quo-
tas and spectrum licences177
Emissions entitlements are different from intellectual property rights. The
aim of the latter rights regime is to reward creativity (copyright) or invest-
ment in developing and branding high quality products (trade marks), or to
encourage innovation (patents). As such, intellectual property rights focus
on protecting the individual right holder, and any public interest in accessing
the creation or invention is dealt with through derogations from the assump-
tion that a monopoly has been granted to the right holder. Any derogations
from the monopoly are only permitted where this is justifiable due to the
public interest in gaining access of the creation or invention. Even in these
publicly motivated circumstances, the limitations on the core entitlements of
exclusion and use are carefully and narrowly drafted so as to minimise the
negative effects on the right holder of such interference.
By contrast, the EU ETS has as its stated principal goal to reduce emis-
sions to scientifically acceptable levels in order to effectively combat climate
change, and as its wider goal to support the transition of the EU to a low-
carbon economy. The fact that emissions allowances are held by individual
entities is solely a means of achieving these regulatory ends, not an end in
itself. This would indicate that emissions entitlements should necessarily
be more limited than intellectual property rights, so as to enable regulatory
intervention as deemed necessary for the attainment of the public policy
goals. Emissions entitlements cannot, based on their regulatory purpose,
benefit from the extensive protection of the entitlements of exclusion and use
afforded to intellectual property rights. The regulator needs to retain some
discretion over adjusting the amount of allowances in circulation at any given
time in order to successfully pursue emissions reductions and EU-wide decar-
bonisation. The scope of use applicable to emissions allowances also needs
to be limited, in the sense that the intrinsic use of emitting CO2 associated
177An earlier version of this sub-part 5.6.4 appeared as Manea, “Defining Emissions
Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions Trading System”, part 5.
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with owning allowances cannot logically extend to non-regulated entities178.
This arrangement resembles the milk quota and the spectrum licensing
systems much more closely than it does intellectual property rights. A regime
of private rights has been established in order to pursue an overarching reg-
ulatory goal; viewed in these generic terms, the statement holds as much for
emissions entitlements as it does for milk quotas or spectrum licences. Emis-
sions entitlements are transferable and have acquired intrinsic commercial
value; so have milk quotas and spectrum licences. However, milk quotas are
specifically described by courts as forming part of the regulation of the EU
common market. This, in turn, is said to justify tighter regulatory control
over them, as the specified public policy goal is paramount and any other
goals or incidents (such as burgeoning transferability and commercial value)
of the milk quota system are subordinate to it. Spectrum licences are ad-
ministrative rights which are closely regulated by Ofcom in order to optimise
the use of the radio spectrum, which is the primary (and in fact only) goal
of the regime.
The EU ETS is not technically part of the common market. In fact,
it goes beyond the common market as emissions trading is open to anyone
who wishes to participate, whether an individual or a corporation, whether
regulated by the EU ETS or not, and whether based in the EU or not.
Viewing emissions entitlements as wholly equivalent to milk quotas, which
are instruments of common market regulation, is consequently not accurate.
Emissions trading is also different from the spectrum licensing regime, which
is very restricted in terms of the rights that are granted to licence holders.
The significantly wider reach of the EU ETS as compared to the milk quota
and the spectrum licensing regimes demonstrates that the goals of emissions
trading go beyond the officially stated goals of emissions reductions and de-
carbonisation. This position stands in contrast with the milk quota and the
spectrum licensing regimes, which exist solely for regulatory purposes, hence
the overbearing and extensive restrictions on the entitlements to exclude pub-
lic authorities, to transfer the quotas or licences, and to use them. On the
178Although the need to clarify the possibility of registering security interests in al-
lowances remains.
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other hand, the EU ETS has an additional key goal, namely the viability of
the emissions market, which is instrumental to the achievement of the envi-
ronmental goals. The milk quota and the spectrum licensing regimes do not
envisage pursuing similar additional goals.
Emissions entitlements differ from spectrum licences in another significant
respect. According to case law, spectrum licences are not private contractual
rights, so as to prevent their holders from claiming damages for breach of
contract from the regulator. Rather, they are administrative permissions to
carry out an activity which would be illegal in the absence of such permission.
Up to a point, emissions entitlements “could also be viewed as regulatory
permissions to emit up to a certain amount, without which emitting would
be illegal, and the regulated entity would be fined”179. This is how they have
been described in INEOS v. Grangemouth180, which concerned a dispute
based on a commercial contract for emissions allowances181. The contract
had been drafted in 1998, before the EU ETS came into force. It anticipated
the advent of an emissions trading scheme sometime in the future. This as-
sumption was based on a UK government-commissioned report (published
some three weeks before the contract), which advocated a future role for
market-based regulation (in the form of either tax of tradable instruments)
in reducing emissions182. The defendant, a special purpose vehicle, had been
formed in order to build a combined heat and power (CHP) plant, which was
to supply electricity and steam to the claimant. Under an electricity sup-
ply agreement (ESA) between the defendant and the claimant, the former
agreed that it would hold all “CO2 Emissions Credits” accruing to it for and
on behalf of the latter, and ensure that the latter obtained the benefit of
such credits in return for no payment183. The term “CO2 Emissions Credits”
179Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, at 321.
180INEOS Manufacturing Scotland Ltd v. Grangemouth CHP Ltd and Another [2011]
EWHC 163 .
181See also Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emis-
sions Trading System”, at 317, n. 92.
182C. Marshall. Economic instruments and the business use of energy. 1998. url: http:
//archive.treasury.gov.uk/pub/html/prebudgetNOV98/marshall.pdf.
183INEOS Manufacturing Scotland Ltd v. Grangemouth CHP Ltd and Another [2011]
EWHC 163 , para. 4.
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was defined as “all the CO2 emissions credits or entitlements (or other sim-
ilar entitlements, rights or benefits in respect of CO2 of whatsoever nature)
accruing to GCHPL [the defendant] in respect of the CHP Plant”184. When
the EU ETS came into force, the defendant was classified as a regulated en-
tity, obtained an emissions permit and was allocated EU allowances. The
claimant argued that EU emissions allowances fell within this definition and
were therefore due to it under the agreement. It argued that allowances were
entitlements to emit CO2, even if they were not credits, as they had not been
earned for reducing emissions. The defendant argued that allowances did
not constitute credits or entitlements, since they were mere authorisations to
emit CO2, not rewards or incentives to reduce emissions. The court agreed
with the logic of the defendant, and held that EU allowances were not credits
within the meaning set out in the contractual definition185.
The view of emissions allowances as administrative authorisations to emit
CO2, however, only accounts for part of their purpose. This is because there
are some market participants who cannot use their allowances to emit CO2,
but can only trade them. From this perspective, emissions allowances do
not embody administrative permissions to do that which would otherwise be
illegal, in the cases where they are held by non-regulated entities. Emissions
allowances resemble traditional commodities or assets, at least from the point
of view of the entities trading in them not for the purpose of complying with
the EU ETS, but rather for investment or speculatory purposes. The exis-
tence of a private market which exists independently of the environmental
purpose of the EU ETS renders it difficult to conceptualise emissions entitle-
ments as existing purely between the regulator and their holders. Had emis-
sions trading been restricted to compliance trading, this conclusion would
have been easier to reach186.
Out of the three rights regimes that the chapter has examined, it has
emerged that emissions entitlements are most similar to milk quotas, with
184INEOS Manufacturing Scotland Ltd v. Grangemouth CHP Ltd and Another [2011]
EWHC 163 , para. 5.
185Ibid., paras. 41-57.
186Manea, “Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions
Trading System”, at 321.
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the notable exceptions that the former are freely transferable and do not
have a single, regulatory goal. The cases on milk quotas can usefully assist
with developing an equivalent, pragmatic approach applicable to emissions
allowances. Courts have categorised milk quotas differently according to the
context of the case under consideration, where the categorisation would in
every case be influenced by the need to further the regulatory goal of the milk
quota regime. While milk quotas have not been regarded as assets separate
from the land for the purposes of transfer (Faulks v. Faulks), they have been
deemed assets for the purposes of tax (Cottle v. Coldicott), and property
for the purposes of insolvency law (Swift v. Dairywise Farms) as well as
assets which are capable of forming the subject matter of a trust (Swift v.
Dairywise Farms). Furthermore, the question of whether milk quotas could
support the existence of security interests was answered differently in Huish
v. Ellis and Harries v. Barclays Bank. It is, however, worth emphasising
that in both cases, the outcome was significantly influenced by the need to
allow the mortgagee bank to deal with the land (to which a quota happened
to attach) in the most expeditious way possible in order to realise its security.
The judgment in Huish v. Ellis enabled the bank to sell the land with the
attached quota without having to enter into protracted negotiations with the
mortgagor producer over the quota itself. To arrive at this conclusion, the
court held that the bank’s charge did not extend to the quota and that the
bank could therefore not sell the quota separately from the land. In Harries
v. Barclays Bank, the bank’s security would have been substantially reduced
if the quota had been deemed to be outside the ambit of the mortgage.
It must be noted here that the problems relating to security interests
over milk quotas differ in a significant respect from the case of emissions
allowances. Milk quotas are rights appurtenant to land, and in that sense
the issue as to whether they can be charged separately from the land is
one which arises generally with such rights. This issue is not specific to
entitlements created for regulatory purposes, nor does it cast any doubt on
the ability of emissions allowances (which are not appurtenant rights) to
support the existence of security interests. The importance of the courts’
approach to security interests over milk quotas lies elsewhere. It is argued
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that, by analogy, the legal nature of emissions entitlements can also depend
on the particular context in which they operate, as evidenced by the differing
outcomes in the milk quota cases.
The relevance of context is further revealed in other scenarios. That
emissions allowances were held to be authorisations to emit CO2 in INEOS v.
Grangemouth was determined by the consideration that, had the allowances
been regarded as credits under the contract, the defendant would have been
compelled to give them to the claimant free of charge while at the same
time having to purchase replacement allowances in the market so as to fulfil
its surrendering obligations under the EU ETS: the court viewed this as
“commercially absurd”187. The categorisation of allowances in that case was
therefore not intended to be universal, but rather to uphold the commerciality
of the particular agreement under scrutiny188. Similarly, in a scenario other
than that in Armstrong v. Winnington, a court may be less willing to declare
emissions allowances the subject of a trust. The particular circumstances of
that case were that Armstrong would be entitled to compensation if the
stolen allowances could be regarded as amounting to trust property which
had been unconscionably received by Winnington. Holding that allowances
could support the existence of equitable interests was therefore paramount
in order to achieve a fair outcome in the case.
5.7 Conclusion
The analysis of intellectual property rights, EU milk quotas and spectrum
rights conducted in the present chapter has revealed that the scope of the key
elements of exclusion, transfer and use is closely intertwined with the regu-
latory goals ascribed to each regime. Intellectual property rights lie at one
end of the spectrum, and constitute strong property rights whose limitations
are, in essence, exceptional derogations from the monopoly granted to their
holder. On the other hand, the nature of milk quotas is wholly dependent on
187INEOS Manufacturing Scotland Ltd v. Grangemouth CHP Ltd and Another [2011]
EWHC 163 , paras. 46-47.
188Ibid., paras. 43-51.
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the primary goal of production regulation that the regime pursues, and any
quasi-property characteristics are necessarily subordinated to and limited by
the extent to which they support the achievement of this goal. Spectrum
licences exhibit some features of property. They are expressly categorised as
administrative rights whose sole purpose is to regulate the use of the radio
spectrum, and are therefore considerably limited from the point of view of
exclusion, transfer and use. By comparison, emissions entitlements are part
of a system whose primary goals are the reduction of emissions and EU-wide
decarbonisation, but which has the additional goal of sustaining the viability
of the emissions market, on which the regulatory goals depend.
Emissions entitlements are therefore most similar to milk quotas, al-
though the importance of the functionality of the emissions market as an
effectively separate goal is greater than in the context of milk production.
Moreover, the pragmatic approach taken by the English and Irish courts in
analysing the nature of milk quotas can be applied by analogy to emissions
entitlements. As well as being primarily determined by the regulatory goals
of the EU ETS, the characteristics of such entitlements shift according to
context, based on other interests at stake. Such interests can include the
need to achieve an equitable outcome for a victim of theft (as was the case
in Armstrong v. Winnington), the need to uphold a commercially viable
arrangement (as in INEOS v. Grangemouth), or creditor protection in the
insolvency context (by analogy with the treatment of milk quotas). Under
the generic label of private property ascribed to emissions entitlements in
Armstrong v. Winnington, these rights can rightfully take their place in the
new special category of instrumental property, as the conclusion to the thesis
elaborates.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion: The Rise of
Instrumental Property
As the introduction has explained, the thesis is not designed as a defence of
emissions trading per se, but rather as an inquiry into optimising the use of
tradable permit regimes in the sphere of environmental regulation, specifi-
cally climate change. The focus of the thesis on improving the workability of
the EU ETS as currently conceptualised is based on the fact that the choice of
this particular instrument has already been made, is likely to remain in place
for the foreseeable future, and has inspired other jurisdictions to implement
similar schemes. In consequence, the introduction to the thesis posed two
key questions engendered by the dual private-public nature of the environ-
mental regulation regime that is the EU ETS. Has this mechanism created
private property rights in regulatory instruments, and, if so, what are the
consequences of this legal status for the conceptualisation and functionality
of property in general?
The thesis has set out to demonstrate that emissions entitlements belong
to a new category of instrumental property. The thesis has further argued
that this notion can accommodate the fluidity of entitlements created for
regulatory purposes better than a generic categorisation of private property
which has been ascribed to such instruments, for instance, in English law.
The judgment in Armstrong v. Winnington has served to precipitate a dis-
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cussion as to what property means when it seeks to achieve regulatory goals.
The emergence of the instrumental property category reveals the marked
flexibility of property rights operating in a regulatory environment: their
characteristics are shaped by public policy goals, as well as by other, poten-
tially competing interests worthy of protection, according to the particular
contexts in which the rights operate. This flexibility, however, must necessar-
ily come at a cost. For regulatory regimes such as the EU ETS, uncertainty in
the nature of the tradable entitlements undermines the success of the system
as a tool of environmental policy. In the wider context, property rights are
revealed as capable of being unstable and susceptible to defeat, particularly
when pitched against other public policy objectives.
The thesis therefore makes a useful contribution to the emerging stream
of awareness as to how entitlements created for regulatory purposes can be
defined and crafted. In particular, it reveals the complexity of regulatory
innovation that is embodied in tradable permit regimes deployed for envi-
ronmental protection. Their impact on the conceptualisation of property
exemplifies how the crafting of such regimes (and, in particular, of the trad-
able entitlements that constitute them) has significant reverberations beyond
their regulatory sphere.
The present chapter consequently argues that, in other words, property
as a regulatory tool is not property as the law traditionally conceptualises
it. The conventional legal notion of private property is of limited use as an
instrument to pursue public policy goals. Property can only become a suc-
cessful tool of regulation if it is drastically reconceptualised as instrumental
property.
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6.1 An analytical construction of emissions
entitlements which achieves regulatory goals:
the new category of instrumental prop-
erty
The thesis has highlighted the urgent need for a comprehensive analytical
construction of emissions entitlements that enables the EU ETS to achieve its
multiple and potentially conflicting goals. The EU ETS is remarkable in its
scope: a private market with a regulatory purpose which seeks to address not
only Union-level, but also global-level environmental problems. At the same
time, it is the ambitious nature of this regime that engenders a tension not
faced by traditional command and control modes of regulation. Reconciling
market certainty with regulatory flexibility in order to achieve cost-effective
emissions reductions and support the EU’s pathway to a low-carbon economy
is imperative, if not already overdue. At the same time, whether or not this
was intended at the outset, the success of the emissions market has evolved
into a proxy for the environmental success of the EU ETS itself, and has thus
become an additional goal of the regime. Policymakers, environmentalists,
economists, scientists, lawyers and other parties interested in crafting and
maintaining a robust regulatory response to the related problems of climate
change and energy security are urged to recognise the need to fully engage
with the market-based mechanism that is the EU ETS and strive to make it
a success, so that it can remain an inspiration for emerging trading systems
in other jurisdictions.
Since the multiple and potentially conflicting goals of the EU ETS owe
their success to an appropriately crafted analytical construction of emissions
entitlements, how should such a construction be articulated? Just as the
EU ETS needs to be seen in the wider context of Union-wide environmental
policy, so the legal nature of emissions entitlements should be explored in the
context of other rights regimes which have been created to fulfil regulatory
objectives. Evaluating comparable regimes necessarily requires a suitable
tool, a benchmark against which the scope of emissions entitlements can
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subsequently be assessed. This tool originates in legal theories of property
rights, and consists of identifying the requisite characteristics of private prop-
erty as being exclusion, transfer and use. At its strongest, a private property
right enables its holder to exercise these entitlements with little or no restric-
tion. However, for the purposes of articulating a construction of emissions
entitlements, it must be borne in mind that, with such rights regimes created
for regulatory purposes, any limitations on exclusion, transfer and use are
primarily determined by the requirements of the public policy goals pursued.
Emissions entitlements have acquired property characteristics which sup-
port the functionality of the emissions market: they are freely tradable and
can be enforced against private parties. On the other hand, the scope of
regulatory interference with such entitlements requires further EU-level clar-
ification, they cannot be used to emit CO2 by non-regulated entities, and
the protectability and enforceability of security interests in allowances is dis-
puted.
The scope and limitations of emissions entitlements are, firstly, deter-
mined by their regulatory goals, namely achieving cost-effective emissions
reductions and supporting the EU’s move towards a low-carbon economy.
While market participants require a certain degree of protection in the shape
of predictability of regulatory intervention and clarification as to private law
usability of allowances (as capable of supporting practically valuable security
interests), the regulator needs to preserve a sufficient degree of discretion to
recalibrate the emissions market as required by environmental goals.
Secondly, the scope and limitations of emissions entitlements are also
determined by the particular contexts in which they operate. Emissions en-
titlements have demonstrated their flexible nature by being deemed mere
authorisations to emit CO2 in order for a commercial arrangement to be up-
held1. On a different set of facts, however, emissions entitlements were cat-
egorised as intangible property for the purposes of supporting the existence
of equitable interests, where this categorisation was necessary to provide ac-
1INEOS Manufacturing Scotland Ltd v. Grangemouth CHP Ltd and Another [2011]
EWHC 163 .
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cess to compensation for a victim of theft of allowances2. The outcomes of
these cases demonstrate that the construction of emissions entitlements is
moulded not just by the regulatory objectives of the regime to which they
belong, but also by additional, extraneous interests which the law deems
worthy of protection in a given context.
Emissions entitlements can arguably be viewed, in a general sense, as
private property, with a number of limitations on their scope which are dic-
tated by the regulatory goals of the EU ETS. The property label is subject
to the right of exclusion as against public authorities being more closely de-
fined (so as to confirm that regulatory interference cannot occur arbitrarily,
but only under carefully delineated conditions). Moreover, the limitation
as regards the use of allowances to emit CO2 by non-regulated entities is
necessary on the basis of the environmental goal of the EU ETS. Security
interests can technically exist in allowances, even though they do not yet
benefit from satisfactory protection and enforceability. However, the req-
uisite balance between market certainty and regulatory flexibility, coupled
with the context-by-context adaptability of emissions entitlements mandates
a definition of these legal interests which is more detailed than the generic
private property categorisation decided in Armstrong v. Winnington. The
thesis posits that emissions entitlements fall within the special category of in-
strumental property, which differs in certain notable respects from the notion
of regulatory/hybrid/statutory property previously advanced by commenta-
tors.
Gray affirms that statutory property “has no meaning at all other than
that generated by its parent legislative framework. Being derived compre-
hensively and exhaustively from that legislation, statutory property has only
the ambit conferred by statute itself”3. Such entitlements are susceptible to
adjustment by public authorities where this is necessary to promote public
interests, rather than being relatively indefeasible, as private property is tra-
ditionally conceptualised in law4. In effect, statutory property is regarded
2Armstrong DLW GmbH v. Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC (Ch) 10 .
3Gray, “Regulatory Property and the Jurisprudence of Quasi-Public Trust”, at 224.
4Ibid., at 224-225.
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as belonging to the public at large, who can determine its use, rather than
to its holder: “[h]ence the emergence of a tradition of ‘quasi-public trust’,
which predicated that certain essential services and facilities are held by their
nominal owners subject to various kinds of fiduciary obligation towards the
people”5. Rose holds that hybrid property “[owes] its existence and manage-
ment to regulation”6. Yandle and Morriss emphasise the public nature of
regulatory property, and define it as “a property right created and allocated
by a government entity, such as a right to emit specified pollutants into the
atmosphere under the terms of a permit issued by a government regulator”7.
Yandle himself views regulatory property as created through the mechanism
of “government agents allocating and managing inalienable rights”8.
Furthermore, it is recognised that regulatory property exists primarily
in order to achieve public policy goals, namely the protection of valuable
(and often endangered) resources: “[t]he creation of tradeable allowances –
“regulatory property” – represents a legal parcelling of the property rights to
use valuable resources”9. In other words, the primary function of regulatory
property is not the protection of right holders (which traditional private
property does), but rather, in effect, the protection of the object of property
itself: “[t]he basic idea of this hybrid property is to preserve resources that
are large and diffuse but nevertheless finite – resources such as air, water or
wildlife stocks”10. Similarly, emissions entitlements are ultimately intended
to protect a certain composition of the atmosphere. The entitlements are not
in the atmosphere itself, but are rights to pollute, whose aim is to safeguard
5Gray, “Regulatory Property and the Jurisprudence of Quasi-Public Trust”, at 226,
238-241.
6Rose, “The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems”, at 164.
7Yandle and Morriss, “The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative
Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons”, at 129.
8Yandle, “Grasping for the Heavens: 3-D Property Rights and the Global Commons”,
at 30.
9Wiener, “Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context”, at
800; Rose, “The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems”, at 164-166; Stewart, “Privprop, Regprop, and Beyond”, at 91,
93-94.
10Rose, “The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems”, at 164.
231
the atmosphere11.
The notion of regulatory/hybrid/statutory property is, firstly, internally
uncontextualised. It focuses on the generalised assertion that this new cat-
egory of property exists solely to achieve public policy objectives: in other
words, the right does not have any meaning outside the legislative frame-
work, and is wholly subordinated to the public interests protected by the
particular regulatory regime. This narrow focus does not pay sufficient at-
tention to the substance of the regulatory regime that has created the rights,
and arguably obfuscates the multiplicity and complexity of the goals that
such regimes can conceivably pursue. To point out the regulatory origins of
the right is a correct observation, but it does not tell us what composition
of the right is required to achieve the particular regulatory goals, which are
often multiple and conflicting. The contents of the right must therefore be
carefully crafted so as to balance and reconcile these goals. This internal
conflict is particularly prevalent in the case of the EU ETS. There, the need
for a viable emissions market as a goal in itself creates a private law con-
cern that lies outside the expressed ambit of the regulatory framework. At
the same time, the success of the private market has come to represent the
means to the environmental goals of cost-efficient emissions reductions and
an adequate price to achieve a low-carbon economy.
Secondly, the notion of regulatory/hybrid/statutory property is exter-
nally uncontextualised. Within the construction of instrumental property,
the thesis has argued that extraneous (potentially both public and private)
interests compete with the regulatory goals of a particular regime such as
the EU ETS, and in doing so shape the contents of the entitlements. This
approach goes further than the idea of regulatory/hybrid/statutory property.
The latter assumes a certain linearity, as it focuses solely on the purpose of
the entitlements as being to achieve the goals set by the particular regime
to which they belong. The thesis has highlighted a variety of practical sce-
narios where property rights employed as regulatory tools have to compete
with other public (and even private) interests: for instance, the scope of
11Wemaere, Streck, and Chagas, “Legal Ownership and Nature of Kyoto Units and EU
Allowances”, at 39.
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milk quotas versus the interests of creditors in insolvency, the scope of emis-
sions allowances versus the interests of victims of theft, or the definition
of emissions allowances required to uphold commercial arrangements. The
notion of instrumental property thus questions the linearity assumed by reg-
ulatory/hybrid/statutory property, and is instead much more nuanced. In-
strumental property reveals the existence of a complex web of interests which
determine the nature of entitlements used for regulatory ends. It highlights
the evolutionary nature of such entitlements and their ability to shift shape
according to context and the particular interests viewed as worthy of protec-
tion beyond the stated goals of the regulatory regime.
Finally, a key consequence of the public origins and aims of regula-
tory/hybrid/statutory property is that, implicitly, certain restrictions must
be placed on right holders which would not exist in the case of traditionally
conceptualised private property. The notions of regulatory/hybrid/statutory
property do not cover the connection between the requisite restrictions and
the achievement of the mandated public policy objectives, namely, how to
determine the nature and scope of such restrictions in a manner which ade-
quately reconciles the various and potentially conflicting goals.
Instead, the thesis puts forward a new category, which it calls instrumen-
tal property, and to which emissions entitlements rightfully belong. This new
category highlights the reality that it is not particularly helpful to rely only
on a purely generic understanding of property rights, since they are not as
fixed and capable of generalisation as traditionally thought in legal doctrine.
By contrast, the new category fully accommodates the fact that property
in a regulatory context has as its primary function the protection of the
object of property itself, not the protection of right holders (which is what
conventionally understood private property does), as the introduction to the
thesis has posited. This function accounts for the role of regulatory goals in
shaping legal interests such as emissions entitlements: their role is to pro-
tect, for instance, a certain composition of the atmosphere which is deemed
scientifically necessary to address the problem of climate change. Further-
more, instrumental property also changes its characteristics according to the
various contexts in which it operates. On a context-by-context basis, the
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regulatory goals of the particular regime have to be accommodated along-
side (and potentially balanced against) other interests which are deserving of
legal protection. Such interests can include, for example, creditors’ interests
in insolvency (as evidenced by the milk quota cases), or the protection of vic-
tims of theft of allowances, or the need to explore the nature of allowances
in order to uphold the commerciality of a private law arrangement.
Instrumental property, as the name suggests, represents property as a tool
or instrument, primarily for achieving the regulatory goals of the particular
regime under which the entitlements under scrutiny have been created. In
addition to these regulatory goals, instrumental property requires taking into
consideration other extraneous interests that may arise in a situation where it
becomes necessary to analyse the nature of the entitlements. Such an analysis
can therefore never be generic: it must be firmly rooted in a practical context,
due to the need to recognise and reconcile the various interests at stake, as
well as protect the object of property, not just its holders.
Within the category of instrumental property, it becomes possible to ar-
ticulate an analytical construction of emissions entitlements which accom-
modates both the regulatory goals of the EU ETS and other interests which
may need to be taken into account in the various contexts where such en-
titlements can conceivably operate. In summary, emissions entitlements are
treated as property, with a number of key limitations, their characteristics
are shaped by the regulatory goals of the EU ETS and the various contexts
in which such entitlements operate, and this flexibility is likely to have signif-
icant negative effects on the functionality of the emissions market and thus
on the environmental viability of the EU ETS as a whole.
Firstly, emissions entitlements exhibit key characteristics of property, but
with crucial limitations, some of which are non-negotiable, in the sense that
these limitations are essential if the EU ETS is to achieve its environmental
goals. As to exclusion, emissions entitlements are enforceable against private
third parties, though not against the regulator (which is a non-negotiable lim-
itation). They are freely transferable, so as to enable the emissions market
to operate. The intrinsic use of emitting CO2 is limited to regulated entities
(which represents another non-negotiable limitation). There remains uncer-
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tainty regarding the protectability and enforceability of security interests,
though, conceptually speaking, emissions allowances are capable of support-
ing the existence of such interests.
Secondly, the scope and limitations of exclusion, transfer and use are
determined by the regulatory goals of the EU ETS. Holders of allowances need
to be able to exercise their exclusion entitlement against private third parties
so as to assert ownership in allowances and trade them, thereby ensuring
market functionality. However, the regulator needs to retain some discretion
to intervene in the emissions market as required by environmental policy. The
right to free transfer is also required for a successful market. The restriction
on using allowances to emit CO2 to regulated entities is logically necessary
as part of the environmental purpose of the EU ETS.
However, there is a need for EU-level clarification of the legal position
on the protectability and enforceability of security interests, so as to en-
hance market functionality. The continued existence of the emissions market
despite the presence of such legal uncertainty cannot be relied on, as this
vulnerability would be exposed upon failure or default of a trading entity,
with potentially disastruous effects for the market and, in turn, for the envi-
ronmental credentials of the EU ETS12.
The importance of retaining a sufficient degree of regulatory discretion
to intervene in the emissions market, while in itself a non-negotiable aspect
of the EU ETS framework, impacts significantly on the ability of market
participants to conduct their private commercial arrangements. The prac-
tical issues of oversupply in the emissions market and consequent hoarding
of allowances by trading entities have been illustrated by the Corus case.
The existence of these issues places a significant responsibility on market
participants to protect themselves against the risk of reduced availability of
allowances, should the EU ETS Directive be amended to allow for regulatory
intervention to cancel valid allowances. Transacting parties entering into
commercial relationships for the sale and purchase of such instruments are
therefore faced with the need to articulate contractual provisions that can
offer adequate protection against the risk of regulatory intervention, which
12See chapter 3.5.
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is inherent in the analytical construction of emissions entitlements.
This situation is a key example of how the regulatory goals of the EU
ETS determine the functionality of the emissions market by establishing the
boundaries of the entitlements granted to trading participants. In turn, the
ability (or otherwise) of traders to address the risk of regulatory interven-
tion in their contractual relationships so that their participation in the mar-
ket remains worthwhile, coupled with any EU-level support in the shape of
clarifying the scope of regulatory intervention will ultimately determine the
environmental success of the EU ETS. Calibrating the level of contractual
protection effectively, at a centralised level (notably through amending the
standard form agreements utilised for emissions trading), is paramount in a
market with public policy ends. It is in the regulator’s interest to maintain a
sufficient level of trading participation to ensure the continued viabilility of
the emissions market and thereby the attainment of the environmental goals
of the EU ETS13.
Thirdly, the scope and limitations of exclusion, transfer and use are also
determined by the various contexts in which emissions entitlements operate.
Using the UK as an example, the case law discussing the characteristics of
milk quotas and the two cases which address the nature of emissions entitle-
ments provide pertinent examples of the types of scenarios where interests
extraneous to the regulatory goals of the EU ETS are taken into consider-
ation when determining the characteristics of these entitlements. Although
no case has arisen as yet which has had to tackle potential limitations on ex-
clusion (beyond those already in existence), based on the treatment of milk
quotas in situations of insolvency, it is possible that holders of allowances
may not be able to exercise their exclusion entitlement against all private
third parties, for instance creditors. As regards transfer, it must be asked
whether limitations could conceivably be held to exist in particular scenar-
ios (which, again, have not arisen to date), for example where victims of
theft of allowances require legal protection, as demonstrated in Armstrong v.
Winnington. Lastly, the aforementioned case has shown that new types of
use can arise which the regulatory regime had not envisaged at the outset,
13See chapter 3.4.
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notably the creation of equitable interests. Conversely, it is plausible that
existing uses could be limited. Even following EU-level clarification that se-
curity interests over emissions allowances can be adequately protected, it is
queried whether it would always be permissible for security to be enforced
where competing interests may be at stake, for instance, if it is part of a
scheme to move assets out of creditors’ reach in insolvency.
The instrumental nature of emissions entitlements put forward by the the-
sis may therefore mean that, in reality, such security interests can be trumped
by other considerations which become prioritised, potentially on a case-by-
case basis. For market participants entering into commercial contracts for
the sale and purchase of allowances (such as the arrangement exemplified by
the Corus case), the ensuing uncertainty as to the protectability and enforce-
ability of security interests in these instruments logically renders allowances
less valuable than other tradable instruments or commodities. The possibil-
ity of such devaluation is particularly significant in the case of investment
participants trading in allowances voluntarily (as opposed to EU ETS regu-
lated compliance traders), who may lose confidence in the emissions market
since they cannot do with allowances what they expect to be able to do with
conventional market instruments. Disincentivising wide participation in the
emissions market is directly opposed to the very purpose of the EU ETS,
which is to create and maintain an open trading mechanism in order to pur-
sue the environmental goals of reducing emissions in a cost-effective manner
and supporting the Union-wide move towards a low-carbon economy.
Fourthly, the nature of emissions entitlements that has been elicited above
has significant consequences for the regulatory success of the EU ETS. The
flexibility of emissions entitlements according to both public policy goals and
context engenders uncertainty for right holders as regards the precise scope
of the right. This is likely to have the same effect as the existing uncertainty
regarding the scope of regulatory intervention in the market and the poten-
tial limitations on use of allowances: it can disincentivise participation in the
emissions market and lead to issues of low pricing, which have already been
experienced, with debilitating effects. Although reduced participation and
low emissions prices would not technically hinder the attainment of mandated
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emissions reductions in accordance with the pre-set cap, industry support and
the goal of the low-carbon economy would suffer considerably. When assess-
ing the potential for success of the EU ETS as a tool of environmental policy
(to reduce emissions as well as to support wider EU environmental policy,
specifically the move to a low-carbon economy), the European Commission
must bear in mind the risk of these substantial negative effects, which are
caused by the flexibility inherent in the nature of emissions entitlements.
The findings regarding the nature of emissions entitlements have wider
ramifications beyond the case study provided by the EU ETS. As the in-
troduction noted, tradable permit regimes of regulation are proliferating in
other jurisdictions, and not just in the environmental sphere. The concerns
that the thesis has identified in the context of EU emissions trading rever-
berate across all market-based solutions to resource preservation problems.
Specifically, the challenge of crafting a construction of the legal interests in
the tradable instruments that can accommodate not only the multifarious
and often conflicting goals of such regulatory regimes, but also extraneous
and potentially competing interests worthy of legal protection, is one that
will continue to face policymakers time and time again. Instead of view-
ing the articulation of each new tradable permit regime as having to start
wholly ab initio, the thesis proposes that it is both easier (in terms of cre-
ating a workable mode of regulation which policymakers can administer and
regulated entities can comply with) and more effective (in terms of achieving
the regulatory goals) to have at one’s fingertips the blueprint of a coherent
analytical framework. Such a framework is capable of taking full account of
the wider policy context in which such regimes exist, so as to elicit a com-
prehensive set of regulatory objectives to be pursued, and of the importance
of the legal interests created thereby for the achievement of the identified
objectives.
At the same time, the analytical framework put forward by the thesis
highlights the inherent flexibility of the legal entitlements in tradable, pub-
lic policy-oriented instruments and their dependence on the protection of
additional interests which lie outside the scope of the particular regulatory
regime. This flexibility has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of such
238
regimes, as it has been seen in the case of the EU ETS. Private property as
traditionally conceptualised and viewed in a generic sense can only provide a
far from ideal regulatory tool. Its reconceptualisation as instrumental prop-
erty in a regulatory environment means that it cannot protect right holders
(and thereby maintain market functionality) to the same extent as normally
expected. In turn, where regulatory success depends on a private market con-
struct, as is the case with tradable permit regimes, the failure of the market
inevitably spells the end of the system itself.
6.2 The new category of instrumental prop-
erty: wider implications for the concep-
tualisation and functionality of property
rights
The creativity of tradable permit regimes, expressed in the shape of self-
managing commercially valuable, private market instruments which can be
harnessed to achieve public policy goals, renders it necessary to adjust the
traditional view of how private property is defined and operates. The enti-
tlements which subsist in the tradable instruments created by market-based
regimes of regulation illustrate the considerable adaptive capacity of prop-
erty rights to functionalise novel and unexpected situations. Property has
been conceptualised as a gateway “between a city-state ruled by the regime
of private property and the largely unregulated commons which lies outside
its walls”14. The findings of the thesis have revealed that what lies outside
the realm of traditionally conceptualised private property is certainly not
amorphous, though it is remarkably flexible.
Even in novel contexts where entitlements have been created for the
primary purpose of achieving regulatory objectives, such entitlements have
shown themselves capable of moving fluidly from protecting the private in-
terests of individuals (as is the case with intellectual property rights) and
14Gray, “Property in Thin Air”, at 48-49.
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thus retaining the traditional property characterisation, to cherry-picking
only those elements of property which are strictly necessary for pursuing the
public policy goals (as with EU milk quotas, spectrum rights and emissions
entitlements). Furthermore, the emergence of the new category of instru-
mental property underscores a crucial aspect of property in a regulatory
environment which has so far been overlooked. In addition to property being
harnessed for the achievement of public policy goals, its nature evolves and
adapts according to context, and is moulded by the presence of additional
interests beyond the regulatory framework to which the entitlements under
scrutiny belong. The consequences of the evolutionary nature of property
are that it must necessarily compete with other (public or private) goals at
stake, and, moreover, that property might not always win.
The recent treatment of intellectual property rights in the context of to-
bacco packaging in Australia provides a case in point. In JT International
SA v. Commonwealth of Australia15, the plaintiffs, who were tobacco com-
panies, argued that the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 amounted to an
acquisition of property (in the shape of the companies’ trade marks) under
the Australian Constitution, which attracted the payment of due compensa-
tion. The said Act provided that tobacco packaging had to be plain and of a
standard design and format, with no distinguishing trade marks. The High
Court of Australia held that no such acquisition had taken place and that,
consequently, no compensation was payable. Ultimately, the judgment and
much of the reasoning leading to it turned on a particular constitutional def-
inition, and namely on a finding that the restriction on the use of the trade
marks did not amount to “the accrual of a benefit of a proprietary character
to the Commonwealth which would constitute an acquisition”16 under the
relevant provision of the Constitution.
However, before reaching this conclusion, some of the judges made several
informative statements on the potential conflict between the tobacco compa-
nies’ intellectual property rights (in other words, private property) and public
health. The importance of the statutory origins of intellectual property rights
15JT International SA v. Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 43.
16Ibid., para. 44.
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was highlighted by Chief Justice French:
There are and always have been purposive elements reflecting
public policy considerations which inform the statutory creation
of intellectual property rights. . . Intellectual property laws create
property rights. They are also instrumental in character. . . The
statutory purpose, reflected in the character of such rights and
in the conditions informing their creation, may be relevant to
the question whether and in what circumstances restriction or
regulation of their enjoyment by a law of the Commonwealth
amounts to acquisition of property. . . 17
Justice Gummow also touched upon the wider questions, raised by the
arguments of the Commonwealth of Australia, of whether a restriction on
property was either not an acquisition for the purposes of the Constitution
or fell outside the ambit of the acquisitions clause, where such a restriction
was motivated by regulation in the public interest, such as public health
regulation. However, since there had been no acquisition of property in the
first place, the said questions did not need to be addressed in the present
case18 :
It is sufficient for present purposes to say that propositions of
the width of those put by the Commonwealth have not so far
been endorsed by decisions of this Court and that whether such
propositions should be accepted would require most careful con-
sideration on an appropriate occasion19.
Justice Heydon (who dissented and held that there had been an acquisi-
tion under the Constitution) discussed the Commonwealth’s argument that
the trade marks were not property for the purposes of the acquisitions clause,
as they were inherently susceptible to modification or extinguishment, no-
tably on public health grounds. He disagreed with this proposition, since,
17JT International SA v. Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 43 , para. 30.
18Ibid., para. 158.
19Ibid., paras. 155-157.
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inter alia, “the fact that the rights in question affect the public interest,
and have often been regulated in the public interest, does not establish that
they are not property”20. He rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that an
acquisition of property fell outside the ambit of the constitutional clause:
if the acquisition of property without compensation is no more
than a necessary consequence or incident of a restriction on a
commercial trading activity where that restriction is reasonably
necessary to prevent or reduce harm caused by that trading ac-
tivity to members of the public or public health21 .
He justified his rejection as follows:
Rights of private property would be much more at risk at the
hands of the Commonwealth Parliament. The elements of the
postulated test are so vague that it would very often be satisfied.
Yet if the test is sound, why should it not be wider? If the stated
principle is correct, why should it be limited to harm to members
of the public or to public health? Why should it not apply to
all of the worthy goals which the Commonwealth legislature has
constitutional power to further in the public interest?22
Furthermore, Justice Kiefel noted the question of whether some legislative
purposes, such as public health, may justify an infringement of the acquisi-
tions clause in the Constitution, or an exception to the application of that
clause. She compared the situation to that in the EU, where prohibitions
or restrictions on the freedom of movement of goods may be justified on the
ground of protection of health. She further noted that such prohibitions or
restrictions would be strictly interpreted by the ECJ using the criterion of
reasonable necessity (although no similar provision was present in the Aus-
tralian Constitution). However, Justice Kiefel proceeded to remark that the
20JT International SA v. Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 43 , para. 209.
21Ibid., para. 229.
22Ibid., para. 230.
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question was not relevant in the present case, which turned on the constitu-
tional definition of “acquisition”23 .
Although the court in JT International did not have to provide answers
to the questions regarding the conflict between the trade mark rights and
public health considerations, the statements above, albeit obiter, illustrate a
very real conundrum. Circumstances can arise where it may become neces-
sary to answer the wider question of how to reconcile property rights created
and operating in a regulatory environment with other, conflicting public pol-
icy (and conceivably even private) interests worthy of legal protection. The
possibility that the Australian case has raised is that, just because a right has
been labelled property in law, does not necessarily mean that its boundaries
and enforceability are guaranteed across the board, in all contexts. This is
particularly the case with rights owing their existence exclusively to statute
and whose purpose is to pursue certain regulatory goals, as implied by the
dicta of Chief Justice French quoted above. JT International illustrates the
potential limitations on intellectual property rights from the perspective of
the entitlement of exclusion, specifically the availability of compensation for
state interference. It is just as likely that similar clashes between rights
created for regulatory purposes and other interests can occur in other cir-
cumstances, where it may be necessary for the law to restrict the scope of
transfer or use of such rights.
By way of example, in the particular context of the EU ETS, based on
the logic employed in JT International, it can be argued that a permanent
retirement of emissions allowances from the market in order to tackle the
current price-depreciating surplus would not amount to expropriation. Such
an approach would send a clear signal that regulatory intervention can and
will occur in exceptional circumstances that seriously threaten the continued
viability of the emissions market. Armed with the knowledge of predictable
regulatory intervention, market participants would be able to hedge against
pricing and supply risks by structuring their contractual relationships so as
to take into account the timing and likelihood of such intervention. On the
other hand, the retirement approach enhances the authority of the EU ETS
23JT International SA v. Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 43 , paras. 342-344.
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legal framework, as it articulates a clear message that, although emissions
entitlements may have necessarily acquired certain characteristics of prop-
erty as between private parties, the fundamental nature of the instruments
remains regulatory. It is crucial for the continued viability of the EU emis-
sions market that the holders of allowances can exclude other private parties,
that allowances are freely tradable and that they are capable of being put
to the kind of commercial uses that would be expected of conventional com-
mercially valuable market instruments, namely the creation of sufficiently
protectable and enforceable security interests. At the same time, it is also
vital that the EU ETS legal framework clarifies that allowances are not en-
forceable against the issuing authority, and at the same time that allowances
will not be cancelled or confiscated at will, but only under clearly delimited
circumstances.
Post-JT International, the realisation that seemingly stable entitlements
with regulatory goals can be considerably restricted seriously undermines
the strength traditionally ascribed to property rights, due to the implied
potential subordination of property to extraneous interests which cannot be
defined ex ante, but arise on a context-by-context basis. As Gray notes,
the nature of property in a regulatory environment signals a shift from the
idea of the private right of exclusion and towards a recognition that public
interests should benefit from obligations placed on the holders of property
rights24 . In the absence of tested precedent, it is precarious to seek comfort
in the supposition that the law will take a strict view of the discretion to
interfere with property and will only give precedence to competing interests
when reasonably necessary, as in the case of freedom of movement of goods
in the EU. Moreover, as Justice Heydon warned, once the floodgates have
been opened, there may be little in the way of all sorts of interests competing
for legal protection as against property rights.
24Gray, “Regulatory Property and the Jurisprudence of Quasi-Public Trust”, at 239.
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6.3 How “instrumental” is instrumental prop-
erty?
The thesis has argued, fundamentally, that the notion of private property
as a generic concept (as viewed in legal theory) has no meaningful core in a
regulatory environment, unless it is specifically defined by the public policy
goals of the particular regime and also by the influence of other extraneous
public or private interests which the law views as deserving of protection.
One possible criticism of this assertion is that dismissing the usefulness
of the general notion of property in a regulatory context ignores the impor-
tance of the three constituent characteristics of exclusion, transfer and use
which were employed by the thesis to provide an analytical construction of
entitlements with public policy purposes. If the property rights which the
three elements constitute cannot act as helpful regulatory tools, then how
are these elements requisite or relevant at all? However, as the thesis has
demonstrated, the core elements can only be meaningfully conceptualised if
they are analysed by reference to the regulatory goals which the particular
type of entitlement under scrutiny has been created to achieve. The notion
of instrumental property emphasises that property, in order to become an
effective tool of regulation, requires more than just a theoretical composition
of exclusion, transfer and use. In other words, the precise scope and limi-
tations of these three elements are necessarily determined by the regulatory
context in which property operates. For instance, to understand why intel-
lectual property rights and emissions entitlements are freely transferable and,
conversely, why milk quotas and spectrum licences are not, it is necessary to
refer to the (public policy) purposes for which these instruments exist in the
first place.
Another criticism that may be levelled against the notion of instrumental
property articulated by the thesis is that regulatory goals are often conflict-
ing, as the particular context of the EU ETS has demonstrated. If these
goals cannot be easily reconciled with one another, how can we determine
the nature of the entitlement at stake with any precision? Moreover, if the
nature of the entitlement cannot be easily determined, what remains of the
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likelihood of achieving such goals? The thesis has argued that the existence
of multiple and potentially conflicting regulatory goals is no barrier to craft-
ing an analytical construction of the instruments created for these purposes
in a given public policy context. For example, the EU ETS seeks to maintain
a viable emissions market while at the same time attaining scientifically nec-
essary levels of emissions reductions. An analysis of emissions entitlements
as belonging to the category of instrumental property can articulate the con-
tents of emissions entitlements which best reconcile these aims with each
other, so that the EU ETS can be an environmental success. For instance,
the free transferability required for the emissions market to function is coun-
terbalanced by the retained regulatory discretion to intervene in this market
as the environmental goal requires. Together with the requisite additional
EU-level input on the scope of regulatory intervention and the private law
usability of emissions entitlements, this balancing exercise rests on acknowl-
edging the instrumental function of emissions entitlements. Specifically, they
can be defined in such a way as to facilitate the achievement of a variety of
competing (but not incompatible) public policy goals.
It may also be asked at this point how instrumental property differs from
traditionally conceptualised private property. According to the thesis, the
difference is that, in the former case, the object of property itself has to be
protected, as well as the interests of its holders. If instrumental property can
shift shape so easily according to context, how can it adequately protect its
objects? It must be emphasised that the protection afforded by instrumental
property to its objects is by no means held to be absolute. Such protection is
necessarily balanced against other relevant interests, whether internal or ex-
ternal to the specific regulatory regime under scrutiny. For instance, devising
a system of tradable instruments intended to maintain a certain composition
of the atmosphere requires the setting and calibration of caps which are sci-
entifically viable and at the same time enable regulated entities to reduce
emissions in an economically efficient manner. More widely, as the thesis has
shown, the EU ETS needs to be viewed as part and parcel of Union-wide
environmental policy, which includes a proposed transition to a low-carbon
economy. This contextualisation demands, in particular, a sufficient emis-
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sions price to incentivise green technology investment, which in turn requires
maintaining the viability of the emissions market. It is therefore not as sim-
ple as saying that emissions have to be reduced to a certain level: they need
to be reduced cost-effectively, and so as to permit market operation. This
is a prime example of the balancing exercise that instrumental property can
and must conduct in order to achieve regulatory goals.
It is impossible to predict what the future holds, but one thing is certain:
property law must learn to live with the realisation that the rights are sus-
ceptible to considerable change when they have been created and continue to
operate in a regulatory environment. Whether or not we are ready to place all
such rights (including intellectual property) in the new category put forward
by the thesis, we should at least be prepared to admit that private property
as a generic, decontextualised concept is likely to be devoid of meaning in
the regulatory state25 . For property to act as a credible tool of regulation in
any given context, its analytical construction needs to accommodate a range
of changing and conflicting goals that are deemed worthy of being furthered
for public (and potentially even private) interests.
25Gray, “Property in Thin Air”, at 50, “beyond the irreducible constraints imposed by
the idea of excludability, ‘property’ terminology is merely talk without substance”.
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